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CHAPTER 1
Dissertation Introduction
 All enduring works of political theory are provocative. To make such an assertion is 
not, however. It is a rather unremarkable statement to suggest great philosophy provokes, 
but what does this mean? By what standard can provocation as a concept be measured? 
Additionally, by what framework can its rhetorical significance, both in style and substance, 
be assessed? Provocative rhetoric has its origins in the first theoretical treatises whose 
intentions are to transform both humans and regimes.
My dissertation describes a specific terminology for the concept of provocation, and 
applies it to three theorists: Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche. These 
three have been chosen because they all come from distinct philosophical eras and 
represent contrasting views about what it means both to be human and the meaning for 
which we are here. They all employ similar language and address similar subject matters—
e.g., pity and self-control—to come to, in some instances, totally opposite conclusions 
about the true nature of humans and thus, by extension, societies and governments.
I examine the authors’ use of provocative language as a strategy for incorporating 
the concept of provocation itself into the overall philosophical program from which they 
base their theories of provocation. In other words, since, as Aristotle argues, that “rational 
desires are those which we are induced to have” (Rh 1362), Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche 
choose words that are meant to persuasively appeal to the audiences’ emotions in order to 
unlock the inner deliberate capacity for the dispositional transformation they seek from their 
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political audience. From this framework, I look at the authors not only as theorists, but also 
as strategists whose explanatory methods purposely include the language of provocation. In 
this way, the concept of provocation has multiple dimensions—one is rhetorical, the other is 
substantive. 
As a tactical measure to most persuasively articulate their respective substantive 
messages, the theorists identify and engage antagonistic interlocutors and audiences whose 
flawed natures and dispositions can be argumentatively connected to the cultural and 
political problems facing the theorists themselves as well as society at-large. But to make 
such an antithetical case that resonates is no easy task, as they are attempting a reversal of 
many deeply cherished values that have come to be culturally revered and politically 
supported. One used most often is the invocation of “God” and “other-worldliness” as a 
conduit for defending the status quo, although, for the theorists, its conventional appeal is 
an absurd—and/or disingenuous use whose rhetorical inclusion represents fear-mongering 
meant to prey on the unsuspecting in order to induce that targeted group to take some 
(in)action that perpetuates the calamitous conditions to which the theorists are reacting. The 
difficulty for the theorists lies in the attempt to use rigorous argument and theoretical 
“evidence” to combat what sinisterly-motivated, opportunistic provocateurs have been 
successful at accomplishing—inciting zealotry or inducing laziness, both of which can easily 
lead to political injustice and illegitimacy.
 As such it is important to focus on the concept of provocation in political theory. 
First, theorizing politics is, in a sense, an act of provocation, in that it is intended to incite 
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(OED). For Socrates, to act justly amounts to resisting provocation (Cr 34); Rousseau argues 
against inequality to free us from provocation; and Nietzsche views his work as the 
provocation necessary for change (EH 332).
 Thus the concept of provocation takes on many forms. To help organize the different 
dimensions and categories of provocation, I turn to a selected body of work that discusses 
the concept. I begin by introducing provocation in terms of the way in which Ludwig 
Wittgenstein presents the concept “games” within language—it is, just as different kinds of 
games share certain similarities with other ones, the concept of provocation, too, has in 
Wittgenstein’s terminology family resembles. For instance, provocation is the act of 
provoking, but to incite is similar but not the same as urging. An act of provocation that is 
meant to incite a response that amounts to war, as we see in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian 
War, where he writes, “nor are we making war against them without having received signal 
provocation” (38), differs from Aristotle’s use of provocation, where in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, his use of provocation means to urge on, stimulate a friendly audience in an effort to 
show how sound political decisions are derived.
A survey in the literature reveals an important feature that despite the different uses 
of the conceptual language of provocation, a more common theme—similar to 
Wittgenstein’s “seeing what is common” (34)—that emerges throughout the various writings 
is the relational dimension that provocation requires. For instance, in Martin Heidegger’s 
“The Question Concerning Technology” provocation serves as a conceptual tool by which 
we as humans ought to see ourselves relative to developing technology and, by extension, 
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each other. That is, “since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way 
of revealing” (6). For Heidegger, provocation becomes the mechanism for properly 
understanding the potential threat technology now poses to our existence.  The fact that 
approaching technology now bears with it a responsibility suggests, for Heidegger, a new 
way to consider the role of technology in our lives and, equally important, a reconsideration 
of humanity. Essentially, Heidegger employs provocation to help reveal to us the “truth”—
that is, it serves as a developmental resource so that it becomes possible to acquire a new 
disposition that re-orientates our world-view. For Heidegger, “technology is not demonic, 
but its essence is mysterious,” which requires an appropriate response to emerging 
technologies so to avoid, in all reality, human extinction (18). He contends that by reducing 
our perceived centrality to being, in an ontological sense. This lowering of what is now an 
undue inflated sense of self-importance is achieved through the kind of reflection 
provocation can foster, if properly channeled. Provocation thus not only helps to explain the 
essence of technology but our human condition as well. And as provocation involves the act 
of “calling forth” and “bringing” to light the possibility to see “truth” and the ability to 
discern “reality,” we are in a better position to then make better decisions about how to 
deal with and employ technology—a view that secures us from the dangers inherent in the 
ambiguity and mystery surrounding our relationship to technology.
Ultimately, Heidegger’s use of the concept of provocation is meant to serve as the 
revealing agent of truth.  Similarly, for Ralph Waldo Emerson, provocation is a means by 
which we come to possess the disposition to act as “[w]e ought” (64). Heidegger develops 
4
the concept of provocation relative to technology; Emerson does so in the context of 
spirituality. For Heidegger, an improper disposition could lead to the misuse of technology, 
whose consequences could mean the end of life, Emerson equates a wrongly disposed 
person who is susceptible to, in a sense, “near-sighted” forms of provocation as essentially a 
life that is “ridiculous” and “comic[al]” (67).  Conversely, Emerson prefers provocation to 
reveal “truth,” as he suggests: “But when the mind opens and reveals the laws which 
traverse the universe and make things what they are, then shrinks the great world at once in 
a mere illustration and fable of this mind. What am I, and What is? Asks the human spirit 
with a curiosity new-kindled, but never to be quenched.” Again, provocation is described as 
developmental guide that, for Emerson, allows one “to say—‘I love the Right: Truth is 
beautiful within and without for evermore.’” Specifically, it is intuition in conjunction with a 
proper disposition that prompts Emerson to assert: “Truly speaking, [intuition] is not 
instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul” (66). Again, overlapping 
among the treatments of the concept of provocation involves the acquisition of intellectual 
and emotional resources that allow for provocation to be of benefit to us while resisting 
another provocation – ones that, as Aristotle suggests, prevents from responding to 
(political) situations rightly (Rh). And the consequences are monumental in terms of 
transferring these skills—or lack thereof—to the political realm, in that being susceptible to 
sophistic or despotic rhetoric inhibits our ability to maximize that which is possible for us to 
experience in this life.
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 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu discusses how acts of provocation (re)produces 
the political conditions whose effects—either by persuasion or force, whether perceived or 
real – perpetuate a power structure that is to the benefit of the political provocateurs and 
the detriment of those occupying a “habitus” with little, if any, influence and power in the 
public sphere. For Bourdieu, “as perceptual dispositions tend to be adjusted to position, 
agents…tend to perceive the world as natural and to find it much more acceptable than one 
might imagine, especially when one looks at the situation of the dominated through the 
social eyes of the dominant” (1990: 130). Political provocation, for Bourdieu, involves 
battling and, in a sense, winning the “war of words” and thus proprietorship over the 
significance of words and their agreed-upon meanings, like the value of “titles” or academic 
degrees for legitimately exercising decision-making authority, which become symbolically 
powerful, and then, in that the unsuspecting “misrecognize” the symbolism for actual, 
conflate that for real power—power whose legitimacy would otherwise be awarded without 
any attachment to bloodline or college level attained. The effect is one that has changed 
the way of making the world, thus reproducing, for Bourdieu, unjust power relations (1990: 
137).  Provocation’s power is one of accepted “utterance” (1991: 170)—that is, provocation, 
like for Heidegger and Emerson, remains a resource, but in Bourdieu’s treatment, one not to 
induce change for the better but to perpetuate hierarchal class structure.  
 Again, theorizing politics—at least for Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche—is an act of 
provocation, in that it is meant to undermine and challenge the prevailing order.  And their 
theories are acts of provocation that also employ rhetorical provocation to substantiate their 
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theoretical claims—that is, the three chosen theorists utilize a language intended to initiate 
or incite or induce a change from the status quo, one comparable to Emerson’s notion of 
provocation. But the three theorists—like Bourdieu’s political actors—are engaged in a 
linguistic battle in which the limits of language create problems, particularly interpretative 
ones. Richard Rorty, I argue, effectively shows the kinds of problems language poses for 
theorists such as Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche. In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, and 
Solidarity, Rorty argues that a metaphysician like Plato, who is in part reacting against the 
democrats who executed Socrates, ultimately fails in his project, given its proposed 
universal applicability, as evidenced by Plato’s own abandonment of the theory of the Forms 
(Kraut 1997). Plato seeks to rely upon a language—that is, language as a medium to 
communicate substantive ideas—that turns out to be insufficient for adequately and thereby 
successfully present and describe the philosophical doctrine(s) he wishes to advocate for 
(Rorty 75), which, according to Vlastos, creates for Plato his “metaphysical paradox” (Vlastos 
1997). But, according to Rorty, for an “ironist” such as Nietzsche, “there is no such thing as a 
‘natural’ order of justifications between logic and rhetoric,” which, in turn, provide some 
insight as to why Nietzsche more readily recognizes the limits of his methodological 
resources (although that is not to say I am suggesting Nietzsche is without a definite theory, 
as I will discuss at length later—he just admits there is no failsafe way to insure its delivery as 
he truly intends).
My analysis of the theorists’ intentions and the different interpretive tools to most 
accurately assess their motives for putting forth such provocative claims, which cannot 
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always be definitively known, and is an essential feature for why I identify these three to be 
among the most provocative theorists. The inconclusively of their theoretical postulates thus 
provides ample ground for wide-ranging and often times conflicting interpretations of their 
philosophies. To help synthesize varying and competing interpretive views, I incorporate a 
number of scholarly experts in the field of political theory throughout my treatment of the 
three major theorists I have chosen as exemplars of being provocative. And to take the 
interpretive analysis one step further, the concept of provocation extends to the scholarly 
field, in that one can use the vast bodies of work Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche have left 
behind to, and perhaps intentionally, make provocative arguments themselves. I address 
some of the ways in which, as well as the opportunities for and likelihood of, different 
readers use—and have used—these three theorists for pursuing and furthering their own 
theoretical agendas for, say, publication and career advancement (Melzer 2007), although 
we ought to be cautious in such an assessment unless formidable evidence exists. That said, 
it is safe to say that Nazi scholars such as Baumler usurped Nietzsche for an evil program 
with no regard for honesty or truth (Kauffman).
 With such context in mind, I now outline for how I layout the dissertation. Chapter 2 
begins by defining the concept of provocation and tracing some of the etymological 
development of the connotations associated with provocation, most importantly the ones 
relating to the sphere of politics. First, provocation necessitates a relational dynamic 
between some subject and object: provocation, as some phenomenon, cannot occur in a 
vacuum—the event requires a provocateur to introduce upon a provokable subject 
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something that creates a reaction. That said, I elaborate on the fact that a provocative act 
does not inherently suggest intentionality. Provocation can be incidental, although it is most 
commonly taken as deliberate, which introduces into the analysis the element of 
interpretation. Provocation is conceptually amoral, and can be used for either positive or 
negative purposes, but similar to it taking on a deliberative connotation, it has evolved into 
a concept viewed with sinister motivation for its, as defined by those interpreters with the 
influence and power that get to determine moral intent. Not surprisingly then, provocation
—and specifically political provocation—challenges the legitimacy of the conventional status 
quo. It is deemed as threatening and thus defined as “wrong.” But for the political 
provocateurs who like Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche, “right” and “wrong” as socially 
accepted definitions have been inverted, thus consequently giving rise to their theoretical 
projects which include strategies to contextualize political concepts—ones like “justice” and 
“legitimacy”—from an alternative perspective where an internal change in personal 
disposition and then an external orientation in the political culture will produce new—and 
superior—definitional meanings for the ways in which justice is recognized and applied.
 Chapter 2 also makes the argument as to why Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche make 
such interesting cases studies, in that conducting a systematic study of the various kinds of 
provocation in theorizing politics is a relevant and consequential endeavor. The goal is that, 
in placing special emphasis on the language of provocation, we not only as readers of 
political theory but also as members of civil society, whose structures have taken shape 
partly as a result of theorizing political formations, will be able to separate harmful 
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provocative rhetoric from beneficial ideas. Doing so will equip citizens with the necessary 
analytic tools to recognize what might be called “dangerous” theories, specifically those 
with the intent to arouse the worst appetites within people for the benefit of the articulator. 
The theorists all elaborate on protecting their preferred political groups from some 
tyrannical ambition, whether it is the democratic mob who, for Plato, put Socrates to death 
or the political opportunists who prevented Rousseau from fulfilling either his obligations as 
a citizen or his solitary dream as a man. In the latter, Rousseau criticizes governments—
namely, corrupt and decadent monarchies of his day—that have exacerbated “extreme 
inequalities” (DOI 42), which, in the name of some perverse notion of “duty”, force—rather 
than, say, compel—people to become unnecessarily and illegitimately dependent on others 
whose relational asymmetry produces personal disunity and public discord. Rousseau’s 
political solution theorizes how to best accommodate inevitable societal restraints with 
natural inclinations for independence.
 For each of the theorists, I examine the interpretive reception of their theoretical 
proposals in terms of the rhetorical choices that underlie the philosophies themselves. For 
instance, when certain discussions take the form of ad hominem arguments, I consider to 
the extent, if any, the intensity of tone becomes a distraction from the merits of the 
argument, and whether the strategy for taking such a chord prevented the substantive 
message from reaching a larger audience, in that the targeted audience representing the 
theorists’ antagonist could not move beyond the personal vitriol the theorists feel for them, 
e.g., Nietzsche’s “European and American species of libres penseurs. I am much more 
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profoundly at odds with them, as incorrigible blockheads and buffoons” (EH 275). Also 
important to the success of theoretical assumptions is whether or not the audiences have 
been persuaded to take action—that is, whether or not those who have acted on behalf of 
the theorists’ provocation did so while remaining true to the theorists’ intentions, or whether 
the action taken was inconsistent—willfully or not—with the theorists’ intent. Such a 
discussion also necessarily considers the role ambiguously articulated theories as well as 
imprecise or vague language—compounded by interpretive problems inherent in translating 
texts—have on interpreting the theorists’ “true” meaning(s) of their work. Plato, Rousseau 
and Nietzsche’s “real” theories of politics are among the most highly disputed—and thus 
contributing to them and their writings as among the most highly provocative. I maintain 
that a dissertation like this is important for providing a framework for evaluating the kinds of 
rhetoric used to supplement arguments—in which are provocations themselves—for 
different ideological regimes, ones in which the theorists‘ would have endorsed themselves
—perhaps, that is, in that they have in large measure lost the ability to control their own 
narrative. 
 In Chapter 3, I detail the specific types of provocation and the degrees to which 
these types of provocation induce reactions, as located in the primary—and secondary—
texts.  The concept of provocation will be divided into four dimensions, which serve as the 
basis from which I approach the analysis of each theorist’s works. They are: (1) the 
provocateur, or theorist and/or his protagonist, being of a particular nature, who provokes; 
(2) the provokable, or theorist’s interlocutor and/or his antagonist, possessing a particular 
11
disposition, which makes him susceptible to being provoked; (3) provocation whose 
response is mirth-provoking—that is, laughable or absurd; and (4) the provocation whose 
response induces irritation and/or anger, up to and including retaliation and execution. 
I discuss the first dimension of provocation relative to a second dimension of 
provocation, which evaluates the type of response induced and the degree of intensity to 
which the person provoked responds, specifically with respect to how the theorists’ 
interlocutors and/or textual examples are either (pre)disposed to use provocation or likely 
prone to succumb to advancements of provocation. Based on the dynamics of particular 
relations based on provocation—the act itself coupled with the interpretation for which it 
was done—the second dimension links back to the first dimension a range of corresponding 
reactions, ranging from comic laughter (if considered counter-intuitive but harmless) to 
annoying (if deemed abstractly unnerving) and up to retaliatory anger (if assessed literally 
anarchical).
Building into that dimensional approach to analyzing the provocation of the theorists 
and their works, the second section of Chapter 3 incorporates into my methodological 
framework six ways in which the dimensions of provocation are illustrated throughout the 
three’s systems’ for which they have sufficiently shown the validity of their criticisms as well 
as the logical rigidity of their substantive arguments. All three theorists, in some form, react 
to, confront and then use provocation in the attempt to construct a historical and cultural 
narrative by which to induce personal and social change and then political reform. They are 
identified as six categories—or thematic narratives—that provide the illustrative platform to 
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contrast themselves and/or their protagonist with their negative-interlocutor and/or 
antagonist. Overall, these six that I have located in their writings provide examples, both 
textually and contextually, of how the rhetoric captures the essence of what they mean their 
theories to convey. That by drawing sharp, poignant contrasts—contrasts that links outdated 
notions about important philosophical concepts to their interlocutors—between the rightly 
and wrongly provokable type of person, the theorists can present the most forceful 
argument to not only win this struggle over the proprietorship of what the true meanings 
and definitions of politically important terms are but moreover to provoke positive change in 
the lives of the segment of their audience that they view as capable of positive change. The 
following are short, specific examples of each.
The first proposal by which they separate themselves is a criticism for caring about 
what other people think. The theorists point out that it is both wrong and counterproductive 
to attempt to gain good social standing in a society corrupted by the kinds of people whom 
respect is wanted.
 The second one is more of a subtle attack that implies a contrast between their 
intent and their message. Here, they represent the vessels by which their philosophies 
appear, yet they describe themselves as ironic, light-hearted, and capable of accepting their 
own futility. This latter is a freeing exercise. The second one employs a rhetorical tactic that 
seemingly pokes fun at themselves, and—when they, and all of them do, use this kind of 
language, they are luring their interlocutor or intended audience into likewise believing the 
theorists are merely average. To go deeper, this is just one more way in which they are 
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inverting traditionally held meanings. One of the strands that permeate throughout all six of 
these criticisms draws a distinction between the theorists’ natures and those whose 
dispositions they are criticizing. The theorists seem to be embracing their shortcomings—
some through their self-deprecating humor, others through their light-heartedness, both of 
which are attitudes not typically held by those admired. However, for the six, this lifts 
burdens carried by others unnecessarily.
 The third way in which they separate themselves pivots from the second, in that they 
depict themselves as advantaged in terms of being free or more natural. The third shows 
them to be transcendent as they do not hold grudges and cannot be bothered with what 
others make ordeals about which they view as sheer pettiness. Their pursuits are more 
philosophic, in part, because they are not distracted with base desires that control most 
people. They are able to accomplish such great feats—while still recognizing their limitations
—and live an existence that is preferable to that of their interlocutors because, unlike them, 
the theorists do not misinterpret—or “misrecognize”—their standing and place. 
 Fourth, the theorists attempt to show that those whom they are critiquing have failed 
to grasp a proper sense of the state of their human condition or their role within the 
universe. This carries a religious connotation. They deceive themselves and overestimate 
their meaningfulness and centrality with respect to some eternity, as evidenced by the way 
in which they invoke and appeal to a higher authority and believe themselves to be justified 
in speaking on behalf of God (although for Socrates this is inverted, but to the same effect). 
Their contrast is an effort to discredit their own sense of virtue, which is contradicted by their 
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actions. By undermining their assertions, they point out how, in fact, their interlocutors or 
antagonists either fail to live according to what they purport. Their continual undermining of 
them and exposing their deficiencies via the examples they use, the theorists’ use of 
provocative rhetoric, as supported by evidence, add further support by the contrasts they 
offer. 
 The fifth is similar to the fourth. The theorists expose their targeted group for their 
exaggerated and inflated claims about intelligibility and insightfulness and rigor, which are 
but fraudulent and misguided to justify their leadership or success or fame, when in reality it 
is just them having duped at best an unsuspecting and naive group of people and at worst a 
dumb and base mob.
 The sixth and last form I identify culminates in the theorists’ social criticism by 
contrasting themselves not with specific kinds of people but with the time they share with 
their contemporaries. They suggest they are from another time, at some points from the 
past, before descending into the vulgarity of the present, at other points from the future, 
available to the theorists who have left their times behind for some imagined improvement 
over their day. This always brings them to assess the deterioration of their society more 
objectively and with greater perceptibility as they have not been tricked into believing the 
rationalizations for justifying what is really the prevailing illegitimate ruling structure. If the 
conventional mode of thought embraces progress they nostalgically recount a better point 
in history, although disagreeing sharply about which points. Some reference points are 
hypothetical, others eternal or beyond this life.
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 In the third and final section of Chapter 3, I give a general overview for the way in 
which their theoretical projects develop as they are analyzed through the prism of 
provocation. I describe the set of circumstances to which the respective theorists are 
reacting. The theorists argue that they are the ones provoked, who then take to writing to 
present alternative theories that sufficiently counter the conventionally accepted views of 
society in terms of legitimacy and justice with a response equal in rhetorical force to the 
level of which the theorists see the pervasiveness of social corruption. Their theories 
represent a rejection of their contemporaries’ rationalization and legitimization of accepted 
cultural and social norms, and which the politics continues to reproduce and reinforce—that 
is, all three theorists introduce an individual or a group who embodies the personal flaws 
that created and continue to reproduce, as they understand it, the societal conditions which 
ought to be recognized as degradation and thus a state of affairs that run counter to a 
(more) natural human state. To that end, the theorists’ intentions for using provocative 
rhetoric are viewed as a means not only to frame the relevant philosophical problems, but to 
provide a sound methodological explanation—that is, urging people to pursue a truer, more 
natural life, as opposed to continuing to fall victim to sophistic types of provocation 
responsible for the condition in which their respective societies find themselves, which 
introduce into the analysis the criterion by which the theorists and their texts get 
interpreted. In each case, I find their eventual argument, which is, in part, an attempt to take 
traditionally held concepts and views, and reinterpret them to have the inverse meanings of 
these terms become accepted. 
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 The overarching goal of the theorists is to, essentially, win this rhetorical debate and, 
in believing to have successfully (re)claimed proprietorship over the rightful usages of 
important terms—ones like, “naturally” and “rightly” (e.g., what it means to be rightly 
disposed, which then implies a temperament that can properly discern between what is and 
is not “natural”). They then begin to offer an alternative conception of human nature, a 
logical necessity before which any political proposals would be interpreted as just, so they 
contend—that is, the theorists intend model a political regime to mirror humans most 
naturally and correct for acquired contradictory inclinations that manifest into anti-social 
attitudes and behaviors. 
 After introducing the concept of provocation and constructing my methodological 
framework in which I attempt to explain the provocation in Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche, I 
apply Chapters 2 and 3’s analyses to the individual theorists themselves, beginning with the 
historical Socrates, in that I have positioned him as—in terms of the Western philosophical 
tradition—the original political provocateur. In Chapter 4, I go on to discuss how Plato, in 
the dialogues of the Apology, Crito, Phaedo and Charmides, introduces us to thinking about 
concepts in a particular way—e.g., attitudes toward this life and the next as well as 
definitions like “temperance” and “wisdom”—whose reconceptualization in the works 
presented prior to the Republic work to further the justification for those proposals made in 
the Republic.
 I start to frame the discussion by referencing end notes made by Allan Bloom in his 
translation of the Republic. First, Bloom discusses how “all uses of the word apology in the 
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Republic refer to this event” (R 97, FN 1). This note clarifies how the word apology is used in 
reference to the “event” of Socrates’ trial in which he must defend himself against the 
allegations of corrupting the youth and not believing in the gods. I intend to show that Plato 
is a strategist and that Socrates is a strategic character whose provocation is systematically 
captured and fit into the works to make the most forceful argument, both substantively and 
organizationally.
 The second endnote sets the stage for the substantive narrative. Bloom notes, “This 
is part of the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (R 136, FN 15), in which “Socrates 
is turning the ridicule not only on comedy but on poetry as well,” thus supporting Plato’s 
wishes to take important concepts and invert their meanings (R 136). For Plato to eventually 
make the case for the ideal city, he must first show the deficiencies of the actual city, and he 
can only do this by demonstrating the flawed way in which its people live personally. This is 
why he must expose their flaws by delegitimating traditionally held social and cultural norms
and thereby making legitimate their ideas about the associated concepts they have come to 
justify.
 Socrates does this by engaging in the dialectic exchanges where he reels them in to 
eventually show them of their own ignorance. Once deflated, Plato shows that the 
interlocutors must now reckon with Socrates’ seriousness. This is not to suggest that Plato is 
misappropriating the historical Socrates; Plato does, however, structure his positive 
philosophical argument in a particular fashion—framing the written Dialogues that 
continually builds concept by concept toward the a political structure consistent with the 
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theory of the Form. For instance, when Adeimantus, one of Socrates’ interlocutors, pushes 
back, demanding, “What would your apology be [for] hardly making these these men 
happy?” (R 97). Plato uses Adeimantus’ rhetorical complaint here to further the process of 
laying out the merits of Plato’s proposal to engage in the pursuit of the Ideal, first privately 
and then publicly.
 Chapter 5 begins by describing Plato’s incorporation of the literary character, 
Socrates, who as a rhetorical figure in the Dialogues, is used for the credible vehicle by 
which to deliver his prescription for why one should live the philosophical life, and how one 
would go about leading such a life. This chapter builds off the previous by putting those 
ideas concerning the best life—one of philosophy—found in the earlier Dialogues to work in 
the Republic. Plato employs his multi-faceted strategy—employing the credible Socrates, 
committing to and being capable of living philosophically, which is in contrast to what is 
prevalent, using provocative rhetoric to invert concepts’ meanings in order to win the 
struggle over what is deemed “true,” in the effort to discredit the current city and thereby 
propose a new political state, one where philosopher kings rule. In terms of method, Bloom 
comments, “those who play, say you’ll tell me this too” (R 254). Part of the strategy is to 
construct the dynamic of the conversation by asking questions that get the anticipated 
answer to continue directing the progression of the argument. In terms of style, Bloom 
maintains, “Socrates uses ambiguous sentences” (R 164).  This note not only reinforces the 
strategy to use the interlocutor as a means for furthering the argument, but it also 
underlines how ambiguity as a stylistic choice allows for the flexibility to maneuver and 
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constantly adapt to the fluidity that comes with these rhetorical exchanges when trying to 
push the conversation in a certain direction—one that culminates in successfully persuading 
the many to cede power to the philosophical few. Therefore, according to Plato, as 
argument is the tool of philosophy and there is nothing worse than developing a distaste for 
argument, Plato attempts to make resonate the political scenario, where contrary to the 
current system, legitimate political authority comes from philosophical rule.
 Protest is not only expected but needed for this theoretical strategy to succeed in its 
purpose. Although seemingly antagonistic at first, the provocation is meant for positive 
change. It is to their benefit, and Plato casts Glaucon to play the role of interlocutor who is 
ultimately willing to be persuaded. The purpose of this exercise is to transform people in 
order to create laws which are not in accordance with nature but are also possible—a sharp 
contrast from what ordinary men who resist these teachings do, i.e., put to death the very 
men who they should put in charge, e.g., Socrates.
 In spite of the rhetoric having such negative consequences in real-life for the 
historical Socrates, it provides, especially in the Republic, the theoretical framework to 
challenge poetry and make the case for censuring the poets, one reason being to ensure 
the kind of upbringing in which children do not develop an emotional disposition that is 
susceptible to provocation, the implications of which weaken the city’s resolve. Hence, Plato 
wishes his city not to respond to suffering with overt expressions of emotion.
 Chapter 6 develops Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose theoretical arc culminates in On 
the Social Contract. Unlike Plato who opposes democracy, Rousseau uses his rhetoric to 
20
support a political system whose legitimacy rests on popular sovereignty via contractual 
consent. They both, however, use rhetoric that deals with democracy in that it is a discussion 
that occurs because of an earlier one about the nature of human beings and what system is 
most conducive to people’s (more) natural state, specifically with respect to what they are 
capable of handling in terms of governance, e.g., participation in the decision-making 
process.
 Despite Plato and Rousseau’s worlds being fundamentally different, they address 
those issues that they are reacting to with similarly provocative rhetoric, while couching the 
rhetorical language and the argument in utopian (or dystopian) discourse. Dealing with 
man’s susceptibility to political provocation spans all of the selected theorists’ rhetoric, 
although Rousseau rejects Socrates and Plato’s rationalism, allowing, rather, for emotion to 
help guide man’s behavior.  For Rousseau, to properly understand human development, he 
points to man’s sympathetic nature to account for human preservation, not solely rationality, 
which, as he argues, “isolates” man from one another (DOI 54).
 However, this emotion, “rightly” understood in the Aristotelean sense of the term, 
facilitates the necessary compassion to which humans owe their existence (Rh 1422). On the 
other hand, this emotion rejects the Hobbesian conception of man as the target. Much of 
the beginning of his theory supports the framework from which I am working—that is, 
Rousseau like the others, theorizes to counter some explanation for how man has been 
constructed by some other, inferior conception—something in which he also engages—in 
order to argue for some disagreeable individual state and social order.
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 Plato intends to set up a system that censures: such indoctrination prevents the kind 
of disposition from emerging in children, one that pities the suffering, as it would leave the 
state vulnerable. This vulnerable disposition is why Plato wishes to denounce the poets like 
Homer, whose two-fold effects comprise flipping Socrates from comedic to serious and 
breeds a type of person conducive to the maintenance of a legitimate and just political 
scheme.
 Rousseau argues, however, that such vulnerability binds us as humans. He traces it 
back to the state of nature and then pinpoints the beginning of inequality in order to 
account for how current institutions have become corrupt. This corruption is reinforced by 
disparities among citizens because of what society has come to value culturally, i.e., vices 
masquerading as virtues (DSA 16). These differences ought not to be given attention, nor do 
they warrant merit. For example, possessing the ability to draw attention to oneself should 
not demand attention from others and it is not necessarily admirable. He advocates for a 
reversal of that which motivates us—more substantive and virtuous pursuits, such as material 
simplicity. He does so through a systematic criticism of what drives contemporary human 
behavior, placing its origins when people began to become increasingly idle and gathering 
around to do nothing more than share in one another’s company. Underlying this, Bloom 
notes in Book 3 of the Republic where he comments how  Renaissance thinking credited the 
dissemination of knowledge as leading to decent regimes (where before it was merely 
coincidental).
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 However, despite others in hindsight—e.g., J.L. Talmon—who blame Rousseau for 
giving rise to revolutionary totalitarianism, Rousseau, although provocatively pessimistic, is a 
critic of contemporary notions about the link between knowledge and progress, which is in 
part how I approach the rhetoric he employs in order to compel people to rethink any sense 
of superiority desired to feel when comparing themselves to others, including the less 
civilized savages, a group whom he often not only defends but praises, if only to further 
slight bourgeois society. Rousseau uses the language of duty and virtue to expose the lack 
of virtue and their fleeting sense of duty to others, as evidenced by the institutions that are 
responsible for educating children. This is the heart of his challenge—and it works: Rousseau 
manages to frustrate and provoke the reactions of bourgeois societies in a host of countries. 
His goal, at least at the end in terms of his contrarian nature, finishes as a political treatise 
that remains consistent to his examination found in his previous Discourses, if not found in 
his personal life and the behavior he demonstrates, all of which run contrary to the practices 
of his day—e.g., remaining in “good social standing” being a primary one, something he 
admonishes but admits succumbing to the same temptations throughout much of his life. I 
call attention to this not to try to reconcile these but to merely show how they contribute to 
his provocative nature and his provocative style and method, which are used to put forth the 
most credible case for his theoretical analysis and his political recommendations. Part of his 
provocative style consistently goads and dares his reader to challenge his postulates and 
assumptions, which are true and consistent with nature and allowable by God in order to 
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almost make the assertion that it is irrefutable, both in terms of the arrangement of the 
argument and the substantive argument itself.
 Another characteristic relevant here is the rhetoric that captures his outrage at those 
who might challenge him, sometimes prefacing potential reactions with what appears to be 
a manufactured outrage. This indignation becomes a tactical threat of rhetorical provocation 
for Rousseau, in that might serve others well to tread cautiously or think twice before 
doubting the merits of his analysis. Thus, this examination deals with Rousseau as a theorist, 
who puts forward a theory that also contextually incorporates his provocative personality as 
a tactical resource in order to convey the most forceful argument possible. Interestingly, 
however, doing so introduces another connotation of provocation: Rousseau’s conduct often 
seems to contradict the theoretical postulates that so passionately fill his pages. For 
example, Rousseau gives us Emile, his treaty on education, after abandoning his own 
children, rationalizing his decision because they would be better of receiving an education 
from the state (C 333).
 Chapter 7 locates the provocation of Friedrich Nietzsche. He is less political than 
Plato and Rousseau, yet his philosophy is, in many ways, a critical response to their political 
theories. Also important is while not overtly political, part of the deployment of provocation 
can be usurped for political goals. Nietzsche, like the previous selected theorists, feels 
provoked—only he is provoked to a significant degree by them. He responds to them in 
various ways when analyzing and explaining the consequences of Plato in terms of the real-
world repercussions of having been exposed to Plato’s philosophical rationalism. Nietzsche 
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also attacks philosophers, like Hegel and Kant, from the position that they, unlike Nietzsche, 
harbor ulterior motives and use substandard methods to achieve fame as opposed to 
uncover (lower case-t) truth. Nietzsche’s attack also has a religious angle, referring to 
Platonism as Christianity for the masses (BGE), which reflects his contempt for a third group, 
proponents of democracy and equality, likened to, as I put it, politically religious Kantians.
 Therefore, he hates Rousseau for these very reasons. For Nietzsche, Rousseau’s 
vanity and idealism are addressed in the harsh rhetoric that Nietzsche uses to describe both 
groups as what is now referred to as “Nietzschean types” (Thomas). It is meant to frame the 
attack on the actual principles to which this philosophical and religious type purport tpo 
adhere and subscribe—one being democratic compassion, for instance. These are all 
unnatural and against man’s first instincts, and which his challenge is meant to undermine so 
that he can reintroduce for consideration politically relevant terms, as he sees them—one 
like aristocratic nobility. Nietzsche believes he can discredit the belief system by exposing 
the hypocrisies of religious socialists by contrasting what they say with how they actually  live 
(the reason for proclaiming the death of God), all of which as I contend, is part of what 
Nietzsche intends his re-revaluation to accomplish. He can then show how terms’ meanings 
should be redefined back to their original and correct way, in contrast to the inverted 
conceptions prevailing throughout the society to which Nietzsche, on his terms, 
unfortunately belongs. Who he is talking about is not just German or even European culture 
but mankind in-general since Socrates, with which Plato, Socrates’ documenter, has  saddled 
us—that is, the despicable condition we find ourselves in misguidedly clamoring for ascetic 
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idealism. Nietzsche is a critic of modernity and contemporary “man,” where his Zarathustra 
becomes the embodiment of the alternative—one who does not merely cope with the 
harshness of reality but, more so, frees himself from the psychological shackles with which 
cultural over-pitying and unrestrained suffering have enchained us and thus giving birth to 
his last man, a fearful and pathetic nihilist.
 Nietzsche’s rigor and skepticism combat these by offering an alternative and 
providing the relief that comes from perspectivism via experimentalization. He wants others 
to be forced to confront their contradictions and hypocrisies through his rhetoric. And as 
Rousseau attempts to trace inequality back to egocentric tendencies and as Plato attempts 
to change attitudes about Socrates in terms of being serious, Nietzsche attempts to undo 
their work by attacking their very philosophical cores, as their lives are the conduits from 
which their theoretical analyses flow. His forceful rhetoric—including the language of 
“war”—is meant to penetrate the indoctrination of more than two millennia rationalism and 
idealism. Nietzsche is not concerned with converting all whom his writings reach, for he sees 
no hope for change in the irrational descendants of Socrates. This sense of pessimism 
contributes to his disdain for “modern men” who falsely rationalize some self-importance by 
participating in the self-congratulatory conversation regarding other-worldly rewards while 
continuing to descend into further and further states of mediocrity.
 Rather, Nietzsche wishes to speak directly to those noble spirits who, by penetrating 
his aphoristic style, are rewarded with the space ward of the bad conscience and realize 
their potential. These types are made aware of how the creation of the bad conscience 
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came into existence as a man-made invention, although has managed to infect the political 
culture with notions that privilege intention over consequence, suffering over sublimation 
and justice over power. Nietzsche feels it is necessary to engage in such ad hominem 
arguments because doing so is the only way to express the dire condition from which the 
artists must break free. He wants the idea of eternal recurrence not to be a hellish one, as it 
is such for the common man who wants “heirs” and to believe that God is still alive, despite 
having been killed by the same people who unjustifiably demand right after right in “His” 
name and on “His” authority (Z 322).
 I conclude the dissertation with Chapter 8, which begins with a summary of the 
power struggle over the relational and perceptual dimensions of provocation. The actors 
engaged in a relationship based on and furthered by provocation make strategic appeals to 
various audiences to justify a continuation of acts of provocation or prevent more from 
happening, often using mechanisms of existing power to that end, like the Athenian jurors 
did in the case of Socrates’ trial found him guilty of corrupting the youth and sentenced him 
to death. I then review how returning acts of provocation between two or more actors can 
escalate quickly in that the respective sides either never trusted the other’s motives or at 
some point lost trust in one another, at which point interpreted provocative acts to be 
deliberate and sinister. And given the advancement in technological warfare, the opposing 
sides turn to the world-audience to try to convince other nations of a characterization of the 
provocative relationship whose narrative draws support for that particular depiction and 
condemnation for the competing version. 
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 For specificity, I cite two contemporary examples, one international and the other 
domestic. The first discusses the provocative relationship between the United States and 
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” Using my model I trace the progression of 
provocation between the U.S. and Iraq, which culminated in the second Iraq war and the 
death of Saddam Hussein. I also include the evolving cases of Iran and North Korea, asking 
if the recent adversarial relationship with Iran can turn into a friendlier one as well as 
considering the increasingly seriousness with which the U.S. approaches North Korean acts 
of provocations. The second scenario I evaluate is former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, 
who is embattled in a struggle with his fellow Americans and the Government over whether 
or not—based on what is the original act of provocation, the surveillance program or the 
leaking of classified documents—he is a traitor or civil libertarian champion. I conclude the 
discussion by briefly tying Snowden back to the theorists as provocation continues—both in 
positive and negative forms—in a world very different than Socrates’, as liberal democracy, 
as I contend, has won the argument.
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CHAPTER 2
Conceptualizing Provocation
Introduction: Definition1 and Etymology2 of the Conceptual Language of Provocation
 I began my dissertation with the following assertion: all enduring works of political 
theory are provocative. It was at that point I asked, “What does it mean to be provocative—
and to use provocation, both stylistically and substantively?” The OED includes in the 
multiple definitions of provocative as “inciting, giving rise to a specific state or condition.” 
Further, the English word comes from the Latin word provocativus, which means “having the 
quality of provoking [or] having the quality of calling forth.” As such, provocation requires a 
subject and an object. Provocation cannot occur in isolation, nor can one be provocative in a 
vacuum. To be provocative inherently requires engagement between at least two entities: a 
subject, or provoker (hereafter referred to as provocateur), and an object, or that which is 
provoked, whose nature—or temperament—is provokable. The French word provocateur, 
which is the most commonly used term to identify the initiator of the original provocation 
that is used in English, shares with the English usages their Latin origins, but the Latin form 
has a Greek predecessor. The Greek word paroxunein means “to goad [or] to render acute.” 
Another form of the conceptual language in Greek is paroxuno, which means “to [literally] 
sharpen [or] to [figuratively] incite,” as in how one might “sharpen” one’s mind or incite to 
“action,” respectfully. Similar to the various Latin forms that share the prefix provo-, the 
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1 All definitional reference come from the Oxford English Dictionary (OED): www.oed.com.
2 All etymological references come from Tufts University’s Perseus Digital Library (PDL): 
www.perseus.tufts.edu.
Greek words—here, paroxumein and paroxuno—share the prefix paro-. Paro-  means 
“beside [or] near,” which further underscores the point that provocation is relational in 
nature (PDL).
 Another feature of the concept provocation in definitional terms has to do with 
intentionality. The OED states that in addition to “giving rise to a specific state or 
condition,” provocation, in general, “caus[es] anger or another strong reaction, esp[ecially] 
deliberately.” As such, provocation can either be deliberate or incidental. It tends, however, 
to denote that the provocateur has identified an object to use the provocation against—or 
even for, as will be shown. However, in terms of intentionality—that is, whether it was 
necessarily meant—provocation makes references to the various origins of that initial 
provocative act. For instance, some activity whose “abstract properties in the external 
world”—e.g., natural occurring phenomena—can take the form of an act of provocation, as 
experienced by an observer and thus potentially be perceived by that observer as a 
provocative active.  In turn, the observer  is made to conclude that he is no longer just an 
observer but the recipient. As provocation is relational—although not always intentional—
much of how that initial act of provocation is interpreted by the object, whether real or 
merely perceived, further emphasizes the fact that the object’s nature or temperament plays 
an important role in how one perceives motive and thus processes meaning. For instance, a 
religious person may interpret a natural occurring event—e.g., an earthquake, tornado or 
drought—as a deliberate provocation to alter the course of previous patterns of behaviors, 
usually ones considered by that religious person as immoral. Although an important note—
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that is, this notion of perceived versus real intentionality as provocations whose origins are 
defined as “abstract properties in the external world”—in that it comes up in the theoretical 
writings of Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche; most provocations, especially those not 
associated with the external world but with the mind and in society, are deliberate in nature.
 Now that I have noted that provocation is not only relational, in that it requires a 
subject to engage an object, who—because of that object’s susceptibility to being provoked
—responds to some initial act of provocation. In addition, similar to the fact that provocation 
generally assumes some level of intentionality, to be provocative—and notice the actual 
characterization of the definition—means to “caus[e] anger or another strong reaction.” The 
concept of provocation, which intrinsically requires an object to interpret the act as 
provocative in some form—which, in turn, is generally determined by the contextual make-
up of the nature, temperament or disposition of the object provoked—tends to induce 
anger in the object. This is a historical accident in the etymological sense. Provocation was 
not always more closely associated with a negative response. As such, provocation is 
inherently ambivalent in ethical or moral terms. In fact, another definition of the term 
provocative, as listed in the OED states, is one that is meant to be used as “an incentive [or] 
stimulus.” Just as provocation is a concept whose connotation has taken on a decidedly 
negative tone, its origins can be traced back at least to Plato’s Fourth Epistle where, in 
Greek, the term paroxusmos, which is used, in effect, to mean stimulating to do good. In 
other words, despite the etymological evolution of provocation, or to be provocative, to 
presumptively—or by default—refer to an act or behavior associated with some sinister 
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motive that is deemed threatening or challenging, the term’s origins include acts of 
provocation to be taken as positive, as well, thus making provocation, at least inherently, 
morally ambivalent and ethically neutral.
 In light of the fact that the conceptual language of provocation includes, among 
others, the above observations which include the following: (1) the object or recipient’s 
temperament or disposition, which generally determines the interpretive response; (2) the 
response as one predominantly marked by anger, thus implying that the original act of 
provocation as sinister and seditious, at worst, or threatening and challenging, at best; and 
(3) the actual motive or intent for using provocation as not necessarily antagonistic or 
immoral in nature—or even neutral, for that matter—but meant for positive and productive 
ends. With these points in mind, provocation involves two additional considerations, both of 
which entail this relational feature of the concept.  First,  provocation is generally accepted 
as threatening suggesting that the status quo—that is, in political terms, the overarching 
governing structure is commonly perceived as legitimate and exercises of power as just—
puts at odds the provocateur with the prevailing thought of his or her contemporaries. That 
is, there is fundamental disagreement over the true—or truer—meanings of what terms like 
“justice” and “legitimacy” entail and how they manifest themselves socially and culturally. 
As to the second point, one very important reason for such disagreement over the “proper” 
or “rightful” conceptions of justice and legitimacy is the degree to which they differ in their 
natures and temperaments, which, from the provocateur’s point of view, only reinforce why 
the acts—which are provocation for positive ends—can seem so undermining to the current 
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political scheme. For the provocateur, it is necessary—even a moral (or “immoral,” for 
Nietzsche) endeavor—to engage in this struggle to wrestle away (and, in some cases, back) 
from those who hold proprietorship over the meaning of what amounts to just acts and 
legitimate exercises of power. 
 As I have attempted to establish, provocations—in terms of linguistically describing 
them as activities—can appear as abstractions in the world, although my dissertation will 
address the alternative ways such provocative acts are dealt with, such as the way in which 
these activities are referred to relative to the mind. Related to these alternative ways, I 
discuss provocation mostly with respect to its use as intentional—that is, as a manifestation 
of the external world into which one injects himself—e.g., Socrates—into the storyline of 
some phenomena occurring externally or beyond human (or animal) interactions or relations. 
It is in such terms wherein one uses provocation intentionally to appeal to one in sensory 
terms that I add another definitional feature: provocation also means “to incite,” which is to 
suggest that provocation, in many instances—and particularly with respect to the important 
and relative texts of Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche that I use to theorize—is a rhetorical 
instrument employed strategically to induce not just any condition of change, but a 
specific”one felt by the intended object—one as the anticipated result for which that 
specific form of provocation took. For instance, provocation has a medical connotation, as 
well. The OED refers to it in this sense as “the eliciting of a physiological or pathological 
response, esp. an immune response; spec. the deliberate eliciting of a response as a 
diagnostic procedure” (provocation test). Thus as a medical professional would use a 
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provocation test to induce a reaction, a provocateur who is conducting political theory 
attempts to elicit some intended emotional response from some identified political 
community. The goal of this activity of provocation meant to incite change begins with 
inducing that identified political community to be provoked to a particular or, in other 
words, an alternative and competing course of action endorsed by those who are the real 
and/or perceived beneficiaries of the prevailing thought which, again, reproduced the status 
quo, specifically with respect to the ideas about what constitutes justice and legitimacy. In 
sum on this point, provocation, as it “induces” in order to “incite” the object or recipient, 
serves as a strategically designed appeal meant to capitalize on the emotional disposition of 
the identified object(s)—or political community—whom the subject as provocateur wishes to 
result in some subsequent course of thought or (re)action.
 As just alluded to, the conceptual language of provocation—for my purposes, 
primarily, that is, although remaining consistent with the forms it takes in its definition—
suggests that the theorists are not just provocateurs making provocative statements, but 
also thoughtful and deliberative strategists whose political theories as philosophical projects 
are ones of provocation. That is, their writings—which, to a significant degree, are a 
reflection of their lives—are inherently ones of provocation, in that both their stylistic, 
tactical and methodological choices as well as the overarching and substantive political 
theories are ones “promt[ing]” and “urging (a person) [or political community] to an action 
[or] state.” In addition, if one were to accept this premise—and is the one on which I base 
my analysis—it behooves us to read these—and other theorists, political and otherwise—as 
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well as to view to anyone with (even seeming) political ambitions as political provocateurs, 
even if, at least initially, not through a lens with seditious motives, although always with 
healthy and informed skepticism, which is what I intend, in part, for my dissertation to 
provide a framework for doing.
 Similar to the fact that no one can ever with total certainty and definitive accuracy 
know another’s true motivations for using provocation, their words—if not outright reveal 
them—provide significant clues, both textually and contextually, especially with the aid of 
having considered the multiple forms provocation takes definitionally. That is—and keeping 
in mind the strategy factor—provocation seeks to elicit any number of types of responses 
that that prior provocative act (which includes the written word) results in. First, in one sense, 
provocation can appear to be a paradoxical term in that an object can attempt to provoke 
the subject to inaction. However,  such an instance implies that the previous condition or 
state was one action. The theorists of my concern would characterize such a case as an 
unjust political regime successfully using provocation to induce a “lull[ed]” state or a 
condition in which that ruled population no longer actively engage, demanding of its 
leaders a sufficient level of responsiveness. Conversely, however, provocation includes that 
which is “thought-provoking.” As the theorists argue, their specific forms of provocation are 
designed to foster the kind of deliberation of a political community that would 
“persuade”—or “force”—leaders to rule more fairly and justly. Again, all of these terms are 
disputed as to what counts as fair and just, which has led to the political conditions that the 
theorists are reacting to and, given their defiant positions, have been deemed as 
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threatening and challenging. Part of their projects in conceptual terms of provocation are 
meant “to pique” the interest of a potentially similar-minded political community and “to 
unlull” or “to energize” them.
 However, given the inevitability of the negative response from those currently 
wielding political power, the theorists attempt to employ the aspects of provocation that are 
directionally oriented. These are listed in the OED. In addition to provocation “giving rise to 
a specific state or condition,” includes inaction in that it is meant to serve as the mechanism 
by which the object goes from an active to a passive state. In other words, it goes from a 
state that another provocation intends to re-awaken or “to unlull” or to reinvigorate or “to 
[re-]energize.” Also, to provoke to change means “to incite [or] to urge [a person] to an 
action or to a reaction.”
 Thus, with respect to the different results—”action” and “reaction”—I begin with the 
latter, “reaction” before addressing the former, “action.” As aforementioned, the object of 
the provocation is expected to react negatively. For example, a political elite who is a 
beneficiary of the status quo would react negatively in that the perception of the motive for 
the use of the provocation by the subject, or provocateur, would likely be interpreted as 
“challenging [and] threatening,” and therefore a “seditious” act. That is, the first kind of 
reaction the theorists encounter in terms of deploying provocation as a strategic component
—or components—of the overall theoretical project.
 Another reaction that is urged upon the subject is to learn from the provocation. This 
time the subject is one of the theorists, or provocateur, and has identified as a friendly 
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subject. The intent for the use of the provocation is for the benefit of the provocateur, who 
by engaging with his friendly interlocutor, learns from the interaction, much in the way the 
Socratic method is a tool for personal—i.e., philosophical—growth and development. For 
example, Socrates seeks out a sympathetic ally who through conducting a discussion that 
includes cross-examination and refutation of each party’s initial positions, old ones are 
solidified as good ones or new ones are identified and replace previously held conceptions 
that have been shown to be inferior. Thus, Socrates and, perhaps “incidentally,” his 
interlocutor have become wiser, which amounts to more philosophical, as Socrates has 
defined what wisdom means although many of his fellow Athenians never accepted this 
definition. The point is that the exercise is primarily for the benefit of Socrates’ intellectual 
pursuits. However, it is one that requires a subject, but a subject that must react to Socrates’ 
initial provocation directed at the subject. In such an instance—and I intend to discuss this at 
length in the chapter on the historical Socrates—Socrates goes from being the subject, or 
provocateur, to ultimately the object, or the provoked, as the result of the exchange of 
provocative ideas with that first subject, or Socrates’ friendly interlocutor.
 Now, in terms of a subject, or for my purposes, the theorists, are using provocation 
“to incite” not a reaction against the subject, whether negative or positive, but an action 
that is directed away from the theorists acting as provocateurs. Of the multiple directions 
these can take, I focus on two, primarily—those incitements which are acted upon by the 
subject internally and externally, or, in a sense, redirected to a third-party, meaning 
elsewhere from within or back at the original subject. In the former, the subject internalizes 
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the provocation, interpreting it as something positive in order for personal development. 
This type of “action” is similar to the one Socrates primarily used, but its main objective is 
concerned with triggering growth in the subject. A good example of this form of 
provocation is Nietzsche’s writings on sublimation, a term which entails overcoming some 
personal defect or external obstacle to channel that suffering into the creation of something 
beautiful. Similarly, Rousseau discusses it in terms of internalization. And as provocation can 
“irritate [or] annoy [and thus] anger” in the figurative and emotional sense, much in the 
same way a medical provocation-test can cause discomfort in the physical sense, the result 
is the increased health—the kind of health felt not only physically but Platonically as well, in 
that the health of the soul (re)produces other healthy states, both figuratively as well as 
politically, as in political states territorially.
 While thinking about political improvement, provocation meant to induce “action” 
by the subject’s objects in order to be turned toward action in the political sphere is the last 
type of action. This one is intended to articulate a necessary set of conditions for a more 
“just” and “legitimate” government—one that the political elites who have been identified 
as friendly and sympathetic to a system of rule that define those important and relevant 
concepts like “justice” and “legitimacy” in terms of what is currently perceived as so 
threatening, in that the regime in power are, in fact, unjust and illegitimate, at least how 
Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche perceive things as they are now to be. This is, in large part, 
the reason—among others that I have alluded to, such as the struggle over proprietorship 
over the “rightful” meanings of terms and concepts and the related fact that there can never 
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be any definitive ownership over them, either the concepts or the theorists—I have selected 
these three to analyze in great depth in terms of their projects—as reflections upon 
themselves as humans—being ones of provocation in terms of the definitions of the 
conceptual language of being provocative and to provoke. It is at this point that I discuss 
what makes Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche so interesting for examination and why they are 
of so much relevance and importance on the matter of political theory as provocation.
Uses of Conceptual Provocation of Interest and Relevance: Plato and Socrates, Historical 
and Platonic
 The following section details some of the important reasons that make Plato, 
Rousseau and Nietzsche’s political theories among the most provocative, which also allows 
for an explanation of the concept of provocation. Specifically, I explore political 
provocation’s rhetorical use that seeks to advance substantive theories of provocation. I also 
assess their theories, comparing and contrasting them—as well as other modes of 
provocation, both theoretical in nature and on-the-ground. In Process and Reality, Alfred 
North Whitehead makes the provocative assertion:
There is no point in endeavouring to force the interpretations of divergent 
philosophers into a vague agreement. What is important is that the scheme of 
interpretation here adopted can claim for each of its main positions the express 
authority of one, or the other, of some supreme master of thought—Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant. But ultimately nothing rests on authority; the final 
court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness ... The safest general characterization of 
the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to 
Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have 
doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas 
scattered through them. His personal endowments, his wide opportunities for 
experience at a great period of civilization, his inheritance of an intellectual tradition 
not yet stiffened by excessive systematization, have made his writing an 
inexhaustible mine of suggestion. (39)
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In addition to just the pervasive use of the language of provocation in Plato, Rousseau and 
Nietzsche, there exists in their writings—and lives, more so than many of the other great 
theorists and enduring theories—other features that include the function of provocation. For 
one, they were—and, in some cases and to varying degrees, are still—read to be 
challenging, which is a key feature of provocation, both in their displays as well as effect on 
elite audiences and thus consequential in real-world terms.
 Consider Whitehead’s most remembered sentence of the above passage: that “the 
safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a 
series of footnotes to Plato.” Although such a claim might be rightfully regarded as an 
exaggeration, the fact that it has received so much attention, particularly criticism, not only 
puts the statement into the category of provocation but more importantly provides the 
opportunity to pause and consider it on the merits. In doing so, one is inclined—if not to 
accept the statement outright—to ponder Plato in terms of what all of his writings—based in 
part on “[Plato’s] inheritance of an intellectual tradition not yet stiffened by excessive 
systematization” which is a reference to his mentor, Socrates, whom because of this will be 
considered alongside of Plato—have resulted in: Aristotle’s response to both the historical 
Socrates and theoretical Plato; Aquinas’ invocation and adaptation of Aristotle; 
scholasticism; Rousseau’s reaction to scholasticism and Platonic metaphysics; Nietzsche’s 
criticism of each of the prior mentioned, not withstanding Aristotle’s aristocracy but 
including his “commonsense,” whose analysis contributed to American neopragmatist, 
Richard Rorty’s thinking (74).  In some ways, even more than a half century after the fall of 
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German nazism, political theory (Arlene Saxonhouse) continues to respond to Plato (Karl 
Popper) vis-à-vis what the Third Reich took—dishonestly so—for their own evil (Heidegger) 
purposes, even using unfinished and unpublished notes that Nietzsche lost control over 
after his career-ending collapse into insanity the last decade of his life, thanks to his anti-
Semitic and Nazi sympathizer sister.
 I begin with Plato because—despite the lack of agreement not only with regard to 
the (more) real meanings behind his works and how his thought should be approached—of 
the overwhelming consensus that he (and by extension Socrates) has had on philosophical 
thought and subsequently on social action and political change. However, ought Plato—and 
Socrates—be taken so seriously almost two and a half millennia later? In his interpretive 
essay included in his translation of the Republic, Allan Bloom posits that “it behooves us to 
study the Republic. For it is the first book which brings philosophy ‘down to the cities’...We 
will learn that the establishment of political science cannot be carried out without sacrifice of 
the...interests of most men” (1991: 310). Thus, if we have not—and essentially cannot, in 
that if one were to even accept Whitehead’s position that “ultimately nothing rests on 
authority”—come to an agreement on any single overarching philosophical interpretive 
approach to the field, but at least have conceded—and with ease—that Plato has played a 
most significant role in the Western philosophical tradition, there is another consensus: that 
self-determination is a most just and legitimate political construction, whose mechanisms 
are those of the basic democratic sort.
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That said, Plato seems less relevant in theorizing a contemporary politics. Our 
modern thinking has totally reversed what seemed so intuitive to him in democratic Athens
—that is, the interests of the many ought to be sacrificed for the interest of the few, those 
philosophical types. Bloom continues: “[T]hese sacrifices are so great that to many they do 
not seem worthwhile; [even] civilized  [Athens] thought it better to sacrifice philosophy [i.e. 
Socrates] rather than face the alternative he presented. This is why philosophy needs an 
apology; it is a dangerous and essentially questionable activity” (1991: 310).
 To be provocative means to be dangerous or to be perceived as such, anyway. 
Socrates certainly was that. He was increasingly felt to be more and more threatening to 
Athenian social norms and political values, escalating to the conviction of the capital crime 
of corrupting the youth. This provoked Plato to write, something Socrates never did. It is to 
Plato that we owe the portrait of Socrates we have come to most view and know. This 
portrait introduces another set of issues in terms of what makes Plato—and Rousseau and 
Nietzsche—among the most provocative and relates to a subtle point I take Whitehead to 
be making in that passage where he inserts right after footnote conclusion, “I do not mean 
the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from [Plato’s] 
writings”—that is, these three, are hidden from us. Granted, no closure can ever be 
achieved, but these three operate behind a mask. I will discuss Plato’s mask at length when I 
treat the dialogue form as Plato’s method in terms of such a medium as a provocative choice 
while bearing in mind the following statement by Plato scholar Charles Kahn (1981: 305): 
“The Socrates of the dialogues is an ambiguous figure, at once Plato's historical master and 
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his literary puppet.” Important here is this concept of how ambiguity—in that it creates 
opportunities for wide (mis)interpretations—as integral to their philosophical projects 
contributes to (seeming) paradoxes. In addition, it is with the concepts of ambiguity and 
paradox in their connection to provocation—as it is pervasive throughout my chosen 
theorists—that make them of interest, and I do so by turning to Rousseau, the most 
contradictory of the three and arguably of any other major political theorists.
Uses of Conceptual Provocation of Interest and Relevance: Rousseau
 I have chosen to analyze Rousseau for multiple reasons, first of which is the amount 
and intensity of the language of provocation he uses, both in his theoretical and reflective—
i.e. autobiographical—writings, perhaps only second to Nietzsche. At the end of his 
Confessions, Rousseau speaks of his contentious relationship with his contemporaries, one 
defined by each side provoking the other, often unintentionally. Setting aside intentionality, 
he comes to characterize the strained relationship: “No matter what place I might choose 
for a refuge, clearly could not safeguard myself  against either of the two methods which 
had been used to export me, the first of inciting3 the population against me by underground 
intrigues, and the second of expelling me by naked force without offering any reasons” (C 
597). This passage is reminiscent of Socrates’ antagonistic relationship with his Athenian 
contemporaries, which is another reason for selecting Rousseau—in that, Rousseau, the 
provocateur, shares many of the personal qualities Socrates embodied. Also, although 
Rousseau and Plato sharply differ as to the possibilities of metaphysics, their philosophical 
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3 Emphasis mine.
styles are similar—one being, given the paradoxical statements, the difficulty with which any 
real certainty about their true(r) meaning with respect to their philosophical doctrines is all of 
which we can be really certain about. That is, there is not only an utter lack of agreement 
about their proposals—plus the plausibility of them, even despite their attempts to suggest 
otherwise—but people (scholars and politicians alike) have interpreted them as arguing for 
fundamentally opposite and incompatible political systems. 
 At bottom, the real Rousseau cannot be both a totalitarian and a liberal, for 
communitarianism and individualism—that is, Rousseau himself, in his heart and mind, 
cannot be both, in any real terms. One reason for their paradoxes—perceived as such, 
anyway—goes to the ambiguity located in their works as it relates to a choice to write 
esoterically. To this point, Melzer writes of Rousseau: “The ancient writers, Rousseau 
emphasizes, are the true masters of this [esotericism] technique of energizing 
incompleteness...[and in] sum, the right kind of obscurity energizes the right kind of reader 
by making him active and responsible” (2007: 1024).
 Now, in terms of setting up Rousseau’s similarities with Socrates, I turn to a passage 
authored again by Melzer located in his article about Rousseau’s Mission, which I will tie in 
to why in discussing provocation, Rousseau—relative to Socrates—makes such a good 
candidate to consider. Melzer argues:
If Rousseau the pessimist had no hopes for the revolutionary or progressive 
transformation of Europe, the question remains why he wrote in so radical and 
dangerous a manner. One might respond that he simply spoke the truth as he saw 
it, regardless of consequences...[For] Rousseau…given the extreme and permanent 
decadence of his times, it was no longer dangerous to speak with perfect openness. 
(1983a: 304)
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In this light—and bearing in mind Rousseau’s concluding sentiments in the Confessions—
Rousseau, like Socrates, drew the ire of his fellow citizens. Rousseau was also thought to be 
dangerous, which as the introduction to the Confessions makes note of, “[Rousseau] 
ventured into a society in which he did not belong ...The fatal Emile was already at the 
printers”—and because of its reception as one of provocation—he could no longer rely “on 
the good will of princes” in that “he had clumsily allowed himself to antagonize4 them (C 
11). To this end, the parallels between Socrates and Rousseau regarding the social toll their 
respective philosophical missions are striking, and are among the many reasons their 
provocations are both interesting and important to examine.
 And just as Socrates was in need of an “apology,” which Plato felt compelled to 
make, so too does Rousseau—for his equally “outlandish” way of life. Rousseau’s, however, 
is made by Rousseau himself, which only exacerbates both of the ways he is provocative, 
first in the way he shares with Plato—that is, producing a system of thought whose distance 
creates conflicting reports about meaning—and second in how his theoretic prescriptions, 
like Socrates’, create such controversy, as their contemporaries, under the current 
understanding of accepted social norms and cultural values, cannot reconcile their—
Socrates and Rousseau’s—lives with their theory for a just politics.
 In the above mentioned Emile—his theoretic production for a just educational 
doctrine—Rousseau seeks to instill a disposition in a student, who as an abstraction, 
resistant to succumbing too quickly to the passions that are the source of their weakness 
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4 Emphasis mine.
and subsequent detrimental state—specifically, a position of victimhood and servitude, of 
which both are perpetuated by structural inequality. For Rousseau, equality for “all”—with 
the interrelated issue of liberty—is the central theme of his political thought. However, for a 
set of political conditions to provide for relative equality—which is absolutely necessary for 
any “legitimate” government to provide for—to be maintained, an engaged citizenry must 
exhibit the type of qualities his student, Emile, acquires, doing so through an education that 
prioritizes learning by experience and not from books.
 Now, as if the preceding theories turned policy prescriptions were not provocative 
enough already for those elites who made up most of Rousseau’s/ up Rousseau’s mostly first 
audience of readers, the fact that Rousseau—and by his own repeated admission—was in 
real-life the antithesis of Emile. Rousseau advocated for Emile to not dwell upon imaginary 
things (E 208)—and even praised the “savage” (e.g., a Native American Indian) for having 
prolonged developing such a vivid imagination (DOI 46), yet wrote in several places the 
sentiment he recognizes in himself:
My love for imaginary objects...ended by disillusioning me with everything around 
me...which seems so gloomy and misanthropic ... [I]t arises from my too loving 
heart...which find no living creatures akin to them, and so are forced to feed upon 
fictions. I...have indicated the origin...of an inclination which has modified all my 
passions, and restrained them by making use of those very passions to curb 
themselves. (C 48)
 To add further fuel to their displeasure at his obvious hypocrisies, Rousseau 
essentially blames modern men—of whom he is a contemporary—for his personal 
deficiencies that, one, prevent him from the civic responsibilities he requires of everyone 
and, two, for becoming the contagonist (as I label him, contextually-speaking with respect to 
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his conduct that undermines his textual theory) that he now is. As such, just as Socrates 
“plague[d]” (A 26) his peers, Rousseau continually takes contrarian positions to the 
prevailing thought of the day—a time to which he preferred not to belong; he says, 
distancing himself and yet back-handedly faults them, “I know my own heart and 
understand my fellow man. But I am made unlike any other I have ever met; I will even 
venture to say that I am like no one in the whole world.  I may be no better, but at least I am 
different” (C 17). Tracy Strong similarly describes it:
[Rousseau] is often blamed or praised for [a very wide range of political positions] ... 
This is odd … Hobbes, the man, tends to be excused … I want to claim here that 
Rousseau in fact sought the kind of direct responsibility...[which] has led many 
writers to attack him personally. He wrote so as to require response of his readers...
[and] for well-worked out philosophical and political intentions … As Rousseau 
would have hoped, Kant was so moved by Rousseau’s writing that his life was 
changed…similar to…the Bible...[for an]…‘interpretation’ was a way of protecting 
oneself, of distancing oneself...To know what a book means, one has to know, says 
Rousseau, what it is to know the person who wrote it  … Contemporary men cannot, 
it appears, see that author for what he is, at least not without help. Precisely the 
reasons that he is misunderstood will be the reasons that he needs to make his 
presence available to his readers. (1994: 8, 9, 11)
 Therefore, because of Rousseau’s inflammatory rhetoric, the devastating criticisms of 
the decadence that surrounds him, and his bombastic delivery; he is vulnerable to 
interpretive opportunism and leaves himself open to equally forceful judgment, all of which 
he shares with another provocateur whose project is one of provocation—Nietzsche, 
perhaps only a bigger critic of his so-called modernity is he of Rousseau. I turn to him now 
to in brief further explain him to be such a good fit with Plato and Rousseau, in part, 
because of the amount of attention they receive from Nietzsche.
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Uses of Conceptual Provocation of Interest and Relevance: Nietzsche
 The third and final theorist I analyze shares many of the characteristics of the others. 
That said, although Nietzsche uses similar types of language as Rousseau, he uses if for 
entirely different political ends—and often, directs it at Rousseau. For Nietzsche, Rousseau is 
the embodiment of democratic values and modern cultural decadence, despite Rousseau’s 
own criticism of modernity and although modernity is seen vastly differently between the 
two. Nietzsche asks rhetorically of Rousseau—and to which Nietzsche immediately follows 
with the answer: “[W]here did [Rousseau] really want to return to? Rousseau, this first 
modern man, idealist...who needed moral ‘dignity’ in order to endure his own aspect: sick 
with unbridled vanity and unbridled self-contempt ... I hate Rousseau even in the 
Revolution” (TI 113). What appears from this passage is two-fold, for my purposes here. 
First, we see a trend emerging with my chosen philosophers regarding the condescending 
tone in which they voice their grievances with the culture of which they are a part, each 
longing for a time passed: Rousseau for a pre-civilized state, which he calls the “Golden 
Age” and Nietzsche for pre-Socratic, Hellenic age (he calls Socrates the first decadent) when 
aristocratic noble values flourished. Related to this tone, their sneering rhetoric is one that 
continually uses the language of provocation. For instance—and as we shall see in the 
chapter on Rousseau—Rousseau, despite employing such “dangerous[ly]” provocative 
rhetoric, which was previously alluded to in the Melzer (1983a) piece, did not intend for his 
works to used for political revolution, as they were by the likes of Robespierre. A similar case 
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can be credibly made for Nietzsche whose works were fodder for a revolutionary-style 
political takeover led by Hitler. 
 Regardless of their true intentions—as well as their efforts to control the narrative 
and thwart others from misappropriating their meanings—the language of provocation—
e.g., the rhetoric associated with war—is constantly used, particularly by Nietzsche, who like 
Plato, can make his meanings similarly difficult to penetrate. Also, Nietzsche would have it 
no other way. That said, however, Nietzsche uses aphorisms in favor of the dialogue, which 
Nietzsche harshly criticizes. That is, all of their meanings are relatively hard to ascertain 
compared to, say, a Machiavelli or a Hobbes, but for Nietzsche, they are so for completely 
different reasons, which make his project an honest one and the others’ projects dishonest. 
With this in mind, the historical Socrates and the Platonic dialogue, Nietzsche laments 
earlier in the Twilight of the Idols:
[H]onest men do not carry their reasons exposed in this fashion. It is indecent to 
display all one’s goods ... Wherever authority is still part of accepted usage and one 
does not ‘give reasons’ but commands, the dialectician is a kind of buffoon: he is 
laughed at, he is not taken seriously. —Socrates was the buffoon who got himself 
taken seriously... It is not only the...anarchy of his instincts which indicate decadence 
in Socrates ... Everything about him is exaggerated...caricature [and] at the same 
time hidden ... —I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic 
equation reason = virtue = happiness derives: that [most bizarre] of equations 
and...has...the instincts of the older Hellenes against it. (TI 41)
 Therefore, like Socrates and Rousseau, Nietzsche chooses a vernacular that is 
counter-intuitive—and thus becomes provocation—which, for Nietzsche, serves an 
additional purpose: it not only delivers his contrast but also underscores the purpose of 
contrasting himself with his contemporaries and their era with a preferable one but also as a 
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subtle confirmation of his theory of decadence, much in the same vein as Strong’s 
assessment of Rousseau, specifically where noting that “[p]recisely the reasons that 
[Rousseau] is misunderstood will be the reasons that he needs to make his presence 
available to his readers” (1994: 11). However, like Plato, Nietzsche’s method as medium is 
essentially the Socratic dialectics captured in writing. This is not just an inferior form of 
communicating philosophy—not to mention that, for Nietzsche, Plato’s theory of the form, 
which was the substance attempting to be delivered by his adaption of the Socratic style—
but also is beyond paradoxical in nature and incomprehensible, thus making it 
disingenuous. Nietzsche’s style and method as medium are admittedly difficult as even he 
recognizes: “(I obviously do everything to be ‘hard to understand’ myself!)—and one should 
be cordially grateful for the good will to some subtlety of interpretation” (BGE 39). The 
difference between himself and Plato, whom Nietzsche is a great “skeptic” of, and between 
himself and those unable or unwilling to grasp his true meanings is that Nietzsche and his 
‘friends’ are honest and intellectually rigorous while the other two are either ignorant (e.g., 
the democratic and/or religious “herd”) and disingenuous liars (Plato, Hegel as well as 
political opportunists, e.g. the anti-Semitic Reich), or both.
 Again, provocation involves vagueness and ambiguity which, in turn, may be or, at 
least, seem paradoxical. Then, the paradoxical invites interpretive errors, based upon others’ 
preconceived notions and dispositions susceptible to misguided and/or ill-informed 
provocations. Provocation results in misconstrued understandings of what, for instance, 
Nietzsche really meant when using the language of war, like when in one aphorism—which a 
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single aphoristic thought ought never be considered in isolation—he says, “Above all, war. 
War has always been the [sound judgment] of every spirit which has grown...too profound; 
its curative power lies even in the wounds one receives” (TI 31). Also, prior, in the Gay 
Science, “Everything abstract wants to be read as a prank against poetry and as with a 
mocking voice ... Thus there are thousands of delights in this war...War is the father of all 
good things; war is also the father of good prose” (GS 145).
 As a theorist and provocateur, Nietzsche writes esoterically, but his philosophy, which 
builds to his perspectivism, is one that is, in terms of Whitehead’s earlier comments, 
reasonable, in that it reveals what is true(r), unlike the metaphysician’s and Christian’s 
assumptions that there exists within the realm of the knowable, capital-letters: Truth, Beauty, 
etc. In that such a philosophy challenges the accepted standard of conducting intellectual 
research by the “academic chairs,” Nietzsche is provocative. He says himself that he is no 
man, but “dynamite!” (EH 326). And remaining true to being a self-identified “immoralist”—
and thus in like fashion being provocatively contrarian—like the contagonist, Rousseau who 
blamed Europe for much of his personal shortcomings, Nietzsche declared in perhaps the 
single most provocative statement made in a philosophy text that “God is dead”—and 
moreover, was murdered by those who proclaimed to serve him. On this matter, 
Nietzschean scholar, Walter Kauffman, has noted:
Nietzsche realized belatedly that his coinage ‘the will to power,’ instead of being 
provocative, might be pleasing to those Germans who would think of nothing but 
the Reich—and [re:] The Will to Power. A book for thinking, nothing else...’I wish I 
had written it in French so that it might not appear as a confirmation of any [reich] 
aspirations’ ... The passage is reminiscent of the pathetic ‘Above all, do not mistake 
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me!’ in the preface of Ecce Homo. Nietzsche begs his readers to keep in mind that 
he does not write to endorse a course of [political] action. (248)
 Nietzsche lost control of his own message, however, just as Rousseau did and 
Socrates, which is why Plato in large measure embarked on his mission of the Ideal. For him, 
the stakes are high. And when the stakes are (perceived to be) high—although for each of 
the theorists, who are in large part responding to the previous one(s), what the stakes are 
and which ones ought to be raised and lowered are completely different—provocation is at 
work. To that end, provocation appears in the most enduring works of political theory, 
because it exists—and is happening—all around us everyday.
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CHAPTER 3
Framing Provocation
2 Dimensions of Provocation: Introduction
 The intent for this dissertation is to evaluate Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche whose 
theories can be explained as projects of provocation. As such and having constructed a 
methodological framework from others’ work on the concept of provocation, I attempt to 
present their theories as political strategies meant to provoke their audiences to, at least, 
conceptualize an alternative—read: more natural, just, legitimate—politics from the current 
ones of their respective contexts. To do this, and specifically to explain the many types of 
provocation, both real and theoretical that they are addressing and then deploy themselves, 
both rhetorically and substantively, I have categorized these various forms of provocation 
and apply them to their overarching philosophical principles. These principles define—or, at 
minimum, point to—their preferred political structures, as maintained by a particular regime-
type and reinforced by a conducive political culture. These members possess a certain 
disposition that (re)produces the culture supportive of the politics of which the theorists are 
so critical. Thus, within all of their most significant works, patterns about the concept of 
provocation have emerged. These patterns have helped organized my discussion of the 
theorists—and their political theories—as important provocateurs whose theoretical insights 
have been read by later thought leaders—e.g., Rousseau on Jefferson.
 For my purposes of analysis, the first dimension of provocation, as I have termed it, 
builds on the terminology used in the OED that defines it to suggest that provocation is 
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relational in nature which means that the concept requires a subject and an object, or a 
provocateur’s use of some mechanism of provocation on something which is provokable, 
likely another person. This first dimension goes beyond identifying the actors and describes 
the types of dispositions of those who predict and determine the reasons for being 
provocative and for being provokable. In other words, using the theorists’ works themselves, 
I attempt to answer two questions. First, what about the make-up, qualities, or natures that 
exist in the theorists that can adequately account for them deciding to engage in the act of 
political theorizing as well as their systems for attaching to others the label of provocateurs 
to whom they believe merits a response? Second, what qualities or characteristics make the 
object of provocation susceptible to a particular act as a form of provocation? This, in turn, 
begs a further question: Given the fact that a criterion is assumed for judging others as 
having provokable natures, what kinds of provocations ought to be employed to provoke 
the ideal response to make possible the change (in disposition) for that ultimate outcome, 
say, in the form of political reform?
 Just as the first dimension of provocation builds upon the conceptual definition of 
the term, the second dimension builds upon first. Based upon having found in their texts 
answers to the above questions about the types of dispositions that describe the 
participants in a relationship whose connection is provocation, we can see, or measure, 
escalation and in some cases, predict the first, then the next, and the following reactions, 
beginning, perhaps with a harmless chuckle that either ends there or can escalate, 
depending on the particular circumstances, and ending with, say, private vigilantism, legal 
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retribution, or, more positively, political improvement. Much of this hinges on the 
dispositions of the actors, whose motives as they are perceived by the other, which, again, 
so often can be predictors of whether the audience is receptive to be persuaded for 
considering and then working toward the alternative that the theorists’ works argue on 
behalf of. Otherwise, as it was in the high-stakes case of Socrates, it is met with forceful 
resistance and served as the basis, in large part, for Plato’s attempt to fix the politics by 
offering a process for personal, or philosophical—and thus, ultimately, political—
transformation.
Dimension 1 of Provocation: Relational
 As previously indicated, a provocateur is one who agitates and lacks subjection to 
authority. In order for one to attach to this characterization other qualities with a more 
negative connotation—e.g., “seditious” in motivation—one is making the assumption that 
the authority is in possession of the moral authority to chastise the behavior of athe said 
provocateur. Conversely, if one were suspicious of the authority itself, the motive of the 
provocateur might be interpreted as honorable. However, putting aside the merits of each 
sides’ position—again, which are caused by disputes over which values ought to be 
privileged (e.g., order over liberty)—and understanding the specific habits and 
temperament that make up a provocateur’s disposition, I argue that one begin to see into 
the cultural attitudes that have not only shaped the theorists’ respective social perspectives 
but also compelled them to engage in cultural criticism and ultimately political theory. 
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 A framework allowing us to access their projects as strategies for conceptualizing 
and using provocation, it becomes possible to provide a criterion for judging whom the 
theorists portray as their protagonists (and antagonists) in terms of their tendencies toward 
using and reacting to provocation. That is, we can compare parallel traits the theorists share 
among themselves (e.g., Socrates and Rousseau’s disdain for ostentation), the ones the 
theorists’ protagonists—as  extensions of themselves—display (e.g., Nietzsche on Goethe or 
his Zarathustra) as well as, in negative terms, those textual examples of antagonists (e.g., 
Rousseau on Voltaire or Nietzsche on Luther) and contextual antagonistic audiences (e.g., 
Rousseau on European high society or Nietzsche on contemporary anti-Semites). These 
examples reveal insights into how the theorists’ think dispositions determine—for better or 
worse—the course of action after some original provocation—real or perceived—which, in 
turn, helps to shape the strategy for producing a new theory of politics. Cornel West speaks 
of Emerson’s project similarly:
The primary aim of Emerson’s life and discourse is to provoke; the principle means 
by which he lived, spoke and wrote is provocation ... For Emerson, the goal of 
activity is not simply domination, but also provocation; the telos of movement and 
flux is not solely mastery but also stimulation. Needless to say, the centrality of 
provocation and stimulation in a discourse is the product of and helps reproduce 
[the] culture … Provocation and stimulation constituted rhetorical strategies of 
sustaining some sense of the self. (25-6)
 Now, in parallel fashion, the theorists attribute to themselves—either overtly in 
textual references or come to appear contextually—particular traits that put them and their 
protagonists at an advantage in their ability to discern good from bad types of provocation 
so that they react appropriately when confronted with someone or something else’s 
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provocation. These identified or alluded to qualities, which make up the theorists and/or 
their protagonists overall general disposition. Conversely, their targeted antagonists not 
only lack these but possess the opposite ones—for the contrasting types the same terms 
hold totally different meanings (e.g., friendship). The theorists intend to make tactical use for 
drawing such sharp contrasts, in that the theorists anticipate their criticisms will become 
familiar to those with whom they are criticizing—and will undoubtedly become enraged by 
the characterizations as made from such unfamiliar beginning assumptions about, say, what 
it means to be friends. And to the theorists’ point, their identified antagonists’ reaction will 
only further prove the argumentative point about good and bad dispositional provokability. 
They are using rhetoric to goad them into responding that will make good on the theoretical 
claims about needing to channel provocation into productive outlets for the benefit of 
society, all of which the political system—in conjunction with the political culture—creates 
and maintains. (And all of this comes through in how they all depict, what I count as, six (6) 
types of “plot-lines” in which the narratives—which are the subject of the second part of the 
methodological framework from which I interpret them to be, at different types and under 
different conditions, both provocateurs and the provoked.)
 That is, they view themselves, as do their supporters as provocateurs, who in having 
utilized their dispositional resources that allow them to see and thus reveal to others the 
possibility for choosing an alternative and better way forward or return to a more natural 
and more real existence, as they envision such a politics, relative to society and culture, 
making good on. Also, they see their theories as the articulations of a more ideal set of 
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conditions, very much in the same manner as Edward Snowden views his “contribution” as 
advancing what he believes to be, and has defined as America. In a parallel context, they 
see themselves as those compelled to act—or react, as it were, the predicament they and 
their contemporaries find themselves in and continue to make worse, which provocation can 
be the mechanism by which transformation can occur, similar to as Heidegger envisions for 
it—that is, provocation as the tool by which we re-orientate ourselves to approach 
technology, in that technology is so high-stakes for humanity now—to function as. 
Heidegger writes:
So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain transfixed in the 
will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology ... The essence of 
technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of 
all revealing, i.e., of truth ... The irresistibility of ordering and the restraint of the 
saving power draw past each other like the paths of two starts in the course of the 
heavens. But precisely this, their passing by, is the hidden side of their nearness. 
When we look into the ambiguous essence of technology, we behold the 
constellation, the stellar course of the mystery ... Human activity can never directly 
counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human 
reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence 
than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it. (22)
 While keeping in mind West’s interpretation of Emerson’s emphasis of stimulation 
over mastery, the take away is that to create the conditions for a superior politics, those 
necessary to bring about the change—even if the only available change is within, as would 
be the case in the most corrupt regimes—must embody the characteristics the theorists find 
in themselves. These characteristics provide them with the right orientation by which to 
assess the nature of things as they are. They do so continually by drawing sharp contrasts 
between themselves and the allies, whether members of, apologists for or even complicit in; 
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the status quo. In addition, these types can often be recognized by how they, as either a St. 
Paul, a Rousseauean democrat or a German fascist, respond to the theorists’ provocations, 
which can vary depending on the scenario portrayed in the writings of Plato, Rousseau and 
Nietzsche. It is here I turn to this second dimension of provocation which provides the frame 
by which they can be assessed along with their counterparts as provocateurs as well as 
provokable for the eventual goal of understanding their philosophically substantive tenets 
through the prism of political provocation.
Dimension 2 of Provocation: Perceptual 
 Before contextualizing by offering many specific examples, these dimensions of 
provocation emerge in parallel ways among the theorists and across their works. I briefly 
want to list the prevalent ways individuals and types who appear in their works react and to 
whom they, in turn, respond. Much of the formatting of their works is structured as 
responses to various phenomena and modes of thought that have taken us to the most 
recent condition, which the theorists feel they can no longer ignore. Upon that first 
provocation, whatever it may be, the object provoked interprets it as something positive, is 
persuaded by the message, and then uses it as a catalyst for personal growth and potential 
change in the public sphere, depending on what is available and possible, given the social 
context. Both in the theoretical works as well as more broadly, as the OED indicates, the 
provocation is more commonly received negatively. 
 In that provocation is almost always a challenge to traditional and commonly held 
modes of accepted intuitive thinking, the object of the provocation is inclined from the 
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beginning to approach its message with skepticism and resist the change it seeks. Based 
upon the specific provocation, one can react negatively in many different forms. If the 
provocation is perceived as non-threatening, one might laugh and dismiss it as ridiculous. 
Now, if the exact same act were made, and still be non-threatening in terms of possible 
consequences but interpreted as maliciously conceived from the provocateur, the degree to 
which the provocation was met with resistance would increase tonally, and the dismissive 
attitude toward it would be accompanied by scorn.
 What I am attempting to construct is a scale by which to link types of acts of 
provocation with types of reactions to those corresponding acts. As the acts are perceived 
to be increasingly threatening, the reactions are met with greater seriousness and thus 
resisted with an equally greater force. That is, if one looks at the theorists’ dispositions 
relative to their theoretical adversaries, as they lay it out in their texts, one can show how a 
certain type of provocation made by Rousseau is met with ridicule, a parallel provocation in 
Nietzsche draws a similar response, and this is the case across all the theorists’ and works. 
This consistency helps one to understand the multiple aspects of the concept of 
provocation, particularly as a core element and function of their theoretical projects.
 The next section cites the specific scenarios which the theorists react to as well as 
construct to illustrate this relationship between provocateur and the provoked, who 
because of their different dispositions, react to provocations differently, positively or 
negatively, and to varying degrees, based on the level of perceived threat. Also, upon 
illustrating the dynamics, the theorists can then use the narrative established to base a 
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substantive analysis which is transferrable to the political sphere, which remedies through a 
new politics, culturally and structurally, the deficiencies in the dispositions and orientations 
that the theorists believe they have accurately and successfully portrayed in contrasting 
themselves—and their protagonists—with their opposition, as they define them, although all 
of whom, in some form, are allied with status quo thinking and thus wrongly understand—or 
“misrecognize,” in Bourdieuean terms—themselves, their social place and role and the 
nature of their humanity, specifically regarding their inevitable mortality. Bourdieu writes:
Symbolic power—as a power of constituting the given through utterances, of 
making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the 
world and, thereby action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical 
power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force 
(whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization—is a 
power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, that is, misrecognized as 
arbitrary. This means that symbolic power does not reside in ‘symbolic systems’ in 
the form of an ‘illocutionary force’ but that it is defined in and through a given 
relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e., in the 
vary structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced. What creates 
the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the 
social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who utter them. 
And words alone cannot create this belief ... Symbolic power, a subordinate of 
power, is transformed, i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated form of the 
other forms of power.  (1991: 170)
Exposing this is a first step to broader cultural and social transformation, which comes later 
in their strategies for articulating a superior political theory. This superior theory is more 
natural and thereby less arbitrary than those regime structures currently in place. I now show 
how they intend to accomplish this in six identified contexts that appear, to varying degrees, 
in and throughout the three theorists’ works.
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6 Categories of Provocation: Introduction
 The following section consists of six illustrative narratives, or, categorical scenarios 
when applying the dimensions of provocation that I described in the previous section. These 
six categories highlight descriptions of various dynamics between those actors whose 
relationship is one based upon and is driven by provocation. I discuss them because they 
draw help to explain their projects as ones whose cores include the element of provocation, 
in that the categories, or illustrations, tie in the dimensions of provocation and provide a 
context by which to assess the situations described by the theorists. They do so in two ways: 
first, by describing as dire and detrimental and second, by setting up for them to, in 
explanatory terms, make the argument for their systematic approach. As we shall see, for 
their systems to be accepted as positive forms and uses of provocation, it requires an 
audience that is differently disposed that the one, in general, now. The audience comes to 
be persuaded to accept a new conception of certain terms’ meanings and associations, 
terms like justice, legitimacy and distributive fairness, whose definitions are fixed, but their 
applications are disputed. This is opposite to the contemporary prevailing notions, as they 
are reflections of those who, although in power,are, unlike the theorists, of the wrong 
disposition, or wrongly disposed, in terms of their uses of and susceptibility to provocation, 
specifically those of the “irrational” sort. Although the purposes differ, the Aristotelean 
observation is picked up over and over again by the strategic Plato, Rousseau and 
Nietzsche; Aristotle asserts: “[This] line of argument is founded upon the various senses of a 
word. Such a word is ‘rightly’ ... Rational desires are those which we are induced to have; 
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there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and 
induced to believe them good” (Rh 1422, 1363).
 For each of the six categories, which appear separately and differently, i.e., not 
sequentially as I have listed them, throughout each of their body of work, I give a short 
description of the individual illustration. Then, I account for how it appears in terms of the 
narrative contrasts that the theorists’ are creating to best substantiate their harsh social 
criticisms of culture and the politics that (reinforce) the norms worthy of such provocative 
rhetorical attacks. In addition to the three writers, Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche—although 
the historical Socrates is almost exclusively familiar to us because of Plato, notwithstanding 
the ever so small but ever so contrasting view by Aristophanes—Socrates heavily influences 
Plato, and to a still significant amount, Rousseau and Nietzsche. Therefore, I include 
Socrates, as he is presented in the Apology, in that this Socrates is (the most) historically 
accurate, as opposed to the figurative protagonist of the literary Plato, which as an issue, I 
will revisit for more elaboration in the following two chapters.
Category 1—Reputation: Overview
 Part of the theorists’ mission is to win (back) meanings of terms, and in order to 
succeed, they engage in a war of words, where the victor holds in possession proprietorship 
over what these terms, or, concepts look like. For instance, in the case of the political notion 
of “legitimate ruling authority,” Plato believes legitimacy lies with his philosopher-kings; for 
Rousseau, legitimacy comes through (social) contractual consent; and for Nietzsche, more 
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definitively than with whom, legitimacy does not rest with the “Socialist rabble,” to be sure 
(AC 191). Bourdieu makes the case: 
The categories of perception, the systems of classification that is, essentially, the 
words, the names which construct social reality as much as they express it, are the 
crucial stakes of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate 
principle of vision and division—is, that is, a struggle for the legitimate exercise of 
the theory effect. (1990: 134)
 Despite the theorists’ differences as to where legitimate rule rests, they all make the 
parallel case for the reasons that their respective political environments fail to properly 
distribute justice, on their terms. The first reason is that those in control fail to see reality. 
Instead, they are consumed with appearance, the appearance of keeping up the facade of 
maintaining a good reputation and of keeping in the good social graces of others. The 
problem is, those with whom they are concerned are corrupt and ignorant for real and true(r) 
justice. The theorists, however, do not especially care for what most believe or think of 
them. That is because they find most ordinary people lacking integrity, partly because they 
care about this reinforcing social standing. This in turn, makes them slavishly susceptible to 
flattery and blinds them to the deterioration of society all around them. The theorists, on the 
other hand, stand by their principles and are unaffected by the fashionable sentiments of 
the day. Furthermore, given their view of ordinary people, they do not care if they are liked 
and even pride themselves as unpopular and misunderstood, which is only natural, in that 
the masses misunderstand much about the contexts in which they exist.
Category 1—Reputation: Socrates, Contextual Discussion
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 During the proceedings of his trial, there is a point at which he has admittedly begun 
to antagonize his jury. At this point, Socrates oddly chooses to chastise those who hold in 
their hands the power over his life. For Socrates, however, this means only his physical life. 
Socrates refuses to show them deference, as he ascribes to a wholly different idea as to 
what counts for justice. This idea  is not so easily seen and surely not prevalent throughout 
Athens, which constituted much of the reason for his (would-be) continued 
“philosophizing,” which could be interchanged with the term “proselytizing,” no matter if, 
as he promises, “I have to die a hundred deaths” (A 16). In addition, to explain their 
fundamental differences, Socrates’ devaluation of the temporal life contrasts with  most 
people’s intuitive view that life is among the most cherished of things, something to be held 
onto at nearly any cost. However, not for Socrates and to a large extent, because of his 
following comments at his defense:
I have never lived an ordinary life. I did not care for the things that most people care 
about ... I thought that I was really too strict in my principles to survive if I went in for 
this sort of thing... I tried to persuade each one of you not to think more practical 
advantage than of well-being in the case of the state or of anything else. What do I 
deserve for behaving in this way? Some reward, gentlemen, if I am bound to 
suggest what I really deserve, and what is more, a reward which would be 
appropriate for myself. (A 21)
 Not surprisingly, he was convicted of the capital punishment of corrupting the youth 
and atheism, which is ironic because he repeatedly defends his mission in religious and 
moral terms. Socrates’ religious devotion forms the basis of the contrast he makes between 
himself and democratic Athens. They cannot even begin to agree what justice is and never 
do. For Athens, justice was served as he downed the hemlock in a single draught. As a 
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consequence, Plato tries to present Socratic justice in a more palatable manner, one more 
likely to result in persuasion instead of force, although he too, in the Republic, presents his 
literary protagonist, Socrates, as a model for achieving justice—and more specifically, a 
political justice known when one is to “take away reputation” (R 44).
Category 1—Reputation: Plato, Textual Example
[I]t’s not easy for the best pursuit to enjoy a good reputation with those who practice 
the opposite.  But by far the greatest and most powerful slander...comes to 
philosophy from those who claim to practice such things— ... that, ‘most of those 
who go to it are completely vicious and the most decent useless,’ and I admitted 
that what you say is true.  Isn’t that so?’ ... ‘First, if it’s present to your mind, truth 
guided him, and he had to pursue it entirely and in every way or else be a boaster 
who in no way partakes of true philosophy’ ... ‘So then, won’t we make a sensible 
apology in saying that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what 
is... (R 169)
Category 1—Reputation: Rousseau, Textual Example
I would note how much that universal desire for reputation...which devours us 
all...how much it excites and multiplies the passions; and by making all 
men...enemies...  I would show that it is to this ardor for making oneself the topic of 
conversation to this furor to distinguish oneself which nearly always keeps us outside 
ourselves, that we owe what is best and worst among men, our virtues and vices, 
our sciences and our errors, our conquerors and our philosophers, that is to say, a 
multitude of bad things against a small number of good ones. (DOI 78)
Category 1—Reputation: Nietzsche, Textual Example
‘For many reasons I may take pleasure in the good opinion of others: perhaps 
because I honor and love them and all their pleasures give me pleasures... —but all 
that is not vanity’ ... The noble human being must force himself, with the aid of 
history, to recognize that, since time immemorial, ...the common man was only what 
he was considered: not at all used to positing values himself, he also attached no 
other value to himself (it is the characteristic right of masters to create values). (BGE 
261)
66
Category 2—Expectation: Overview Using Plato, Contextual Discussion
 At certain points located throughout their writings, usually as a prefacing tactic 
before making a later point, the theorists describe themselves counter to their rhetorical 
adversaries as ironic although their versions of irony differ, particularly Socrates’ and 
Nietzsche’s, as I will show, are light-hearted and at times jovial. Simply, they have found joy 
in life from having properly understood and more importantly embracing that which is 
actuality, both in relative and absolute terms, mortal futility.
 Such an experience is liberating, they want to express. This freedom is not without 
license, however. To not take oneself so seriously is not to be unserious. The issue is one of 
provocation, in that what makes one prone to laughter reveals the health of one’s being. For 
instance, laughter is something of which Plato is so often critical. Plato scorns laughter when 
it accompanies an inferior disposition that finds funny a “naked woman practicing 
gymnastics for the sake of the best, ‘plucks from his wisdom an unripe fruit for ridicule,’ and 
doesn’t know—as it seems—at what he laughs or what he does” (R 136). Also, Plato 
champions the self-deprecating humor that largely defines the ironic Socrates. This is so 
because Socrates, the other theorists, and their similarly disposed listeners have figured out 
how to maneuver about happily on earth, despite the largest of shortcomings; that is, the 
inevitability of death. They do more than lament or even cope, they channel it, as Nietzsche 
has, where his predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, who was born the twin of fear, were wrong; 
note Kaufmann’s footnote commentary:
In despite of that philosopher who, being a real Englishman, tried to bring laughter 
into ill repute among all thinking men—’laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, 
67
which every thinking mind will strive to overcome” (Hobbes) [41]—I should actually 
risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their 
laughter...’ [41: Hobbes is evidently thinking quite literally of laughter while for 
Nietzsche laughter represents an attitude toward the world, toward life, and toward 
oneself.] (BGE)
 The theorists embrace their intrinsic limitations, those that cannot be mastered, like 
physical decay and death. Such recognition provides them the ability to engage in mirth-
provoking behavior, in part, because they see themselves as a bit ridiculous, especially 
relative to the masses’ unfounded grandiose beliefs they hold for themselves. I suggest that 
highlighting this part of their overall personality is, in part, a rhetorical tactic in the tradition 
of provocation used to lure in an otherwise skeptical audience. It is a disarming mechanism 
by which to take would-be detractors off their defenses to put them in the frame of mind 
most conducive to receive the theorists’ message, as they are strategists. They are doing so 
by keeping in the tradition of Aristotle, who in The Rhetoric, advises, “We must also take 
into account the nature of our particular audience” (Rh 1356).
 The idea is, given their perceived gifts, if the theorists can accept a person’s/their 
limitations, so should others, particularly those who in failing are contributors of the 
degradation of the contemporary social order. That said, however, and to which I previously 
alluded, they remain steadfast in their serious attitudes toward approaching those aspects of 
life they can control, namely self-improvement. However, they respectively conceptualize 
that activity, as it is different for each. To recap, they believe themselves to be principled, 
disciplined and temperate models which others ought to emulate. 
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 In sum, at times, the theorists cast themselves as willing to appear foolish as a 
disarming mechanism in order to eventually expose those whom they are critical of 
possessing the same inherent traits, which they ought to realize and accept. Upon doing so, 
it frees them to take seriously what the theorists do. Thus, they use appearance as a 
pedagogical device to reveal the truth. The truth is the proper orientation toward the world 
where one is light-hearted and even a little self-deprecating about his/her futility and deadly 
earnest about achieving maximum potential. The implications of that process of provocation 
are politically constructive in nature, as they, for Plato, set the necessary social conditions for 
the administering just policies, which so happen to be opposite from those suffered by 
Socrates under the current regime and which Plato’s Republic seeks to rectify:
Then we weren’t giving laws that are impossible or like prayers, since the law we 
were setting down is according to nature.  Rather, the way things are nowadays 
proves to be...against nature ... Therefore...no practice of a city’s 
governors...belongs to woman because she’s woman, or to man because he’s man; 
but the natures are scattered alike among both animals (R 178)
Category 2—Expectation: Socrates, Textual Example
[P]eople dread [death] as though they were certain that it is the greatest evil, and 
this ignorance, which thinks that it knows what it does not, must surely be ignorance 
most culpable.  This...is the degree, and this the nature of my advantage over the 
rest of mankind, and if I were to claim to be wiser than my neighbor in any respect, 
it would be in this—that not possessing any real knowledge of what comes after 
death, I am also conscious that I do not possess it. (A 15) ... What do I deserve for 
behaving in this way? Some reward, gentlemen, if I am bound to suggest what I 
really deserve, and what is more, a reward which would be appropriate for myself. 
(A 15, 21)
Category 2—Expectation: Rousseau, Textual Example
For us—ordinary men who heaven has not distributed such great talents and whom 
it does not destine for much glory—let us remain in our obscurity.  Let us not chase 
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after a reputation that would escape us and which, in the present state of things, 
would never return to us what it would have cost us, even if we had all the 
qualifications to obtain it.  What good is it to seek our happiness in the opinion of 
another if we can find it in ourselves? (DSA 21)
Category 2—Expectation: Nietzsche, Textual Example
[T]hat Hebrew died too early whom the preachers of slow death honor; and for 
many it has become a calamity that he died too early ... Perhaps he would have 
learned to live and to love the earth—and laughter too ... He died too early; he 
himself would have recanted his teaching, had he reached my age. Noble enough 
was he to recant... Immature is the love of the youth, and immature is hatred of man 
and earth ... Tell me: how did gold attain the highest value? Because it is uncommon 
and useless and gleaming and gentle in its splendor; it always gives itself ... 
Uncommon is the highest virtue and useless; it is gleaming and gentle in its 
splendor... (Z)
Category 3—Deviation: Overview with Contextual Discussion
 On the one hand, the theorists approach themselves with a sense of irony and do 
not take themselves so seriously, which allows them to be joyful although their joy is a 
harnessed type, tempered by moderation, perspective and reason(ableness). They possess a 
confidence others tend to lack. For the theorists, however, they see through the others’ 
prejudicial delusions of grandeur and focus on remaining serious about matters that warrant 
rigorous study and reflection, thus freeing them to maximize their philosophical potential 
which includes the activity of responding to self-deceptive “haughtiness” that comes to 
culminate in theorizing a new politics that is transformative, in that it would provide the 
social and cultural conditions for extraordinary (Plato) sublimation (Rousseau and Nietzsche). 
As such, the implied contrast between what differentiates their senses of humor—the 
theorists’ willingness and ability to access human triviality in absolute terms versus the 
others’ false sense of superiority—exposes both parties equally. However, the revelations are 
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opposite: the theorists’ natures are honest where the masses are shameful (which reinforces 
the extent to which they hide theirs by ridiculing that which should not be).
 The outcome of this takes us to the third illustrative narrative found in the theorists’ 
works; that is, by exposing themselves and revealing the social facades others take seriously 
(and by implication, exposing the others), they become the embodiments of a natural 
human, which is to their advantage, as they construct nature to be. Put differently, in having 
freed themselves from, first, the social expectations of remaining in good social standing 
(because the motivations lie in vanity and flattery) as well as from, next, the self-inflicted and 
culturally constructed burdens of always appearing serious and solemn, as if life demands 
from us our levity, the theorists reclaim a free, more natural way of life, which puts them at 
an advantage over others—they can transcend the contempt others hold for them and 
release themselves from holding petty grudges to which others cling.
 Of importance here is that the theorists see themselves as more natural although 
when appropriate, as some circumstances, in varying degrees and what manner, depending 
on the individual theorist, they must return provocation with provocation. As critics of the 
current political structures and whose legitimacy rests upon acquiescence or, at least, tacit 
approval of a majority comprised of participants of the aforementioned behaviors 
disapproved of and disavowed by the theories and the theorists, respectively. As models for 
a more natural condition, they intend to link dispositions to politics. All political regimes are 
artificial constructions made by humans to incentivize and disincentivize behaviors. The goal 
is to construct a kind of politics that, in terms of provocation, encourages and reinforces the 
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good and transforms and suppresses the bad. However, people, including and most 
especially the theorists, disagree about what consists of and amounts to the good and bad 
in us. One profound similarity exists in their analysis, however: all attempt to ground their 
conceptions of justice as (the most) accurate reflections of what is “natural,” what most 
resembles “nature.” It is an argumentative resource they all draw upon and claim about 
themselves to describe the inferior state even if, as Plato attempts, suggesting the existence 
of an Ideal, with a capital-i relative to a less artificial, less arbitrary, or a more naturally 
assembled set of customs and policies. 
 The reality is, for the theorists and the motive for theorizing, the systems to which 
they belong and of which they are products represent a deviation from a (more) natural, 
(more) just, fair(er) state, as they are reflections of the deviated and departed, decrepit and 
decadent dispositions of the power elite.
 The inflamed, impassioned and irrational temperaments which induce men to certain 
acts “prove” the theorists’ cases for them, the evidence being: Socrates is forced to drink 
the hemlock; Plato is forced to make an apology; Rousseau is forced to suffer the ridicule he 
likens to Socrates’ cup; and Nietzsche is forced to retreat as a hermit does to the forest. All 
repercussions of that first act of some provocation were forced upon them to which in turn 
they felt forced to respond in kind by writing a theory of the “(more) natural.” Although each 
conceive of the “natural” differently, the parallel is that they intend to contrast their lives (as 
persons and pursuits) and their corresponding political theories with those currently at the 
helm of political control, where injustice abounds as the mechanisms for justice are 
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implementations of a corrupted value social structure. In this way, the theorists present their 
theoretical writings as political scenarios that better recreate a more natural state, in that 
what is deemed to be (more) natural and similar to the etymological evolution of the 
conceptual terminology of provocation assuming a more negative connotation assumes the 
elevated status of better, superior and preferential. The term natural is given deference, 
which means to suggest that for one to argue against nature, one assumes the burden of 
proof for having to make the argument against the “natural.” It has been done, and 
Christianity has been enormously successful in defining natural in negative terms and doing 
so even more forcefully by invoking morality as a way of conceptually approaching its 
contextual meaning.
Category 3—Deviation: Socrates, Textual Examples
This...is the degree, and this the nature of my advantage over the rest of mankind, 
and if I were to claim to be wiser than my neighbor in any respect, it would be in this
—that not possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, I am also 
conscious that I do not possess it ... For my own part I bear no grudge at all against 
those who condemned me and accused me, although it was not with this kind 
intention that they did so, but because they thought that they were hurting me; and 
that is culpable of them. (A 15, 26)
Category 3—Deviation: Plato, Textual Examples
[The Platonic Socrates of The Phaedo:] It is natural that these people whom you 
speak of should act in that way, Crito...because they think that they gain by it. And it 
is also natural that I should not, because I believe that I should gain nothing by 
drinking the poison a little later—I should only make myself ridiculous in m own eyes 
if I clung to life and hugged it when it has no more to offer. (Ph 96) ... ‘But which of 
the current regimes do you say is suitable for it?’ ... ‘None at all,’ I said, ‘but this is 
the very charge I’m bringing; not one city today is in a condition worthy of the 
philosophic nature.’ (R 176)
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Category 3—Deviation: Rousseau, Textual Examples
[P]ity is a natural sentiment, which, by moderating in each individual the activity of 
the love of oneself, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species. 
Pity is what carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see suffering. Pity is 
what in the state of nature takes the place of laws, mores, and virtue. (DOI 54)
Such is the natural and inevitable tendency of the best constituted governments.  If 
Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to last forever? If we wish to form a 
durable establishment, let us then not dream of making it eternal. To succeed, one 
must not attempt the impossible or flatter oneself with giving to the work of men a 
solidity that things humans do not allow ... The body politic, like the human body, 
begins to die from the very moment of its birth, and carries within itself the causes 
of its destruction.  (SC 194)
Category 3—Deviation: Nietzsche, Textual Examples
And if the lambs say among themselves: ‘these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is 
least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb—would he not be good?’ 
there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that 
the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: ‘we don’t dislike them at all, 
these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender 
lamb.’ (GM 44)
[I]nequality of rights is the conditions for the existence of rights at all. —A right is a 
privilege. The privilege of each is determined by the nature of his being. Let us not 
underestimate the privilege of the mediocre. Life becomes harder and harder as it 
approaches the heights ... A high culture is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad 
base, its very first prerequisite is a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. 
(AC 191)
Category 4—Centrality: Overview with Contextual Discussion
 A fourth type of rhetorical scenario of the theorists is a criticism grounded in what 
they find to be  if not (only) a disingenuous and/or hypocritical invocation, then, a misguided 
and/or unmerited invocation of religiosity to rationalize their authority. The theorists happen 
to see through the leader’s scheme. These elites, some of whom actually have successfully 
deceived even themselves into believing they have the authority to speak on behalf of the 
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gods/God where the gods/God, if one were inclined to extend to the gods/God authorial 
intentionality, have/has chosen to remain silent. However,  these elites have anointed 
themselves the mouthpiece of the gods/God to interpret sacred doctrines for political 
explanatory purposes that, for the theorists, conveniently reinforce policies favorable to the 
regimes whose enforcement mechanisms actually run contrary to the very scriptures the 
elites cite to justify their wrongful practices.
 Within this context, the theorists intend and they expect to discredit them. That is, 
the theorists, in different ways, contend that they can prove, to the extent that theorizing 
allows, that the leaders, whom the theorists label as opportunists, at least within the sphere 
of politics, misrepresent what virtue truly is. The theorists attempt this in a couple of ways. 
One method is to wrestle away from them the assumptions by which they make their 
religious claims that they channel for exercising, in the name of the gods/God, political 
justice, or injustice, on the theorists’ interpretation. They set out to accomplish this by 
pointing out their gross contradictions, hypocrisies and spiritual shortcomings, which is 
meant to strip them of any credibility of further references to dogmatism. The goal is to 
discredit their claims by lowering the religious stakes that have made political obligation one 
of religious duty.
 In different rhetorical presentation, the theorists mean to, and similar  to the previous 
categories’ tactics, lay out a sound and what should be convincing argument for—at least as 
currently practiced—their religions’ politics-driven evolution and incoherent applicability to 
things beyond the pulpit, such as society, culture and government. To be successful, the 
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theorists effectively invert commonly held conceptions about virtue and morality. The stakes 
are high for their audience as their eternal soul is on the line, as the elites would like them to 
believe. The task seems almost insurmountable but is absolutely necessary, in that because 
the general public believes itself to be so central in the make-up of the universe. 
 The theorists contrast themselves and by extension their visions of justice, with the 
appearance of justice as it applied contemporaneously, in that its seeming quality is the 
attempt, a laughable one at that if it were not so destructive, to apply religious dogma, 
attained via revelation, to this-worldly political circumstance. The result has been repeatedly 
shown to be inequitable in real-terms but deserving in moral and abstract terms and, per 
the gods’/God’s  earthly mouthpieces, on the gods/God’s command as part of their/His 
eternal plan, which requires the unwavering and unfettering trust and believe everyone.
Category 4—Centrality: Socrates, Textual Examples
 Socrates’ version of religious duty is so foreign to Athenian practice that his accusers 
neglect to characterize it as blasphemous. Instead, they charge him with outright atheism, 
one of the counts against Socrates:
As for your prospect of convincing any living person with even a smattering of 
intelligence that belief in supernatural and divine activities does not imply belief in 
supernatural and divine beings...it is outside all the bounds of possibility ... I do not 
feel that it requires much defense to clear myself of [his] accusation. What I have said 
already is enough. (A 13)
This is a result, in part, of him leveling against his fellow Athenians with that inflated sense of 
spiritual access to the gods in terms of what they conceive as “their” wisdom: “[R]eal 
wisdom is the property of God...that human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me 
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that he is not referring literally to Socrates...as if he would say to us, ‘The wisest of you men 
is he who has realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless.’ (A 9)
Category 4—Centrality: Plato, Textual Example
 The Republic is an attempt to correct for the injustice administered in The Apology. 
Bloom’s footnote is noteworthy here:
The sailor...each supposing he ought to pilot...claim it isn’t even teachable and are 
ready to cut to pieces the man who says it is teachable ... And sometimes, if they fail 
at persuasion and other men succeed at it, they either kill the others or throw them 
out of the ship ... Besides this, they praise and call ‘skilled sailor,’ pilot,’ and ‘knower 
of the ship’s business’ the man who is clever at figuring out how they will get the 
rule, either by persuading or by forcing the shipowner, while the man who is not of 
this sort they blame as useless. So...don’t you believe that the true pilot will really 
be called a star gazer, [6]...and useless to them by those who sail on ships run like 
this? [6: ‘studying the heavens’ was a serious [charge]; astronomers tended to be 
atheists and were accused of so being...it is not casual that this speech is presented 
as an apology.] (R 168)
Category 4—Centrality: Rousseau, Textual Example
 Rousseau uses the language of provocation to help to account for the third thematic 
category of provocation: “[H]ow man sees everything in God; how the soul and the body are 
in harmony with one another, like two clocks, without communicating.” (DSA 12)
Category 4—Centrality: Nietzsche, Textual Examples
‘Good’ is only what little people call good ... And today ‘truth’ is what the preacher said, 
who himself came from among them, that queer saint and advocate of the little people 
who bore witness about himself: ‘I am the truth.’ (Z 266) ... [O]ur educated people of 
today, including the Christians of ‘educated’ Christianity [have] no cause for 
amazement...among these ruins [that is] the taste for the Old Testament ... —perhaps he 
will find the New Testament, the book of grace, ....more after his heart (it contains...musty 
true-believer and small-soul smell). To have glued this New Testament...to the Old 
Testament to make one book...as ‘the book par excellence’...is perhaps the greatest 
audacity...that literary Europe has on its conscience. (BGE 65)
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Category 5—Intelligibility: Overview with Contextual Discussion 
 A fifth dynamic that surfaces in the theorists’ thought is similar to the previous one. 
Where the fourth sought to expose the illegitimacy and arbitrariness of monarchal 
argumentative premises based on the dogmatic and unchallengeable appeal to the ‘divine 
rights of kings,’ often supported with religious cohorts, this type of narrative that the 
theorists construct focuses on exposing the fraudulent bases for and the processes by which 
the elites whom the theorists’ oppose derive their superior reasoning and intellect. For 
those elite leaders, their superior reasoning and intellect justify their decision-making and 
distributive power.
 The theorists identify multiple parties in their analysis on this matter. Two of the 
parties appear to be their audience, one positive and the other negative.  The former 
consists of those like-minded, and the latter consists of the power elite toward whom the 
theorists direct their criticism. The third group is incidental, in that they embody the general 
public who have been, essentially, duped into trading a superior condition for which to live 
for a lesser one, one in which the elite leaders thrive at the expense. The problem is not 
necessarily a distribution of resources, especially not for Plato and Nietzsche, but with 
respect to the leaders’ dispositions and inclinations. They prefer a differently-motivated 
governing body, one that unsurprisingly shares many of the characteristics the theorists and 
their protagonists possess. The theorists present a pessimistic tone for what they aspire to in 
terms of the plausibility for transformation. This is so, to a significant degree, because of 
how badly the deception has seeped into the general public’s psyche. 
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 The theorists are indicting these self-proclaimed intellectual leaders on multiple 
counts. First, the theorists attempt to show that they lack the intellectual resources and skill-
set as they point to various instances in which their decisions resulted in a worse condition. 
Related, the theorists connect how these elite leaders attempt to cover up their deficiencies 
by conflating the real and measurable policies, which the theorists deem as failures with 
counterfactuals. That is, like the religious leaders, the theorists manage to continue holding 
onto power by confusing the many into accepting the status quo as the superior alternative 
to a falsely invented abstraction, and in the process, they have come to believe their own 
deceptions. For the theorists, this makes them lacking in both integrity and depth. The fact 
that these leaders have not admitted their failures and, in many cases, can no longer do so 
exposes them, too, as lazy and weak, which is partly the reason why the elites constantly use 
certain tonal language—e.g., poetic for Plato, inspirational for Nietzsche—to divert 
attention from the substantive merits and the actual outcomes. The theorists, in turn, color 
their commentary with the provocative language of mocking exasperation in explaining and 
contrasting the type of knowledge and wisdom practiced by their targets with themselves. 
Much of the difference lies not only in their ends but also in the initial assumptions of the 
terms’ meanings, as evidenced by the disagreement in the manifestation of the expressions 
of knowledge and wisdom.
 Socrates’ mission is to destroy the traditional conception of wisdom. Unlike the 
others, who as we shall see argue for alternative orientations for understanding the 
instances in which wisdom has been truly exercised, Socrates’ negative characterization of 
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wisdom amounts to a confession of ignorance, for all practical purposes. Only upon such 
recognition can one begin to become philosophical which in a seemingly paradoxical way 
can one begin to know about what one can be certain. Socrates himself is certain  that what 
others are certain about, e.g., their confidence is themselves, have been shown and will 
remain in dispute. For Socrates, the problem is that his negative certainty is especially in 
Nietzsche’s analysis, equally dogmatic and without empirical proof. That the contrasts are 
parallel in that they all attack a specified audience that the theorists believe to demonstrate 
false-conceit whose repercussions have been devastating for the society and culture, but 
those “wise men” identified in each of the individual theorists are wholly different, some of 
whom are the targets of the later theorists. Even Plato begrudges Socrates for engaging in 
this kind of behavior, as Rousseau does Plato, and as Nietzsche does all of them.
Category 5—Intelligibility: (Historical) Socrates, Textual Example
I want to explain to you how the attack on my reputation first started ... Why does 
he not use plain language? I am only too conscious that I have no claim to 
wisdom, great or small. So what can he mean by asserting that I am the wisest 
man in the world? He cannot be telling a lie; that would not be right for him ... I 
went away to interview a man with a high reputation for wisdom, because I felt 
that here if anywhere I should succeed in disproving the oracle and pointing out to 
my divine authority. You said that I was the wisest of men, but here is a man who is 
wiser than I am. (A 7)
Category 5—Intelligibility: (Platonic) Socrates, Textual Example
Neither would we ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand--
rather we would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them
—nor would we trust those over whom we ruled to do anything except what they 
would do correctly, and this would be that of which they possessed the 
science...‘when we say what a good thing it would be to know what one knows 
and what one does not know?’ ... But in spite of the fact that the inquiry has 
shown us to be both complacent and easy, it is not a whit more capable of 
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discovering the truth. It has, in fact, made fun of the truth to this extent, that it has 
very insolently exposed as useless the definition of temperance which we agreed 
upon and invented earlier. (Ch 88, 95)
Category 5—Intelligibility: Plato, Textual Example
‘[T]he poetic man also uses...phrases to color each of the arts. He himself doesn’t 
understand; but he imitates in such a way as to seem, to men whose condition is 
like his own and who observe only speeches, to speak very well. He seems to do 
so when he speaks using meter, rhythm’ ... ‘Won’t we assert that these men 
delight in and love that which knowledge depends, and the others that on which 
opinion depends? Or don’t we remember that we were saying that they love and 
look at fair sounds and colors and such things but can’t endure the fact that the 
fair itself is something?’ ... ‘So, will we strike a false note in calling them lovers of 
opinion rather than lovers of wisdom. And will they be very angry with us if we 
speak this way?’ ... ‘No,’ he said, ‘that is, if they are persuaded by me. For it’s not 
lawful to be harsh with what’s true.’ (R 283)
Category 5—Intelligibility: Rousseau, Textual Examples
[If one]...supplements uncertain chronicles with philosophical inquiries, one will not 
find an origin for human knowledge corresponding to the idea that one wants to 
form of it. Astronomy was born of superstition, eloquence of ambition, hatred, 
flattery, lying...even moral philosophy, of human pride. Thus the sciences and the 
arts owe their birth to our vices; we would be less in doubt about their advantages, 
if they owed it to our virtues ... ‘What do the writings of the best known 
philosophers contain? ...each crying from his own place on a public square, ‘Come 
to me; I alone do not deceive?’ ... These then are the wonderful men on whom the 
esteem of their contemporaries was squandered during their lifetimes, and for 
whom immortality was set aside after their deaths!  (DSA 10, 18)
But not everybody is capable of making the gods speak or of being believed when 
he proclaims himself their interpreter [which is laughable] ... [A]ccording to Plato, a 
king by nature is such a rare person ... Surely then it is deliberate self-deception to 
confuse the royal form of government with that of a good king ... These difficulties 
have not escaped the attention of our authors, but they have not been troubled by 
them. The remedy, they say, is to obey without a murmur. God in his anger gives us 
bad kings, and they must be endured as punishments from heaven. No doubt this 
sort of talk is edifying, however, I do not know but that it belongs more in a pulpit 
than in a book on political theory. (SC 164, 186)
Category 5—Intelligibility: Nietzsche, Textual Examples
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What provokes one to look at all philosophers...half mockingly, is not...how 
often...they make mistakes and go astray; in short, their childishness and 
childlikeness—but that they are not honest enough in their work, although they all 
make a lot of virtuous noise... They all pose as if they had discovered...their real 
opinions through...divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics...who 
are more honest and doltish—and talk of ‘inspiration’); while at bottom it is...a 
hunch...a kind of ‘inspiration’—...a desire of the heart that has been...made abstract
—that they defend [what]...they have sought after the fact. They are all advocates 
who resent that name... and very far from having the courage of the conscience that 
admits this...to mock itself. (BGE 12)
Man himself had become God’s greatest blunder; God had created for himself a 
rival, science makes equal to God—it is all over with priests and gods if man 
becomes scientific! Moral: science is the forbidden in itself ... Science is...the germ 
of all sins, original sin.  This alone constitutes morality. —‘Though shalt not know’ ... 
Man shall not think. (AC 176)
Category 6—Residency: Overview with Contextual Discussion
 A sixth and final, for my purposes, narrative that I categorize to assess the contrasts 
made in order to more forcefully draw distinctions between what the theorists’ embody and 
what those with whom the status quo and current conditions resemble. As the theorists 
argue, there are the reasons for the further deterioration of society whose political culture is 
most culpable. Specifically, this criticism is one that pits the theorists against their 
contemporaries by associating themselves with a distant context and environment, spatially 
and/or temporally. Temporally speaking, the theorists align themselves with another type of 
personality, one that resembled a time-past when justice was defined more naturally and 
applied appropriately. This reference is the kind of historical analysis they all conduct when 
describing the opposition as decadent and deviant, e.g., Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality and Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. 
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 In addition to historicizing the account to describe progression, regression, on their 
terms, they theorize about a future place where the values and dispositions promoted by 
the theorists flourish. In this sense, it re-establishes many of the qualities that defined those 
historical points for which the theorists are so nostalgic. The social and political structures, as 
a manifestation of the members’ rightly provocative and provokable temperaments and 
natures, are ordered in such a way that reflects the overarching philosophical principles, 
e.g., philosophically-driven political rule by philosopher-kings for Plato, liberty from equality 
for Rousseau. When the theorists’ analyses remain centered in the present, respectively, they 
identify their philosophically-represented homes in places far removed that their actual 
residents, e.g., Athens for Socrates, Germany for Nietzsche. For instance, Nietzsche’s 
protagonist, Zarathustra, dwells in mountainous caves (Z 18); and to the ears of his fellow 
Athenians, Socrates speaks as “if [he] were from another country” (A 4).
 A longing contempt fills their literary voices when forced to acknowledge the same 
physical space and age that the theorists occupy with their contemporaries and adds 
rhetorical force to their disparaging attacks on what their philosophical adversaries point to 
and call social advancement or cultural achievement. Their provocative message means to 
agitate and vex and to yet awaken people from the lulled state they have been lured and 
coaxed into by the power elites who perpetuate an earthly existence in which people aspire 
to merely cope.  Although the theorists’ friendly audiences, those with whom they identify 
and sympathize, greatly vary according to their political ideology, in each case, despite the 
seemingly insurmountable odds for real, on-the-ground action, which is not the sole 
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objective for having theorized a new vision of politics, anyway, for the theorists, it is of vital 
concern, as it is who they are, to distinguish the figurative locales of where the they feel at 
and call “home.” It is far removed from the institutions that maintain the status quo, the 
norms and mores that have forced the theorists to flee to write from afar.
Category 6—Residency: Socrates, Textual Example
One thing, however, I do most earnestly beg and entreat of you. If you hear me 
defending myself in the same language which it has been my habit to use, both in 
the open spaces of this city—where many of you have heard me—and elsewhere, 
do not be surprised, and do not interrupt ...[A]nd so I am a complete stranger to the 
language of this place. (A 4)
Category 6—Residency: Plato, Textual Examples
And [he] interrupted and said, ‘What would your apology...Socrates, if someone 
were to say that you’re hardly making these men happy, and further, that it’s their 
own fault—they to whom the city in truth belongs but who enjoy nothing good from 
the city as do others, who possess lands, and build fine big houses, and possess all 
the accessories ... [A]nd all that’s conventionally held to belong to men who are 
going to be blessed? (R 97)
Then we weren’t giving laws that are impossible or like prayers, since the law we 
were setting down is according to nature. Rather, the way things are nowadays 
proves to be...against nature ... ‘[F]oreseeing...we were frightened; but...compelled 
by truth...that neither city nor regime will ever become perfect, nor yet will a 
man...before some necessity chances to constrain those few philosophers who 
aren’t vicious, those now called useless, to take charge of a city, whether they want 
to or not.’ (R 135, 176)
Category 6—Residency: Rousseau, Textual Examples
I foresee that I will not easily be forgiven for the side I have dared to choose. 
Running head on into everything that men admire today, I can expect only universal 
blame ... Thus I have taken my stand. I do not care about pleasing either the witty or 
the fashionable. There will always be men destined to be subjugated by the 
opinions of their century, their country, their society. (DSA 1)
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[Strong on Rousseau:] [Rousseau] has seen himself as he is. Whereas others cannot 
see the author of these books, he can … The paradox intended is that a book that is 
filled with singularities about one person is to be a portrait of that which is human … 
The usefulness of this work…is that it may allow at last the beginning of the study of 
the human being… [Re:] the Confessions…to be painting a portrait of home…is to 
say that he is home and that no one else is. (1994: 12-3)
Category 6—Residency: Nietzsche, Textual Examples
I flew too far into the future: dread overcame me, and when I looked around, behold, time 
was my sole contemporary. Then I flew back toward home, faster and faster; and thus I 
came to you, O men of today, and in the land of education ... I was amazed, you men of 
today. (Z 119) ... At this point I shall not suppress a sigh. There are days when I am 
haunted by a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy—contempt of man.  And so as 
to leave no doubt as to what I despise, whom I despise: it is the man of today, the man 
with whom I am fatefully contemporary. (AC 161)
[S]laves of the democratic taste and its ‘modern ideas’ ... [T]hey are unfree and ridiculously 
superficial ... Without the pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained difference 
between strata—when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon 
subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience and command, 
keeping down and keeping at a distance... (BGE 54, 201)
5 General Points at which to Analyze Provocation: Introduction 
 In the last section of chapter three, I give a general outline of proceeding chapters 
that discuss the theorists themselves. I construct my analysis of their contexts as one largely 
defined by relationships built around provocation (dimensions of provocation) as well as the 
incorporation of provocation into their thought and explanation. I do this by looking at their 
most significant writings that explicitly use the language of provocation as well as the places 
that make reference to provocation (categories of provocation) in theorizing an alternative 
and superior politics. In addition to a textual analysis of the theorists’ catalogues, I 
supplement my argument with a wide range of some of the leading academic scholars on 
the theorists themselves as well as areas on philosophical rhetoric, interpretation and 
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methodological strategies. This scholarship includes competing theories about how to best 
approach the interpretive process, which, in turn, adds to their work the possibility of 
introducing another dimension of provocation—that is, extending the discussion of 
provocation to the scholarly community. To illustrate this point, a leading authority on 
Rousseau, Tracy Strong, in his book, The Politics of the Ordinary, concedes: “I cannot 
attempt to account for the diversity of opinions on Rousseau by suggesting that such and 
such an interpretation ‘gets him right’—or wrong. What…Rousseau gives us [is]…our 
language for politics and personhood…I want to therefore read Rousseau in such a way that 
our questions appear as his concern” (1994: 2). 
 Without delving too deeply into this area, as it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, I do make reference to the most striking cases, as there exists, to a degree, 
interpretive trends that come into and fall out of scholarly fashion about the most prominent 
theorists, such as the three I have selected. This is important to refer to, as there is a parallel 
that can be applied to the political setting where it is important for citizens to be able to 
recognize the various places from which provocation originate: scholarly experts, media, etc.
 The theorists represent three vastly unique philosophical traditions, particularly 
regarding their differences on what the proper nature of the activity of philosophy ought to 
be as well as the expectation for what it can contribute to our lives. However, all have in 
common the concept of provocation as part of their overall theoretical projects. Thus, I 
attempt to layout out their respective projects as ones of provocation in order to compare 
their parallel applications of provocation as well as the instances where the concept appears 
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similarly. The dimensions and categories of provocation previously introduced appear 
differently from one theorist to the next. For example, to make the most plausible case for 
his rhetorical strategy, Rousseau uses the fourth thematic category, which criticizes his 
theoretical opposition for thinking they are smarter than they actually are, to frame the terms 
for fair and accurate accounting of the historical record. For Rousseau, using conjecture to 
establish the initial assumptions on which to build just political obligation is credible. 
Nietzsche’s genealogy relies more heavily on the narrative described in category three. For 
example, Nietzsche explains the result of European nihilism through the lens of the 
invention of morality whose promise is a false one although, on his opponents’ terms, a 
highly effective one. In what follows is the general format the next chapters take, to the 
extent the differences in the three permit.
Point 1 of Analysis: Circumstantial Origins
 I start each of the chapters  on Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche by contextualizing the 
individual circumstances that contribute to the eventual decision to engage with their 
contemporaries and take to writing their social criticisms and then philosophies which 
include political theoretical proposals, to varying extents. For the theorists, the detrimental 
situations to which they are responding have begun, in real-terms, obstructing the theorists 
and their allies from living the types of meaningful existence that would otherwise be more 
readily available to them if not for the corruption, decadence and injustice pervasive all 
around them.
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 Socrates is forced to defend himself in court, to which Plato forces the literary 
Socrates to speak at the beginning of the Republic. Rousseau sees himself as the victim of 
an oppressive condition of real and perceptually-sanctioned conditions of inequality from 
which he cannot escape. To set the record straight, he writes in his Confessions: “No matter 
what place I might choose for a refuge, clearly could not safeguard myself against either of 
the two methods which had been used to expel me, the first of inciting the population 
against me by underground intrigues, and the second of expelling me by naked force 
without offering any reasons” (C 597).
 Similar to Rousseau’s assessment of society’s imposition is Nietzsche’s. However, 
where Rousseau laments his persecution from a position of inferiority, as, in Rousseau’s view, 
domination is arbitrarily constructed socially. Rousseau recalls past relationships he mistook 
for real friendships and the friction it later caused when writing: “I overstepped the limits 
and conceived a friendship for them, of a kind only permissible between equals” (C 483). 
Nietzsche’s indignation for the so-called “strong races of northern Europe” comes from a 
self-anointed, aristocratic-like sense of superiority. In feeling the societal effects of 
democratic idealists’ “decrepit product of decadence” (AC 140), Strong writes, “Nietzsche’s 
task, as he sees it imposed upon him, is to destroy those prejudices that keep men from 
acknowledging their conditions” (Strong 1975: 53).
 In my dealings with these theorists as political provocateurs, Socrates represents the 
original provocateur, whose mission originated with the oracle, who assigned him with 
properly defining wisdom. As his mission ended in his conviction, Plato, upon assessing the 
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injustice toward the philosophical Socrates, intervened to prescribe a newly disposed leader. 
Although sharing with Socrates an understanding of and duty to justice, Plato takes to 
writing and creating a dynamic between teacher and student less antagonistic than the 
historic Socrates. Thus started the Western philosophical tradition of writing as a 
communicatory device to create a learning environment most conducive for managing the 
tone of the debate, so ensure that the interlocutors’ response to the provocation were 
positive ones and where growth and understanding, in turn, led to a recognition of a just 
regime ruled by Socratic-like philosopher kings who no longer minded their own businesses 
but were provoked to a political course of action. 
 Rousseau and Nietzsche’s works are similar, if one were to view, in methodological 
terms, their criticisms similarly to Socrates’ negative assessment of the general Athenians’ 
cultural disposition and their political theoretical agendas as responses to those 
determinations similarly as Plato’s was to Socrates’. On this reading, one can connect the 
natures of their projects whose features and components, in terms of the concept of 
provocation, back to the initial contexts to which they were induced to respond in writing. 
To reinforce the positions from where Rousseau and Nietzsche launch their rhetorical 
attacks, Rousseau’s attack is from below, as intuitively supportive of democratic equality and 
Nietzsche’s is from above, as a fierce opponent of democratic “mediocrity.” Furthermore, 
Rousseau makes self-referential inclusions of how Nietzsche might characterize it as being 
“all-too-human.” Rousseau is confident but mindful of his many shortcomings and is careful 
to make mention of them, so as to not present a distorted picture of the truth. He writes in 
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his Confessions, “Deluded by my stupid conceit, I thought that I was born to destroy all 
[these] deceits” (C 388). However, Nietzsche’s attitude toward himself lacks any hint of 
uncertainty. The two, however, have in common a shared devotion to the truth, something 
both of whom think they have on their side. 
 In addition, this commitment to integrity and honesty drives much of their work, as 
the devastating blow of the poor understanding of virtue, though differently conceived 
among the theorists but similarly critical of the prevailing assumptions of their respective 
cultures. As such, Nietzsche reflects back on and anticipates his role for confronting the ills 
of his age: “I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of 
something tremendous—crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of 
conscience, a decision that was conjured up against everything that had been believed ... I 
am no man, I am dynamite! (EH 326). It is their characters, their rightly provocative and 
provocable natures, coupled with their duty to the truth, that makes their writings necessary 
and honorable. As such, their characters define the nature of their theoretical projects, which 
employ a number of rhetorical strategies that include the various categories of provocation, 
and thus their philosophical doctrines and complimentary political theories, all of which are 
assessed throughout the chapters.
Point 2 of Analysis: Frameworks of Rhetorical Strategies
 Given the contexts that provoked the theorists to return provocation with 
provocation—except for the historical Socrates, who initiated that first act of provocation 
and to whom Plato (among the many Athenians, some friends and others enemies) is 
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reacting—they supplement their social and cultural criticisms with chosen rhetorical 
strategies. These strategies carry in them their respective interpretations of the unfolding of 
events leading to the deterioration of the conditions prevalent in society, on their terms. As 
descriptions of history, their analyses appeal to certain assumptions that they identify as the 
right and, importantly, fair ones from which to analyze the situations and thus provide a 
favorable lens from which to then contextualize their postulates so as to logically progress to 
a proper and favorable conclusion, reached systematically (again, on their terms), from the 
frame they construct for how to account for the historical record and what are the best 
examples to support such an accurate interpretation of those unfolding of events.
 For example, Socrates’ main philosophical objective is to improve his own soul. This 
self-perfecting endeavor means to become a more reasoned or rational being, who is less 
emotional, and thus less concerned with physicality. Although a seemingly solitary activity, 
achieving such philosophical rationality requires other participants to engage in the back-
and-forth question and answer, which has come to be known as the Socratic method. As 
Socrates’ primary goal remains inwardly-focused, and thus his concern for others’ internally 
enhanced philosophical “capacity for human excellence” is secondary or incidental, as 
Dobbs puts it, the “operation of dialectical argument [can] inevitably deteriorate into eristics 
(as happened between [him] and Thrasymachus)” (265).
 Consequently, Socrates’ confrontational style of fearless questioning, which riles 
many to anger and leaves others in bewilderment, remains a key and necessary component 
of his rhetorical strategy that makes possible the condition for “get[ting] rid of the body and 
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contemplat[ing] things by themselves and the soul by itself” (Ph 49). Others’ condition, even 
if in a worse state than before, is seemingly, for Socrates, merely a byproduct of the 
argumentative process that privileges the outcome of his own self-perfection. All else is 
provocation’s incidental collateral damage and remains a driving force to the more 
cultivating and therapeutic approach Plato takes in abandoning Socratic oral argument in 
favor of an “investigative strategy,” in Dobbs’s terminology (275). This strategy captures in 
writing the exercise of “establishing a city in speech,” in order to eventually unearth true, as 
opposed to the appearance of, justice, as defined by those members belonging to and 
comprised of such a regime.
 Once the theorists identify a rhetorical strategy by which to frame the terms of the 
debate and choose to engage interlocutors or audience members, the theorists select 
concepts pertinent to their criticisms and thus seem precisely tailored to analyze within their 
strategic framework by which to build upon their beginning argumentative premises and 
initial postulates. On my terms, Plato’s theme of justice applies. In response to Socrates’ 
failures, in a larger context beyond Socrates himself, Plato creates a nurturing environment 
that fosters the necessary reception for differently defining the meaning of justice and thus 
producing an acceptable inversion of justice as it is certainly practiced and applied to cases. 
 Similarly, and as alluded to in this section’s introduction, Rousseau’s overall rhetorical 
strategy includes a conjectural appeal in which he couches the argument for changing—that 
is, inverting the behaviors that correspond to virtuous acts and those that correspond to 
immoral ones. Rousseau seeks to wholly alter the prevailing view of his day as to what 
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counts as progress, intending to show that attitudes and behaviors commonly associated 
with advancement actually represent regress and devolution. The opposite is that the falsity 
of any attempt as serious that links modernity to morality, on Rousseau’s definitional terms 
for “virtue” and “vice,” serves as the strategic reference points to rhetorically prove his 
version of morality. Rousseau writes:
Everywhere I see immense establishments where youths are brought up at great 
expense to learn everything but their duties ... Without knowing how to separate 
error from truth, they will possess the art of making them unrecognizable to others 
by means of specious arguments. But they will not know the meaning of the words 
magnanimity, fair-mindedness, temperance, humility, courage ... One no longer asks 
whether a man has integrity, but whether he has talents; not whether a book is 
useful, but whether it is well written. Rewards are showered upon the wit, and virtue 
is left without honors. (DSA 16, 17)
 Although from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, where morality drives 
politics, the narrative character of Nietzsche’s assessment of moral and ethical values shares 
real analytic parallels with Rousseau’s in that Nietzsche’s genealogy provides the basis for 
which he “stand[s] all valuations on their head” (BGE 75). The reversal he seeks is our 
understanding of concepts as they should be conceived, as they once were, before the 
historical conflation of their meanings. Nietzsche’s strategy attempts to delineate the 
conflations and re-articulate their original and true(r) definitions and meanings; he writes:5: 
“([I]n modern Europe) the concept ‘punishment’ possesses...a whole synthesis of ‘meanings’: 
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5 Kauffman makes note of on this issue, as well in his footnote of Nietzsche’s analysis in [BGE]: “What 
Europe owes to the Jews? ... [T]he grand style in morality, the terribleness and majesty of infinite 
demands, infinite meanings ... We artists among the spectators and philosophers are—grateful for 
this to the Jews.” [21] [21: ...probably alluding to Nietzsche’s own ambitions. He is hoping to initiate a 
“revaluation” comparable to that ascribed to the Jews in section 195: they are his model. Of course, 
he does not agree with the values he ascribes them...] (BGE 185)
the previous history of punishment...finally crystallizes into a...unity that is hard to 
disentangle [and] totally indefinable. (Today it is impossible to say for certain why people are 
really punished. [O]nly that which has no history is definable.)” (GM 80).
 Now, in terms of provocation as a means by which to reveal the truth, the theorists 
choose concepts—Socrates’ wisdom-ignorance, Plato’s real-seeming justice, Rousseau’s 
virtues-vices/progress-regress and Nietzsche’s revaluation of values—to begin to delineate 
or conflate so that properly understood meanings of such terms, coupled with correctly 
orienting a person who has gained a rightly provokable disposition, can set the necessary 
conditions for an alternative politics, an improvement upon the status quo’s distribution of, 
on their terms, “so-called” justice. The conditions are, at this point, reflections of those 
distorted notions the theorists have begun to, via the disentangling process, return their 
applications to the original and true(r) sense of the terms’ meanings, which, in turn, requires 
a specific methodology for success, one particular to the respective theorist’s project and 
one discussed next in terms of chapter development.
Point 3 of Analysis: Transformation of Dispositions
 Next for development involves a discussion related to certain features in the 
dimensions of provocation, specifically regarding the impact the subjects and objects’ 
disposition have on the outcome of engaging each other, whose relationship can best be 
characterized as a chain of provocations in which one action induces a reaction and so forth. 
This characterization suggests that the specific type of reaction depends on how the object, 
at that particular point in the chain of events, e.g., the theorist’s interlocutor, is instinctually 
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inclined, whether this instinct/inclination is natural or acquired, say, socially, to react, either 
perceiving the provocation as intended for positive change or intended maliciously in order 
to prove some insulting argumentative point. The fact is that particular expression of 
provocation often means to accomplish both: to bother the interlocutor as well as to achieve 
a productive outcome.
 Having earlier identified the reversal that occurred (e.g., virtue for Rousseau, value 
for Nietzsche, both artificial human acquisitions), which led to what is generally considered 
intuitive to that context, although unnatural and deviant, as well as the reason for 
internalizing the provocation negatively, the theorists as educators adopt a pedagogy that 
takes into consideration their student-audience as they currently are. Additionally, to the 
extent possible, the respective pedagogical approaches attempt to provide the student-
audience with the necessary skills to make possible reversing that first inversion back to a 
(more) natural state, in the definitional sense of provocation—that is, to be personally 
transformative and thus to lay the cultural groundwork for political reconfiguration.
 The linchpin for achieving a successful orientation that allows for acting “rightly” is 
predicated upon obtaining proper levels of reason and emotion when confronted to make a 
choice on which astute deliberation determines if what follows is good or bad. Based on the 
theorists’ understanding of and attitudes toward all of these components, each of the 
theorists look entirely different in terms of the levels of emotion, nature, duration of 
deliberation.
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 Socrates’ pedagogical negativism is largely the product of his refusal to believe such 
an education that effectively transfers philosophical knowledge is even possible. This belief 
is reinforced in the similarly repeated disclaimers, like the one in the Republic where 
Socrates admits (although for Platonic purposes) his inability to teach: “I seem to be a 
ridiculous teacher, and an unclear one” (R 71). Melzer also confronts the problem at the 
intersection of philosophical knowledge, transference and esotericism: 
[T]hen it really is an open question whether [genuine philosophy] is teachable. 
Wisdom cannot be told. The central paradox of philosophical pedagogy…is: how 
can one transmit from the outside what can only grow from within? Is there 
something that one can do for a person that will somehow make him do everything 
for himself? ... This means (among many things) that it must take its start from where 
the student is, from what he believes right now, and proceed through an internal 
critique. One cannot begin abstractly from first principles or from a general 
statement of the big questions … Thus, his education must begin by lighting up and 
then questioning…the foundations of the life that he is already living. (2007: 1021)
Plato does try to “begin abstractly from first principles,” however; but he and Socrates 
agree that emotions are impediments to sound decision-making and thus need to be 
squashed:
‘Haven’t you noticed how irresistible and unbeatable spirit [33] is, so that its 
presence makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything? .... 
Where will we find a disposition at the same gentle and great-spirited? Surely a 
gentle nature is opposed to a spirited one.’ [33: The word here is thymos [which] is 
the principle or seat of anger or rage.] (R 52)
 Rousseau and Nietzsche respond to Plato critically. For example, Rousseau appeals 
to a natural solution to rectify the social ills resulting from human passions by relying on a 
proper harnessing of emotions, arguing that “[r]eason is what engenders egocentrism, and 
reflection strengthens it...[and] turns man in upon himself ... Philosophy is what isolates him 
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and what moves him to say in secret, at the sight of a suffering man, ‘Perish if you will; I am 
safe and sound’” (DOI 54). Bloom writes of Rousseau and Nietzsche: “Sublimation as the 
source of the higher psychic phenomena, as the explanation of that uniquely human turning 
away from mere bodily gratification to the pursuit of noble deeds, arts, and thoughts, was 
introduced by Rousseau … Nietzsche…first introduced the term” (1978: 146). Nietzsche 
makes a similar attack on Socratic (and Platonic) rationalism although his reliance on 
emotions is a version wholly opposite than Rousseau’s, which Nietzsche attacks with equal 
disdain. For Nietzsche, a properly disposed—that is, a naturally instinctual and superiorly 
inclined—person “overcomes” himself and the impositions of others by practicing the gay 
science and not by engaging in inferior pedagogical methodologies of his predecessors. 
Kauffman notices of Nietzsche on this matter:
Nietzsche did not want philosophy to be less scientific than this but rather more so; 
only he had in mind the ‘gay science’ of fearless experiment and the good will to 
accept new evidence and to abandon previous positions, if necessary ... Where 
other critics of a philosopher might assume an oversight or error, Nietzsche 
frequently flies into personal attacks against what seems to him a flaw of character 
and a lack of intellectual integrity. (86, 90)
The point of practicing the gay science or, for Socrates, practicing death or, for Plato, the 
Form, is to put oneself and the student-audience into a position for the right conditions to 
emerge for real and actual, on their definition, progress, socially and ultimately politically. Of 
course, this takes a receptive audience, one that is persuadable, where persuasion comes 
from exposure to a new and provocative philosophy communicated by a chosen medium, 
which is the next matter of the theorists I discuss.
Point 4 of Analysis: Philosophical Provocation
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 I now look at their methods as mediums as their preferred communicatory vehicles to 
deliver their substance doctrines in the most effective and forceful way; that is, the means by 
which they anticipate will provoke the respective audiences as intended, some to good, 
others to be rendered moot and ultimately powerless. Thus, as the theorists are reacting to 
a certain social context, they, too, represent a departure from previous theorists to whom 
their substantive philosophies are not only responses, but also their chosen methods as 
mediums represent an improvement over the other communicative delivery systems.  As 
that is the case, the intent for using such systems anticipates superior philosophical results 
and thus eventual political outcomes relative to what remains, for them, possible.
 Based upon these suppositions, the theorists select to deploy their methods as 
mediums to control for interpretive variations, some admittedly inevitable, by readers in 
order to minimize inattentive errors and avoid blatant interpretive abuses while 
simultaneously not being so esoteric in the presentation that it fails to reach their intended 
audience. The goal of the medium selection, in part, is to distinguish between those readers 
who are capable of ascertaining the theorists’ real meaning, to the extent possible. For 
instance, Plato identifies his preferred audience as the “extraordinary” ones. And for 
Nietzsche, they are his “higher men,” or, when including himself among them, Nietzsche 
uses “we,”—and to which, Conway adds: “The Nietzschean ‘we’ thus comprises those select 
readers who are strong enough to contest the master on his own terms. | In order to create 
this vanguard, Nietzsche must actively cultivate readers who see through his stratagems and 
falsehoods, who treat him as irreverently as he treats his own philosophical 
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predecessors” (191-2). To use a biblical analogy, the method as medium selection means to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. The wheat comprises those audience members that the 
theorists liken to themselves in terms of the potential for obtaining a similarly disposed 
ability to resist (base and inflamed) emotionally-charged provocation and to channel 
reasoned pleas for the betterment of oneself and thus potentially the political culture.
 Plato chooses the dialogue form; Rousseau, among others, the treatise as discourse 
(Morganstern 47) and even the novel and autobiography (Friedlander 1); and Nietzsche, the 
aphorism. Nietzsche maintains, “Whoever writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to 
be read but to be learned by heart... Aphorisms should be peaks—and those who are 
addressed, tall and lofty” (Z 40). Now, Rousseau seeks a more direct and intimate encounter 
with his audience (Strong, Salkever), but this is not so for Plato (Stone 90) and Nietzsche, 
each from different perspectives and with different motives, although both are meant to 
challenge the reader so as to increase intellectual capacity for discernment. The method of 
medium selection not only communicates their substantive theories but supplements them 
as well, in that their selection is meant to identify a specific reader as the target audience 
who, in turn, reflects the best person because that person has sorted through the linguistic 
challenges inherent in that particular method as medium. Thus, that person becomes 
representative of the political organization that defines and then accordingly distributes 
justice most fairly and truthfully and naturally. This is further shown in the theorists’ chosen 
subject-matters that appear within the medium, similar to the way in which concepts’ 
meanings were reevaluated within their respective rhetorical strategies.
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 Therefore, in working toward their overarching philosophical doctrines of which a set 
of logically reducible policy recommendations and prescriptions are transferable, the 
theorists substantiate their argumentative claims, as delivered on the page in the selected 
medium. They couch their theoretical positions in particular subject-matters treated in such 
a manner that coincides with their views of the most natural human experiences and that 
when illuminated against a political backdrop verifies and corroborates their two separate 
tracks of analysis, and brings them together under a single coherent system.
 One topic that not only Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche take on but so does nearly 
every major thinker, in some form, is human suffering. No one disputes that suffering is 
avoidable with respect to the human experience, but beyond that initial recognition and 
also that they all address it as a relatively integral component of how they have come to 
understand both natural and social personhood, the theorists rely on differing 
interpretations to best account for suffering. Because of its inevitability—as society assumes 
a certain cultural character for how to appropriately view and process suffering, as 
predicated upon that accounting—it ultimately falls on those installed political institutions, 
as reflections of those defined and accepted cultural mores and values, to manage suffering. 
 On the matter of the societal orientation for understanding the nature of and 
responding to suffering, the stakes are at their highest in terms of the way in which 
institutions are organized—in their capacities to compel and coerce—to react to the sight of 
suffering and thus (re)produce the cultural attitudes to either embrace or reject suffering. For 
the Platonic Socrates, suffering remains in the physical realm where a bodily urge “fills us 
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with...desires and fears...and a great deal of nonsense,” such as “[w]ars and revolutions 
[which] are due solely to the body.” (Ph 95). Plato stresses a life of moderation and a love for 
argument, as helped by good laws (R 242), to drastically reduce the temptation to 
excessively mourn, especially in public; Plato rhetorically asks to solidify his thesis, “[I]sn’t it 
argument and law that tell him to hold out, while the suffering itself is what draws him to the 
pain?” (R 287). This is Plato preparing to unveil the culmination of his thought. Such an 
extraordinary person is the one who practices philosophy and thus resists emotions in favor 
of the pursuit of the Form, which can only be experienced by the most rationally disposed 
being, as evidenced in thoughtful and deliberative judgments. This is the person who ought 
to rule, in that only that person can separate justice from the appearance of justice. Plato’s 
attempt to solve for human suffering in such a way is misguided and impractical, according 
to Rousseau and Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, it is delusional and destructive, psychologically. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I trace back to Rousseau and Nietzsche’s political views in terms of their 
views about distributive justice and mechanisms of enforcement are manifestations of their 
their understanding of the origins and the evolution of human suffering. Their differences on 
suffering, as well as pity and compassion, particularly regarding their naturalness, point to 
the different political constructs for which they advocate as social corrections for natural 
human suffering. They determine who is deserving of individual pity and institutional 
compassion and who is not. For now, the contrast is considered in sentiments toward pity 
from Rousseau and Nietzsche. Where Rousseau rhetorically asks us, “[W]hat are...mercy and 
humanity, if not pity applied to the weak [or] guilty?” (DOI 54), Nietzsche sincerely reminds 
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us, “‘God too has his hell: that is his love of man’ ... ‘God is dead; God died of his pity for 
man’ ... Thus be warned of pity’” (Z 90). Like Plato, these discussions build toward and lend 
argumentative rigor to the cornerstones of their overarching projects as well as interpretive 
implications once they have published their theoretical findings.
Point 5 of Analysis: Interpretations of Provocation
 Within the chapters on the theorists themselves, I address some evaluations about 
taking interpretive liberties, as either unduly provocative or within the bounds of authorial 
rigidity. I also detail their principal doctrines that provide the basis on which they articulate 
their theories of politics. The standard to which they hold citizens accountable in terms of 
justifiable political obligation in the public realm can be seen as a derivative of what they 
deem existentially possible and argumentatively provable in (meta)physical terms—or not—
and both of which remain consistent with their depiction of humanity, naturally and by 
acquisition, for which their version of a just politics best accommodates and compensates, 
respectively. 
 Socrates is, at most, minimally concerned with a new political arrangement. He is 
preoccupied with other-worldly aspirations whose rewards he, despite having no empirical 
basis for which to substantiate his claim, remains unequivocally certain about in terms of 
what awaits him after mortal death, in that he has devotedly practiced death, which is, for 
him, ironically what it means to live. Socratic philosophy is “[securing immunity for his soul] 
from its desires by following reason and abiding always in her company, and by 
contemplating the true and divine and unconjecturable...and that after death it reaches a 
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place which is kindred and similar to its own nature, and there is rid forever of human 
ills” (Ph 67). Socrates’ disregard for this-worldly pursuits and possessions and his seeming 
neglect for the circularity of his moral dogmatism leave him vulnerable to the criticism based 
on logical rigidity and consistency. This vulnerability is compounded by the certainty with 
which he expresses this belief when asserting that “the soul is clearly immortal” (Ph 89). 
Socrates, the Platonic literary figure, here, as representative of metaphysical objectivity, 
frustrates Rousseau and enrages Nietzsche.
 In response, Rousseau sets his philosophical standard at the level of authentic 
sincerity (Strong 1994: 125). This is a decidedly pragmatic reconciliation of Platonic 
metaphysics and religious fundamentalism. This provides the political maneuverability to be 
inclusive of religious dogma while prioritizing political virtue (Melzer 1996: 354, 356), which, 
for Rousseau, creates the necessary social conditions of (relative) equality to achieve the 
liberty possible (Shklar 1978: 17). Nietzsche’s philosophical projects crescendo to his 
perspectivism. It is a rebuke of both Plato and Rousseau. He rejects Plato’s metaphysical 
claim of the Form that holds a thing-in-itself. He finds such a standard as unknowable, 
incomprehensible, and as such, reprehensible, particularly for making available to Christians 
the opportunity to co-opt its recognition of the Objective and emphasis on other-worldly 
preoccupations. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, ascertained through rigorous experimentation, 
privileges excellence without burdening practitioners with the possibility of absolute 
Perfection. Making Perfection available as a consequence instills an investigative culture 
inclusive of intuition and resembling the religious rationality of the irrational Socrates. 
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 So, where Plato sets the bar impossibly high and whose effects have, inevitably, 
manifested in a culture of accepting failure and thus mediocrity, Rousseau’s standard of 
sincerity embraces pragmatic mediocrity, in that it stops short of truth-telling. This, for 
Nietzsche, and without concern of offending, reconciles instead of exposes. In turn, this 
exposes Rousseau as weak and afraid, as evidenced by Rousseau’s own admission; Melzer 
writes:
Based on the goodness and justice of God and the shocking prevalence of 
injustice and undeserved suffering in this world, he deduces the existence of the 
afterlife in which the good are compensated and the bad punished (Emile, 
282-83). If there were no otherworldly settling of accounts, God would be unjust, 
which is impossible. Thus, the afterlife is a moral necessity. (1996: 354)
5 General Points at which to Analyze Provocation: Conclusion
 Rousseau, unlike Nietzsche, writes with an overt political motivation grounded in a 
liberty only possible from equality and virtue. Despite Nietzsche’s proclamation, as 
Nussbaum summarizes, “to be a political thinker, indeed an important political thinker” (1), 
Kaufmann argues that Nietzsche “was not a primarily social or political philosopher [but] 
primarily concerned about the realm of Absolute Spirit, i.e., art, religion, and 
philosophy” (123). Nietzsche loathes the state—particularly one with Rousseauean 
democratic tastes—for impeding Nietzschean artists, saints and philosophers from “willing 
to power,” in that at the intersection of the state and culture of the democratic sort, the 
Rousseauean Christian anarchist (AC 191), under the contemptuous guise of civic 
responsibility and civility, latches onto the Neitzschean higher-man, preaching, “‘Be like [us]! 
Become mediocre!’” (BGE 212). As such, that would-be higher-man, like Nietzsche himself, 
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cannot be understood in the socialist language of political discourse, so Nietzsche turns 
from politics to critical theory, from which a theory of politics can be construed—in terms of 
provocation. In Nietzsche’s work, Ecce Homo (Latin for ‘what man is’6), he unabashedly 
proclaims: “Have I been understood? —What defines me, what sets me apart from the 
whole rest of humanity is that I uncovered Christian morality. That is why I needed a word 
that had the meaning of provocation for everybody ... Blindness to Christianity is the crime 
par excellence—the crime against life” (EH 332). And with that, I turn to the political 
provocation of the historical Socrates.
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6 This sentiment is shared with Rousseau—both assertions of provocation. Similarly noted by Bloom: 
“Rousseau intends [for Emile] to show that only his understanding of nature and history can 
adequately describe what man really is, while cautioning his contemporaries against simplifying and 
impoverishing the human phenomena.” (1978: 152) Each of the theorists think that they have gotten 
“nature” and “humanity” right—or at least better, which is at the core of what makes them so 
provoking.
CHAPTER 4
The Historical Socrates of Plato
Introduction: Socrates, the Original Provocateur
 I have previously mentioned Professor Whitehead’s characterization of European 
[Western] philosophical tradition as “a series of footnotes to Plato,” (39) and I bring it up 
again not to express support for or opposition to the validity of the claim on the merits but 
only to raise a point concerning its inference important to my analysis: philosophy, and by 
extension, the practice of political philosophy, can be viewed as an ongoing debate and/or 
discussion. A theorist, in reacting to or being provoked by (a) philosophical predecessor(s), 
supplements, revises, rejects and/or replaces some previous theory that has captured the 
attention of the engaged philosophic community. On such a view and as I have previously 
made reference to, Nietzsche, in part, is a provocative response to Rousseau (and Plato); 
and Rousseau to (among others, e.g., Hobbes) Plato; and Plato to Socrates. If we are to 
grant to Plato, by sheer magnitude of impact, the status of beginning the tradition to which 
all else is footnote, what recognition is Socrates due, considering the fact that Socrates says, 
“Knowing nothing, what could I write down?” (Strathern 63).
 In terms of philosophy as provocation, I place Socrates at the beginning. Now, of 
course, he can be shown as a reaction, as well, but, relative to the other philosophical greats 
within the political tradition and although Socrates was not your typical political 
commentator, his reaction is one without equal parallel. In other words, whom or what he 
was reacting to or against is not another human but seemingly a god. This refers to an 
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experience that is not confirmable in any empirical way, such as one can trace, say, 
Nietzsche to Rousseau. Thus, where Nietzsche thinks of himself as the political “bringer of 
glad tidings,” (Nussbaum 1) the same title Jesus adorned, Jesus, like Socrates’ appointment 
came not from another human (or himself, as Jesus or Socrates would admit) but through 
divine revelation. One has to take Socrates’ word for it and in this way, I contend that 
because provocation, in dimensionally conceptual terms, is relational; Socrates assumes the 
role of original provocateur. Also, the nature of the relationship, help[ful or merely 
antagonistic, respectively, depends on which audience has Socrates’ attention  whether it be 
his student, Plato, or his eventual accusers, Anytus or Meletus, to name two, given their 
different orientations and thus their different interpretations of and accountings for Socratic 
provocation.
 At his trial, before the jury and Athenian witnesses, Socrates admits as much, saying 
that “I made myself spokesman for the oracle” (A 9). Shortly after, he repeats himself, 
adding the following and confirms my thesis:
It is literally true, even if it sounds rather comical, that God has specially appointed 
me to this city, as though it were a large thoroughbred horse which because of its 
great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly. It 
seems to me that God has attached me to this city to perform the office of such a 
fly, and all day long I never cease to settle here, there, and everywhere, rousing, 
persuading, reproofing every one of you ... I suspect, however, that before long you 
will awake from your drowsing, and in your annoyance you will take Anytus’ advice 
and finish me off with a single slap, and then you will go on sleeping till the end of 
your days, unless God in his care for you sends someone to take my place. (A 16-7)
This passage is rather long, but it contains several different and yet related points about 
Socrates’ provocation. First, the fact that he has been summoned into court is a feature of 
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the conceptual language of provocation. The OED lists, as one definition of the transitive 
verb form, it to mean “[t]o invoke or supplicate; to call forth, call upon, or call for; to 
summon, invite.” On this point, Socrates rebukes his accusers for having summoned him (A 
12, 15) to court on what, in Socrates’ views are trumped up and false allegations. As they are 
in a court of law, an earthly court, Socrates invokes another definitional connotation by 
“appealing to a higher ecclesiastical court against a judgment,” as the above passage from 
the Apology indicates.
 A third way Socrates uses the language of provocation is to identify himself as the fly 
that stimulates the horse that represents the lulled-to-sleep Athens, which Socrates on 
behalf of God cannot ignore or accept. As such, Socrates makes it his job to awaken them. If 
this work is not viewed skeptically enough in that it might initially appear as if Socrates’ 
“rousing” actions, if nothing else, are motivated by benevolence. The extent to which he 
escalates the animosity toward him increases exponentially when Socrates is shown to be 
acting primarily out of self-interest, all the while taking his philosophical project seriously as 
it benefits him and, at least seemingly, finding others’ perplexity toward his findings amusing 
and dismissing as non-serious their problems with him. Before arriving to the climatic end 
when the jury has secured enough votes for reaching a death sentence, the Apology starts 
with the aloof Socrates undermining his accusers’ ability to properly understand him. Thus, 
he attempts to rig the proceedings in his favor by immediately exposing them as their brand 
of ignorance, in that it is ripe with false conceit as “most culpable,” (A 26) and by inference, 
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they are the culprits in the case, not him. Socrates’ opening statement to the court is as 
follows:
I do not know what effect my accusers have had upon you, gentlemen, but for my 
own part I was almost carried away by them—their arguments were so convincing. 
On the other hand, scarcely a word of what they said was true. I was especially 
astonished at one of their many misrepresentations; I mean when they told you 
that you must be careful not to let me deceive you—the implication being that I 
am a skillful speaker. I thought it was peculiarly brazen of them to tell you this 
without a blush, since they must know that they will soon be effectively confuted, 
when it becomes obvious that I have not the slightest skill as s speaker—unless, of 
course, by a skillful speaker they mean one who speaks the truth. (A 4)
 His introductory comments bring to bear the first and most fundamental problem 
between Socrates and his contemporaries, namely those detractors who come to take on 
the additional role of prosecutor—and is returned to in the Crito dialogue, which 
chronologically proceeds the events in the Apology, when, just before he gulps down the 
hemlock poison on the court’s ordering, Socrates shares his last moments with a few friends, 
Plato records (on behalf of Socrates) the Socratic position on provocation relating to the 
negative—e.g., forceful—kind: “So one ought not to return a wrong...to any person, 
whatever the provocation is [knowing] there are...few people who think like this, and 
consequently between those who do...and those...not there can be no agreement on 
principle” (Cr 34). 
 In sum, Socrates and his interlocutors cannot engage in positive provocation 
because, as the result of coming from and residing in different worlds, they cannot proceed 
from some initially agreed upon point from which to continue. Consequently, no chance 
exists, particularly for Socrates’ interlocutors, for them to accurately ascertain, let alone 
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appreciate, Socrates’ true intentions and thus his actual philosophical mission as beneficial, 
or in the very least, harmless. This is why they identify themselves and his student-youths as 
his victims, who “become annoyed, not with themselves but with [Socrates], and they 
complain that there is a pestilential [pernicious] busybody called Socrates who fills young 
people’s heads with wrong ideas” (A 9).
 They interpret Socrates’ motivations not as religious, as Socrates portrays them to 
be, but for sophistic reasons, whose message, like Rousseau’s—a parallel Steven Salkever 
notices—becomes inevitably misrepresented as paradoxically sinister rather than correctly 
taken for the good it intends to produce or, at least, harmlessly amoral; Salkever writes:
The original Greek sense of the term [paradox] refers to a statement which is 
strongly contrary to the orthodox or received opinion … As a rhetorical device, the 
ability to defend the apparently indefensible might be taken as a sign of the 
virtuosity of the speaker … However, as the Platonic use of ‘paradox’ implies, the 
term may have a favorable connotation as well: it may point not to the brilliance of 
the speaker but to the inadequacy of contemporary orthodoxy. (Salkever 204)
That Socrates’ relationship with his fellow Athenians originates from a religious experience 
suggests his main partner is not the Athenians but the oracle (or himself). As such, Socrates’ 
efforts remain focused on improving his spiritual relationship with the gods. The apparent—
in that, what is felt by his interlocutors—lack of attention paid to them produces states of 
anxiety and confusion, at minimum, and resentment and anger, at worst. 
 His Athenian peers see themselves as more than merely incidental characters; they 
believe themselves worthy of a higher status than the menial pawn in some Chess match 
Socrates is playing, especially a game in which they have been forced to participate without 
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ever having asked to be a part. For this reason, their misunderstandings turn to 
misrepresentations and end in returning Socrates’ ‘force’ with forceful retaliation.
 Instead of taking his interlocutors’ concerns seriously by providing clarity by 
addressing those concerns, Socrates appears to make light of it, dismissing their perplexity 
as having “an amusing side” (A 19) and stripping from them any perceptual power the court 
is thought to conventionally give. Socrates says, “Neither Meletus nor Anytus can do me any 
harm at all; they would not have the power, because I do not believe that the law of God 
permits a better man to be harmed by a worse” (A 16). 
 Important here is that Socrates, on one hand, is deadly serious in his belief, in his 
religious conviction. On the other hand, he fails to be respectful for the tradition of 
remaining deferential to the authority of the courts. Instead, Socrates blames his 
condemnation on his refusal “to address [them] in the way which would give [them] most 
pleasure” (A 23). Socrates, in religious-based argumentation, blames their ignorance as 
lacking access to the truth of which he is most certain, despite the impossibility of any kind 
of proof. Socrates says that it is “literally” true that “God has specially appointed” him (A 
16), which is why he “cannot mind [his] own business” (A 23). Thus, on my terms, this makes 
him the original provocateur, but in that his orders came not as those on the battlefield by a 
human general, despite his attempt to draw that parallel (A 15) ”in every other way that any 
other divine dispensation has ever impressed a duty upon man” (A 19). Thus, his argument 
is circular. However, Socrates seems not to be affected, either of the insufficiency of the 
proof he purports as logical or that they fail to accept it. As for him, they cannot understand 
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him, for they are too emotional to grasp the meaning of his pursuit of pure rationality. While 
his fellow contemporaries reside in Athens, he resides in the nonphysical realm, which is why 
he lacks the reverence they desire of him and the fear of death he sees in them. 
 Socratic provocation is challenging to all the conventional ways to approach the 
things most cherished—truth, humanity and identity. Socrates blows away their dearly held 
answers and thus, to at least a majority of his Athenian jury, embodies the following 
observation:
[T]he source of unclarity is a desire to appear wiser…to surround oneself with a 
cultish air of mystery…and to shelter oneself from criticism. Voluntary obscurity 
arises from vanity at best, charlatanry at worst … All the sages of premodern 
cultures seem to share a belief in the ineffectiveness of open statements, the 
superficiality of direct communication. Wisdom, it seems, would not be so rare and 
difficult a thing if it could simply be ‘told’ by one person to another. (Melzer 2007: 
1017)
The problem is that worse than neglecting to provide them with the guidance his 
interlocutors seek from him, Socrates forces them to confront the question—to which there 
is, by their account, no good answer, or for that matter, any empirically knowable answer 
other than Socratic proof—they never asked. To them, Socrates’ mission is a solution to a 
manufactured problem, a problem Socrates forces upon them, but for whose sake?
The Participatory Requirement of the Dialectic Process
 Now that I have introduced the historical Socrates as the original provocateur, whose 
provocative relationship with Athenian polis provided the context for which Plato’s theoretic 
writings drew inspiration, I elaborate on a point I briefly alluded to toward the end of the last 
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section; that is, the consequential implication of his fellow citizens with respect to his 
philosophical mission originated by the oracle at Delphi.
 Despite a rather counter-intuitive but albeit an inventive rhetorical gambit: Socrates 
—although a tactic he seemingly fails to fully commit to—predicts a reversal of fortunes for 
whom a guilty verdict would “really” serve as punishment. In offering and appealing to the 
counterfactual, Socrates says, “So far from pleading on my own behalf, as might be 
supposed, I am really pleading on yours, to save you from misusing the give of God,” and 
furthermore, makes a prediction that “ [i]f you put me to death, you will not easily find 
anyone to take my place.” (A 16). Given the result, the irony was unsurprisingly lost on them. 
Not forgotten, however, was another Socratic invention—that sort of irony still attributed to 
the persona of the historical Socrates, although conceptually difficult to nail down with 
scholarly definitiveness.7 That said, Gregory Vlastos hits upon the larger point:
[Socrates] changes the word [irony] not by theorizing about it but by creating 
something new for it to mean: a new form of life realized in himself...as innocent of 
intentional deceit...as free of shamming as are honest games, though, unlike games, 
serious in its mockery, dead earnest in its playfulness, a previously unknown, 
unimagined type of personality, so arresting to his contemporaries and so 
memorable forever after...educated people would hardly be able to think of ironia 
without its bringing Socrates to mind. (1987: 84)
Pages later, Vlastos continues:
The concept of moral autonomy never surfaces in Plato's Socratic dialogues—which 
does not keep it from being the deepest thing in their Socrates, the strongest of his 
moral concerns ... Socrates doesn't say that the knowledge by which he and we 
must live is utterly different from what anyone has ever understood or even 
imagined moral knowledge could be. He just says he has no knowledge, though 
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7 There exists a wide debate about the best encapsulation of Socratic irony. (Vlastos 1978, Wolfsdorf)  
without it he is damned, and lets us puzzle out for ourselves what that could mean. 
(1987: 95)
 Socrates’ overarching goal of philosophizing is to prepare himself for the non-
physical. Reaching the philosophical achievement of total rationality—that is, experiencing a 
thing-in-itself, or the Form—differs from the process of reaching it, in that the 
developmental journey requires the relational activity of provocation, where the destination 
is a place of total isolation. This effect is parallel to another effect: “The effect of these 
investigations...has been to arouse against me a great deal of hostility, and hostility of a 
particularly bitter and persistent kind, which has resulted in various malicious suggestions, 
including the description of me as a professor of wisdom,” Socrates recounts (A 9).
 Socratic soul-care, or improvement of the soul, is the internally experienced 
transformative reward of the Philosophical condition. Paradoxically, however, the condition 
becomes possible only via external engagement commonly referred to now as the Socratic 
Method. At least, two participants refute and cross-examine previously held beliefs and 
positions in hopes of providing their validity or replacing them with rationally superior ones, 
a result rarely achieved, contributing to Socrates’ interlocutors’ bewilderment and 
compounded frustration. 
 Similar to Socrates’ use of irony failing to resonate as intended, Socrates often fails to 
notice, or outright ignores, the worse condition the dialectics leave his interlocutors. The 
reason for this, as others have noted, and as do I, although from the perspective of the role 
of provocation—is that Socrates, as original provocateur, whose mission is religious in 
nature, has multiple audiences. His primary one, however, the one in which consumes nearly 
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all of his attention and concern, is, undoubtedly, himself. A contemporary parallel would be 
an evangelical Christian who believes the Holy Spirit lives within and, therefore, ought to 
take precedence over other human relationships, even familial ones. 
 As a devout practitioner of the God’s command, Socrates makes sure to faithfully 
execute his religious duties by nurturing his soul no matter the incidental harm done to 
others, something for which Socrates assures others cannot be held accountable for and 
apparently not all too concerned with, which only provides further support for why he is so 
confident about something he cannot be entirely certain; that is, the afterlife. Socrates says 
to Meletus:
[I]f I unintentionally have a bad influence, the correct procedure in cases of such 
involuntary misdemeanors is not to summon the culprit before this court, but to take 
him aside privately for instruction and reproof ... But you deliberately avoided my 
company in the past...and now you bring me before this court, which is the place 
appointed for those who need punishment, not for those who need enlightenment. 
(A 12)
One can also read Socrates’ statement as another inference regarding his advancements 
toward Meletus, seeking him out—and from which Meletus sought refuge in avoidance, as 
Meletus had become all to privy of Socrates’ real audience—himself, Socrates, not Meletus 
himself, a mere wall off which Socrates can bounce ideas in hopes of catching a glimpse of 
Philosophy, as reported in a different but applicable context by Plato in the Republic where 
Plato has Socrates defend Philosophy from the ridicule “pour[ed]” onto Her by men of 
another sort: “For, as I was talking I looked at Philosophy and, seeing her undeservingly 
spattered with mud, I seem to have been vexed and said what I had to say too seriously as 
though my spiritedness were aroused against those who are responsible” (R 215).
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Socrates’ Primary Audience as Himself to Improve His Own Soul
 In the last section, I attempted to show that Socrates’ primary audience is himself, or 
the oracle but not another person or group of people. In the relational timeline of 
provocation, after beginning as the oracle’s object, Socrates then takes on the leading dual 
roles, both object and subject, where his interlocutors—although procedurally necessary 
cannot be assured of success themselves—are cast as secondary characters who function as 
potential third-party catalysts for helping to set the conditions for Socrates to most likely 
position himself to experience Philosophy if and when She makes herself available.
 Therefore, for Socrates, practicing philosophy—which is an activity, not a technique
—is the act of getting to know oneself. It is mostly, but not entirely, existential experience, 
as that inscription at Delphi “know thyself” suggests. In the Charmides dialogue, Socrates 
and his interlocutors try to find a find an acceptable definition of temperance, and although 
they fail, important here, for my purposes, is they hit upon qualities that the philosophically 
disposed person possesses—coming to knowing oneself and acting temperately. Socrates’ 
student even likens them to being the same thing:
That ‘know thyself’ and ‘be temperate’ are the same (as the inscription claims, and 
so do I) might be doubted by some, and this I think to be the case with those who 
dedicated the later inscriptions ‘Nothing too much’ ... As a matter of fact, this is 
pretty much what I say temperance is, to know oneself, and I agree with the 
inscription...at Delphi. [45] ... [That] we should rather urge one another to ‘be 
temperate.’ [45: ...the inscription was probably intended to mean something like, 
‘realize your mortal condition.’] (Ch 76)
Similar to self-knowledge, temperance, for Socrates, is mostly directed inward, but it has 
relational implications which are defined by the nature of the relationship between the two 
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(or more) actors. In other words, the relationship is symmetrical balance in terms of power 
relations, whether perceived or real, as it relates to Socrates’ attitude toward cultivating his 
students and the extent to which transferring philosophical knowledge is even possible. 
Socrates plainly acknowledges in the Charmides, “I am examining the argument mainly for 
my own sake,” to which Griswold concludes that “Socrates ‘teaches’ others insofar as he 
prepares the ground for them to...disabus[e] them[selves] of their firmly held 
opinions” (542). 
 I do not wish to overstate or make the inference that Socrates’ is totally self-
absorbed, however, only that his main objective lies within himself, where his intention—
albeit interpreted differently by those who come to be his dissidents—is neither sinister or 
seditious nor are his uses of ironic gestures where he react in aghast or mocking tone. The 
ends for which he intends are not just for his “own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of [his] 
other intimates” and “that the inquiry...has very insolently exposed as useless the definition 
of temperance which we agreed upon and invented earlier.  I am not so much vexed on my 
own account, but [theirs]” (Griswold 542, Ch 95).
 However, in a traditional classroom setting, where the instructor researches the 
material for presentation during lecture, it is the teacher—as the result of his preparation—
who ends up increasing his knowledge far more than do the students. Effective teaching 
forces the instructor to learn, but this is an unintentional consequence, albeit it a positive 
one. Again, in traditional education, good schools and good teachers are measured by 
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student success, which, recognizably, is the result of highly effective teachers, of which their 
knowledge level is—albeit an important one—only a single factor.
 Socrates’ vision for engaging his student-interlocutors reverses this: he makes the 
improvement—in this case, his soul—in that the measure for a successful classroom learning 
experience, which is also a reason for such an ad hoc style Socrates’ teaching has, an 
observation Plato repeatedly expresses of Socrates’ apparently flippant and casual 
concessions of being a “ridiculous” teacher with an “artificial style.” (Ph 83) Such an instance 
appears in the Charmides, as well (note the editor’s comment in his footnote):
‘But Socrates...you are not conducting the investigation in the right way. This 
science does not have the same nature as the rest, any more than they have the 
same natures as each other, but you are carrying on the investigation as though they 
were all the same.’ [47] [47: Critias is quite correct in distinguishing the second-order 
techne, temperance, from technai of the first order.  Socrates does not agree with 
his distinctions among the latter, however, as he now proceeds to state.] (Ch 78)
 Socrates views his mission, however, in ethical and moral terms, and paramount to 
his overall world-view is to never commit harm—in Plato’s Crito, Socrates says that ”one 
ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is” (Cr 34)
—but given such disparities in the social conventions in which Socrates and his 
contemporaries are operating, we should not be surprised of suspicion directed toward 
Socrates—and in that such skepticism is part of the definitional concept of provocation, their 
attitudes about what counts as provocative behavior—good versus negative—are parallel 
manifestations. And in addition, Socrates comes across—even as the Platonic literary 
protagonist hero—as apathetic toward rectifying those strained relationships. This is so for 
at least two reasons, I suggest: first, he believes the effort to be a futile one, in that the 
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severity of the reaction has heightened to a point where persuading back the audience to 
his side no longer exists, which—and for him, becomes proof of truth and a self-fulfilling 
prophesy—is attributed to their emotional, irrational preoccupation with physicality. As the 
dialogues depict, Socrates often fails to anticipate the effect of his provocation until after-
the-fact—or, from Socrates’ perspective, that anger as the all-too-typical result of failing to 
rightly assess the reasonable response. Belatedly, Socrates notices, “I am not so blind that I 
cannot see that you...have come to the end of your patience with my discussions ... You 
have found them too irksome and irritating, and now you are trying to get rid of them” (A 
22).
 Again—and similar to the point of clarification made above regarding the fact that 
Socrates is so obtuse that he lacks true concern for his interlocutors’ well-being—Socrates 
does make predictions. These predictions, however, tend to be rhetorical strategies for 
controlling the narrative of the debate—he says prior to the previous quote, “I am going to 
tell you something else, which may provoke a storm of protest, but please refrain 
yourselves” (A 16). But despite his prefatory use of prediction, it is ineffectual in the end, 
which underscores his disinterest in any other conclusion than remaining consistent to his 
overarching objective—the virtuous life, as achieved by habitually practicing philosophy, 
even at the expense of violating social customs and cultural norms—e.g., exposing others’ 
ignorance—and, worse, breaking man-made laws—e.g., corrupting the youth:
A number of young men with wealthy fathers and plenty of leisure have deliberately 
attached themselves to me because they enjoy hearing other people cross-
questioned. These often take me as their model, and go on to try to question other 
persons. Whereupon, I suppose, they find an unlimited number of people who think 
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that they know something, but really know little or nothing. Consequently their 
victim become annoyed, not with themselves but with me, and they complain that 
there is a pestilential [pernicious] busybody called Socrates who fills young people’s 
heads with wrong ideas. (A 9)
 The second reason for Socrates’ neglect to either prevent or amend fractures in 
relationships, incidentally caused by the dialectic process of engagement is related to the 
first—that is, as Alexander Nehemas describes: “Socrates constitutes a peculiar figure, 
concerned primarily if not exclusively with the improvement of his own soul.” (305) The 
outgrowth of this is another important contributor to what makes Socrates, in my 
determination, the original—and, perhaps, the most significant—political provocateur. 
Ironically, Socrates is not at all political—not, at least, in any conventionally-held sense of the 
word “political.” And similarly ironic, Socrates’ total commitment to improving his soul—and 
thus in “practicing death” (Ph 64), Socrates, paradoxically, is afforded the virtuous life—
translates into an ambivalence toward his fellow Athenians who he swears his provocations 
are meant to—in addition to himself—help. On the Socratic method, Boghossian concludes: 
Often as a consequence of sustained dialogue, one realizes that one did not know 
something that one thought one knew. …This realization is a pivotal step in helping make 
one's ideas clear, and in distinguishing truth from falsity, and yet it is hard to understand 
why one would believe that this discovery could be humiliating or shameful. ...Realizing 
that one does not know some particular fact has nothing to do with humiliation, shame or 
perplexity.  It simply has to do with knowledge. (712)
 However, because Socrates is more dedicated to himself, this is lost on his student-
interlocutors—and as such, Socratic ambivalence—as I refer to it—leaves even his closest 
companions in a total state of confusion, which for the ironic, self-deprecating Socrates, 
even at the moment of his death, serves as both a teachable moment as well as greater 
120
proof of the validity of his argument and philosophical mission—and from the opposite 
perspective, the reason for its physical end; the end of the Phaedo reads: “It is natural that 
these people whom you speak of should act in that way, Crito...because they think that they 
gain by it.  And it is also natural that I should not, because I believe that I should gain 
nothing by drinking the poison a little later—I should only make myself ridiculous in my own 
eyes if I clung to life” (Ph 96). And it is here, I now turn to Socratic ambivalence.
The Ambivalent Socrates
 In Nehamas’ “What Did Socrates Teach and to Whom Did He Teach It?” article 
referenced above, Nehamas touches upon another important point that alludes to Socrates’ 
apparent ambivalence, which makes him such a controversial—and thus provocative—
figure. Nehamas incorporates an observation made earlier by Martha Nussbaum about 
pertaining to one possible consequence—even if an unintentional byproduct—of Socrates’ 
fanatical pursuit of achieving the “good”—or, synonymously, the virtuous—life: that “with 
the things that...chance might give us or take away without any responsibility on our part, 
Socrates ‘can't lose’ in the game of life, because he does not care so deeply for the things 
that are subject to risk that their loss would be a serious loss to him” (Nehamas 280)8.
 Socrates’ apparent apathetic demeanor toward his neighbors runs counter to the 
political culture of the fifth century. The aggregate good took much greater precedence 
over any individual gain. The political concept of liberalism had not yet been introduced—
let alone conceived—into the lexicon—and yet Socrates embodied such an individualistic 
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attitude, even while, as he defends, his military service; Socrates says: “[W]hen the officers 
whom you chose to command me assigned me my position at Potidaea and Amphipols and 
Delium, I remained at my post like anyone else and faced death.” (A 15) 
 Plato’s Republic—or, the Ideal—constitutes, in large measure, a theoretical response 
to the Socratic-Athenian feud. Its solution aims to end the vicious cycle of returning 
provocation with more provocation. It attempts to re-direct—and largely suppress—”the 
unnecessary pleasures and desires...that are hostile to law and...but, when checked...with 
the help of argument...they are entirely [or nearly] gotten rid of” (R 251). If not—as was the 
case for Socrates—the safety of citizens is put at great risk—which is why, for Plato—
Socrates’ defender—we “must consider it most shameful to be easily angry with one 
another.” (R 51)
 To achieve this—and although a historical accident—Plato’s theorizes a reconciliation 
between the historically quarreling politician and philosopher, so that to intellectually locate
—and then install—a just regime, in that “not one city today is in a condition worthy of the 
philosophic nature” (R 176), those with a mature philosophical disposition, yet “now called 
useless”—and despite their natural disinclination—out of necessity, are compelled—in terms 
of the conceptual language of provocation—“to take charge of a city” (R 178).
 Plato relies on a number of situations to develop his rationale—and simultaneously, 
his audience’s temperaments and dispositions—for, essentially, making that which has been 
deemed condemnable decisions—i.e., Socrates’—into that which will be considered 
redeemable decision-making.  The point is, throughout the Republic—which interestingly 
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enough, the term republic, in our modern vernacular, means “the common good” (OED)—
Plato articulates a novel—and more nuanced—explanation of truthfulness with the “noble 
lie” and experiments with communistic values in the ‘community of women’—all in the effort 
to tie the interests of politics to the public; Dobbs says: 
The lie transforms conventional justice into an obligation of piety, fortifying a sense 
of belonging rather than merely appealing to a merely instrumental and reciprocal 
obligation ... Blood, as we say, is thicker than water; but earth is thicker than 
either.” [while] “erotic idiosyncrasy undermines any prospect for friendship between 
men and women. Connubial communism may be necessary...because there are not 
sufficient safeguards against erotic idiosyncrasy in the sexual matings undertaken 
currently in the context of private family life, [respectively]. (271, 274)
 Implicit in the above discussion is Socrates’ ambivalence and the emotion it incites in 
his and Plato’s democratic rulers. Athenian democratic principles and republican values 
demand participation or, conversely, reject misanthropy. In addition, Socrates’ private 
ambivalence viewed as political contrarianism, in Athens comes as a great slap to Athenian 
political achievement. With historical Socrates, the embodiment of philosophical rationality 
still in clear view, Plato uses the language of provocation to sum up the passionate zeal of 
the democratic man:
The same disease...which arose in the oligarchy and destroyed it, arises also in [the 
democratic] regime—but bigger and stronger as a result of the license [‘out of the 
extreme of freedom’]—and enslaves democracy. And, really, anything that is done to 
excess is likely to provoke a correspondingly great change in the opposite direction 
[like] in regimes. (R 240)
 The psychological expectation that comes from democratic entitlement, in 
conjunction with the privileging of the popular of the principled, dooms the character of the 
democratic man, in that—just as with the political instability created—he is too emotionally 
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susceptible to mistake despotic propaganda for reasonable policy. Also, the fact that 
democratic politics institutionally solicits the opinions of immoderate, ordinary men—that is, 
“the unspoken premise of the Socratic assault on oratory was disdain for the common 
people of Athens [prone to] orators as practitioners of flattery” (Stone 92)—in turn, makes a 
Socrates physically at risk of democratic outbursts. The reason is, on the one hand, Socrates 
is viewed as meddling, and on the other, as misanthropic, thus accounting for the two 
charges brought against him, each stemming from a particular kind of provocative act. 
Where democratic theory cannot tolerate misanthropy, the kind of detachment indicative of 
a so-called “star gazer” (R 168; FN 6), the democratically-disposed man is dangerously 
susceptible to “supposing he ought to be pilot” [or, ruler] (R 168). In parallel fashion and 
because of the underdeveloped capacity to see sharply and thus respond discernibly, he 
”blames without knowing what he blames” (R 272).  
 Specifically, the democrat’s knee-jerk reactions prevent him from properly identifying 
the truth. For example, he mistakes Socrates’ religious convictions for atheism; commitment 
to philosophizing for pernicious meddling; the limitations of the dialectic process for 
ambivalence; and last, his orientation toward these as misanthropic. At bottom, Socrates, 
because of his slavish state, has set his expectations for what is possible much too high; that 
is, he demands instant results from the Socratic Method, only to fail to achieve philosophical 
status. As a result, his inflated sense of self-worth, as perpetuated by democratic principles, 
demands a false justice, according to Socrates. As such, “justice”—and similarly, “duty,” 
“political” and “friendship”—as rightly understood and correctly defined have taken on 
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inverted meanings associated with those base democratic tendencies, resulting in the 
misfortune the Platonic Socrates, using the language of provocation, observes in The 
Phaedo: “No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than that of developing a dislike 
for argument ... Misanthropy is induced9  by believing in somebody quite uncritically. You 
assume that a person is absolutely truthful and sincere and reliable, and a little later you find 
that he is shoddy and unreliable” (Ph 71).
 Thus, in a society where flattery is demanded and conversely, honesty refused and 
thus reality rebuked; Socrates’ aloofness, or perceived ambivalence, gets interpreted as a 
refusal to adequately help his interlocutors find knowledge. However, for Socrates the 
problem is that philosophy does not work in such a way—true knowledge cannot be taught 
or received, as it were a gift. Given this fact, as Socrates sees it, the level of his 
misunderstanding increases at an equal rate of the frustration it causes although he has 
done nothing wrong, and given his moral beliefs, he can make the reply, “I do not believe 
that the law of God permits a better man to be harmed by a worse” (A 16).
 For example, in the case of impatient Alcibiades, a much younger student and friend 
of Socrates’, who—in an exchange about the nature of Platonic eros, or love—is left to 
“wallow in self-deceit” because of Socrates’ refusal. For Socrates, no pedagogical method 
exists—to “tak[e] any decisive action to dispel” Alcibiades‘ preconceived notions about 
eroticism as false, Alcibiades must figure out, without traditional pedagogical instruction—
and most ironically—the meaning of (Socratic) love “the hard way, in a long night of 
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9 Emphasis mine.
anguished humiliation,” when, if only he were “looking to Socrates not as a guru but as a 
partner,” he could have obtained knowledge about eros “for free” (Vlastos 1978: 89, 93).
 The point is, along with Nehamas and Nussbaum’s, Socrates’ intellectualism, from 
which his method originates,  although virtuous in nature, by his account ”produces an 
agnosticism or even cynicism which may, under certain circumstances, be correctly 
described as ‘corruption’” (Nehamas 282). This occurs especially because of the 
diametrically opposite definitions of terms like “patriotism” and “loyalty” on which they—
Socrates and others, whether Alcibiades or Anytus—base the concept “fair” and “just” 
behavior. Also, where justice is concerned, the state gets involved, in that when shaming, 
the kind used as a device in the Socratic methodological toolbox (Sanderman 435), gets 
processed as intended to maliciously induce humiliation, the engagement can escalate, 
especially in a democracy that preaches equity and prides congeniality—from a private 
miscommunication into public criminality. This escalation results from the self-reinforcing 
circularity of misaligned intention, expectation, method and outcome (from Socratic 
dialectics), all of which are driven by disposition.
 That said, Socrates’ unrelenting pursuit of seeking out interlocutors—all the while, 
wholly aware of their philosophical stuntedness and thus subsequent emotional volatility—
as it is both mandated by the gods and necessary to his soul-care—and coupled with his 
negativism, it is no wonder Socrates, as provocateur, helps to solidify the dominant negative 
connotation that the conceptual language of provocation has taken on, particularly in the 
political sphere. It also suggests why, despite all of Socrates’ declarations in court and 
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elsewhere, provocation has come to particularly imply deliberate intentionality. To a large 
extent, the problems of  intentionality and determining meaning arise from the limitations of 
clear linguistic communication about important concepts, whose struggle becomes social, 
cultural and, important for my purposes, political, which I address next.
The Confusing Socrates—to the Point of Death
 One can trace the fall or rise, if so inclined to accept Socratic Objectivity as the 
“view” of Socrates along a parallel plane of intensity of tonal reaction to the-just-prior act of 
provocation, whether from Socrates or his interlocutor. As Socrates’ “cognitive moral 
psychology” (Kahn 1996: 73) denies any legitimate recognition to others’ authorial control 
over their life-choices, where actions originated not from reason but emotion (a position that
—and starting with Aristotle10—has been rejected and refuted), are simply errors made in 
ignorance, Socrates’ “intellectualism” gets successfully caricatured as sophistic profiteering. 
This sophistic profiteering demands an “apology” (to which, as we shall see, Plato provides
—with a provocative “technical” addendum). Furthermore, Socrates’ accounting for the 
unfolding of events leading to his arrest becomes a self-(re)producing manifestation of his 
argument relative to the outcome. They mistake his morality for sophistry and thus confuse 
real justice for an illusory one subscribed to by Athens.
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10 “Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity [impulsive], another weakness. For some men after 
deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation, others 
because they have not deliberated are led by their emotion...if they have first perceived and seen 
what is coming and have first roused themselves and their calculative faculty, are not defeated by 
their emotion... It is keen and excitable people that suffer especially from the impetuous form of 
incontinence; for the former by reason of their quickness and the latter by reason of the violence of 
their passions do not await the argument, because they are apt to follow their imagination” (NE 177).
 The problem for Socrates is that the rhetorical sophistry of “making the weaker 
argument stronger,” which Socrates “does not think that...what [his student-interlocutors] 
learn is specifically a technique” (Reeve 19), like the definitional concept of provocation, 
might, at best, be amoral, but certainly is not moral. Compounded by the fact that some 
find  the act of dialectic persuasion “amusing,” that which exposes others’ ignorance seems 
to make less a spiritual quest and more a childish game, where the losers were more than 
shamed but humiliated.
 On one hand, procedurally, Socrates comes across deadly earnest about the 
seriousness of his mission in terms of the eternal consequences. On the other hand, in all of 
his self-deprecatory glory, Socrates, ironically, appears to be a condescending elitist. 
Socrates’ other-worldly preparation is a serious business whose success lies in the activity of 
improving one’s soul. In contrast, his antagonists’ focus remains not on the process but the 
outcome of achieving this-worldly recognition for a wisdom permanently unavailable to 
them and thus, “may have seen it this way because they were resistant to...following a line 
of reasoning no matter where it led [seeing] Socrates as trying to use verbal and logical 
trickery to confuse them. Ironically, they thought that Socrates was a Sophist” (Boghossian 
715).  In sum, they are confused by what they believe Socrates thinks to be serious and what 
not, in that the two sides represent inversions of the other. 
 Philosophizing is not a game. Comical, however, is their obtusely emotional 
resistance to accept what Socrates finds so glaringly obvious: earthly human futility. 
Moreover, for Socrates, the difference between the activity of philosophizing and a 
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technique for persuading is so glaringly opposite in terms of their moral character. That is, 
the former is and the latter not: who could ever combine the two into a single event!? The 
ferocity with which the accusations are levied surprise an unsuspecting—perhaps in his 
child-like naivety—Socrates, peculiarly, however, in that he, at the time of the trial, has 
reached the age of 70.
 Examples abound where Socrates uses the language of disbelief for rhetorical affect 
to demonstrate his calling as both, moral and rational as well as innocent, even in the legal 
sense. In the Apology, (the historical) Socrates can be seen to rely on, at least, in part, 
situational irony (Wolfsdorf) and ironic gesture (Cook, Gellrich) to supplement his 
flabbergasted state: “I was bound to interview everyone who had a reputation for 
knowledge.  And by dog, gentlemen, for I must be frank with you ... It seemed to me...that 
the people with the greatest reputations were almost entirely deficient” (A 8). In the 
Gorgias’ assault on the sophistic rhetoric described above, (the Platonic) Socrates tries to 
steer the debate by reacting with such exacerbation to Gorgias’ claims about (un)just 
speech: “[B]ut since a little later you said that the rhetor might use rhetoric unjustly as well, I 
was thus amazed and thought that the things said did not harmonize ... So then...by the 
dog, Gorgias, [what] is a matter for no little conversation, so as to examine it adequately.” 
The English phrase “by dog” is translated to effectively capture the sentiment of 
astonishment. Another problem for the provocative Socrates is—and one very similar to his 
interlocutors’ confusion about him, resulting from not correctly deciphering what Socrates 
takes seriously and what light-heartedly—the difficulty through which to navigate the times 
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emotions are acceptable. That is, Socrates’ surprise turned indignation turned utter defiance 
traced throughout the Apology—the best portrait of Socrates, the person—reveals Socrates 
not necessarily hypocritical, but his impenetrability, which, in turn, contributes to the 
incitement created by his presence.
The Defiant Socrates
Socrates is certain of his moral exoneration but becomes less so legally in the Apology. As 
such and in terms of provocation as a rhetorical strategic deployment, Socrates, briefly, co-
opts the language to which they are emotionally susceptible and to which he is foreign in 
order to make the most resonate argument (A 4). The problem is that Socrates seemingly 
fails to appreciate the irony of making use of emotions, both in gesture, or tonally, and 
substantively, especially since doing so potentially—given, in Socrates’ view, their 
sophomoric readings of his work—undermines the credibility of his central message; that is, 
to completely detach from reason-preventing emotions. 
 Now, with respect to philosophizing, Socrates puts all of the emphasis on the 
procedural aspect, in that in doing so, the desired outcome, a philosophical disposition 
oriented toward metaphysical rationality, will organically come. However, here, in terms of 
demeanor as well as delivery and puzzling in its apparent contradiction, Socrates seemingly 
expects a rational decision to derive from an emotionally-laden plea, despite the fact that 
his appeal in “augment[ing] pure intellectual dialogue by calling upon his interlocutor[s’] 
appetites and desires”; his argumentative grounding, however, and although emotionally-
based, is a superior use of it, in that “human motivators, such as shame, are so basic to the 
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human race that Socrates' appeals to them are not grounded in faith” (Sanderman 436). As 
such, it can lead to a reasonable outcome. Socrates quickly learns otherwise, realizing (yet 
again) that the jurors cannot be persuaded to his side, at which point the exchange takes a 
decidedly confrontational turn, where justice, in the Athenian mind, would come through 
force, not persuasion. 
 Thus, just as they interpret Socrates’ self-proclaimed futility as self-congratulatory 
arrogance, they take his persona of child-like innocence for something more sinister; that is, 
“Socrates' use of mocking irony calls upon the interlocutor's emotions and sense of shame 
in a way that does not appear to be simply aimed at correcting false belief” (Sanderman 
432).  I suggest that his adversaries are ultimately proven right, not only on my reading 
through the lens of conceptual provocation but Plato’s, as well (although that is not to 
equate Athens’ criticism of Socrates with Plato’s—an issue for elaboration next).
 At the point in the Apology, when Socrates finally seems to appreciate the 
psychological toll his series of provocations has taken on his fellow citizens. Also, his 
rhetorical provocations, ‘pure’ as they were, could no longer affect the deliberative process 
to secure a conclusion favorable to Socrates, the legal defendant. However, he makes 
another argumentative inversion to, at minimum, let the record show, in addition to the 
caricature written in the Clouds, the political Socrates; that is, if politics were totally re-
imagined.  
 Just as his rhetorical tactics have failed to be effective, in similar fashion and in 
subsequent order, his mode of convincing, the “elenctic examination” (Reeve 159) has 
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failed, too. That is, argumentatively superior and thus successful, the enchanting Socrates, 
whose seductive charisma as one of his “forces capable of changing people’s 
minds” (Gellrich 285), sets the way forward for how the dialectic process unfolds, so long as 
the setting is conducive to Socrates’ goal: to increase his “synoptic capacity,” (Dobbs 275)—
e.g., Plato’s Republic. Socrates thrives in a friendly atmosphere, where just one or a few 
other companions and Socrates are: “is reciting everything...all the speeches of all the 
characters” (Saxonhouse 730). Soul-care is a rather intimate, or private, affair but certainly 
not a public one, where politics resides.  Further, the elenchus aspect of cross-examination 
produces the best result due to, in part, the egalitarian atmosphere and symmetrical 
balance between the parties. Socrates must defend himself, using oral dialectics in front of a 
jury of 500.
 However, Socrates believes “that everyone should care for the city by making its 
citizens as good as possible” (Sanderman 432) whose mission is performed by conducting 
traditionally thought of didactic examinations of each other’s beliefs on issues of importance 
and relevance. Then one could, as does the Platonic Socrates in the Gorgias, argue that 
such a view of political participation—although a different sort than a general’s, per se—is 
both new and superior, as it brings together philosophy and politics; Reeve summarizes 
Socrates in the Gorgias: “I am one of a few Athenians...who undertake the real political craft 
and practice of politics, the only one among people now” (Reeve 159). However, in the 
Apology, Socrates is not political or even apolitical. In fact, Socrates is found to be anti-
political, and as with the prevailing connotation of provocation, in general, a charge whose 
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origins seem to be seditious in nature thus appropriately carries a heavy sentence upon 
conviction, as proved in Socrates’ case. 
 That said, however, Socrates was not defeated, not even remotely, in his mind. 
Socrates, again, changes the rules in which the beginning judicial arguments were framed, 
from legal (and moral) to strictly moral. Toward the end of the trial, Socrates turns outright 
defiant, making clear the “true” narrative character of the events leading up to the 
sentencing. No longer able to win the legal debate—not that his intention was sophistic, 
although in their confusion, that point got muddled—Socrates shifts his efforts to winning 
the moral high ground, as he can no longer dictate the direction of the argument like he 
could in those more intimate and friendly elenctic encounters. It is as if Socrates blatantly 
goads to the point that they feel pressured into sentencing him to death, thus “proving” his 
point about the ineffectual ability to see and practice real justice. Both sides are using the 
authority bestowed upon them to judge, except Socrates comes from God, the higher, more 
legitimate one.
Conclusion
 For Socrates, the problem is—and although a few moments ago he charged Meletus 
with being “not at all convincing” (A 13)—that, to the ears of the jury, Socrates’ appeal rang 
hallow. Socrates turns that problem into an opportunity to re-define the narrative. His 
accusers have ultimately defeated Socrates by playing the court’s game, but Socrates, one 
last time and in order to secure his credibility and thus his mission’s validity, attempts to 
convince them of his sincere conviction, the same kind that Jesus would be successful at 
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producing in the convict tied to one of the other crosses, as evidenced in his new-found 
belief that surely Jesus was the Son of God. 
 Socrates, too, was a religious missionary who provoked his own martyrdom. Despite 
a lack of self-awareness, as highlighted in the Gorgias, in that, “[g]iven his often-admitted 
lack of knowledge and his denial that [Socrates] teaches...he could be understood, like [the 
sophistic rhetoricians], to produce nondidactic persuasion” (Gor 36), Socrates, the mortal, 
could be ironic, as well. Thus, while unconvincing as he might have been in proving his 
divinely-inspired provocation to be “literally true” (A 16), because of his failure to, as 
Aristotle writes, “define [his] terms and get at its essential meaning, and then use the result 
when reasoning the point at issue” (Rh 1422) as well as to persuade convincingly, even 
Plato, of the non-circularity of an “authority which can justify itself by its tried and true 
accomplishments on the other” (Nehamas 294). The historical Socrates was at his most 
convincing, and most ironically honest, while uttering his final words, “Crito, we owe a cock 
to Asclepius. Please, don't forget to pay the debt” (Ph 98).
 Socrates spoke those words; Plato wrote them down. Athens no longer had a 
Socrates problem; it, however, became the problem, the one for which political science 
would attempt to solve. While, on my terms, the historical Socrates issues that first 
provocation that turned political, it was the Platonic Socrates—that is, Plato, the 
metaphysician—as the written response to the historical one, who was and, by far, remains 
to be responsible for the still ongoing series of theoretical provocations of political 
consequence. I now turn my analysis to the provocation of Plato, whose political theory, to a 
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large extent, was provoked by Socrates, Athenian democracy and the antagonistic 
relationship between the two wholly different dispositions. I end my analysis of the historical 
Socrates and transition to Plato with W.K.C. Guthrie:
Socrates's statement [on ‘[t]he poets divinely inspired’] is plainly ironic, since his 
reason for making it is the inability of poets to understand their own productions. 
Nor could his best friends claim that he had a poetic side to his nature. But Plato 
had. He says much about poets, and his ambivalent attitude towards them can be 
largely explained by the internal conflict between his acquired devotion to the 
Socratic demand for ‘rendering an account’ of what you say and the re-emergence 
of his natural feeling that poetry had a value of its own, independent of its rational 
or moral content. (1975: 89)
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CHAPTER 5
Plato and the Platonic Socrates
Introduction
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau contextualizes the story of his life—and politics—in the 600-
plus-page Confessions. Friedrich Nietzsche supplements the development of his thoughts 
and ideas in Ecce Homo, even titling one of his chapters, “Why I Write Such Good Books.” 
Plato does nothing comparable to that Rousseau and Nietzsche provide for us about their 
lives and works. We have to extract it, almost exclusively, from Plato’s philosophical work. 
The interpretive burden is much heavier to carry for Plato than for the more recent Rousseau 
and Nietzsche; W.K.C. Guthrie observes: “Reading the [Platonic] literature only shows how 
equally good scholars can disagree about the arguments because of our alien ways of 
thinking” (1978: 364). A related interpreted problem regarding Plato for contemporary 
readers within the Western philosophical tradition is that “[o]n a purely statistical basis, the 
huge majority of philosophical writings are cast in the style of treatises” (Griswold 531). 
Plato, however, relies on the dialogue form to communicate his ideas. His choice, and 
perhaps to the dismay of Socrates, brings Socrates’ oral dialectics to the page in order to 
greatly increase the size of his student-audience body. 
 Now, in terms of provocation, I maintain that their overall theoretical projects are 
ones of substantive provocation, in that their philosophical systems serve as the mechanistic 
catalyst by which personal transformation (thus political reform) is induced, as consistent 
with their versions of what is (more) natural. In addition, provocation also takes various 
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tactical forms in articulating and arguing for the substantive claims, such as tone, style and 
method. Thinking about how the dialogue style is not external to what is being said, as a 
resource to locate the concept of provocation that another medium, say, the treatise, would 
fail to provide—can offer a substitute for what Plato did not say elsewhere or directly. That 
said, if we can be confident that it is achievable, despite the difficulties with which Plato 
leaves, like limited hard textual evidence, to make a solid interpretative case for the 
provocative intentions of Plato’s work—as well as, although different from the interpretive 
matter of assessing outcomes and effects in terms of provocation—we must pull away from 
Plato the masks his works wear. 
 Much has been written about the relationship between Plato’s choices, for example, 
written dialogue, and the substantive content of his message. One further difficulty to add 
has to do with the large volume of and the wide array of topics covered in Plato’s body of 
work. It has led to diverse and often contradictory readings of the theories Plato was really 
putting forth, which extends the analysis of provocation to the interpreters of and 
commentators on Plato, in that where textual ambiguity exists and empirical evidence does 
not, there exists  the opportunity for provocative theorizing. That said, however, there seems 
to be consensus about the premise from where these interpreters soon depart:
[The] question: is the choice of the kind of style which a philosopher uses related in 
some essential manner to his philosophy? Or are the style (i.e., species of style) and 
content (i.e., what is being said) always external to each other? ... The author of a 
dialogue is hidden by or removed from his writings (since he does not cast himself 
as one of the characters), and so different rules of interpretation must govern the 
reader’s effort to state. (Griswold 531, 533)
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 The point is, as does Plato’s substantive theory wear a mask, Rousseau and 
Nietzsche’s also wear masks, which results in no real consensus and which adds to the 
reasons for which they are provocative. However, unlike Rousseau and Nietzsche, Plato does 
not supplement his doctrinal claims with additional commentary about his personal views. In 
fact, much of the time, he removes himself further from us, his audience, by putting into the 
mouth of Socrates (his) philosophical and political points of view. The relationship between 
style and content in Plato’s written dialogue form has a role in clarifying interpretation:
[T]hat the close and continual relationship between the style and the content of his 
work may serve[d]...to elucidate his argument; and...that at certain points his style 
itself has a direct connexion with his philosophic thought. The essence of dialogue 
lies in the interaction of human minds. [So] it becomes natural to express all his 
thought in the form of personal utterance by one individual or another...and to work 
out its development in terms of progressive agreement between such individuals. 
(Tarrant 28)
Also, despite only having access to Plato’s pure philosophy, clues about him as provocateur 
still emerge because of his choice of dialogue. As such, my method allows for me to 
assemble sufficient textual evidence that shows Plato to use the same kind of provocation—
although not directly and to far different ends—as did Rousseau, who dared anyone to 
suggest that there was a better man (R 17), and Nietzsche, who titled another chapter in 
Ecce Homo, “Why I Am So Wise.”
 What follows is my chapter that develops the different dimensions and categories of 
provocation found in Plato’s work, most significantly his famous political work, the Republic, 
whose protagonist is Socrates—although not necessarily the exact one in the Apology, 
which is what I discuss next, particularly with Saxonhouse’s approach to the Republic guiding 
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my thoughts as Plato as provocateur. She argues that “given the diversity of narrative styles 
for his dialogues, Plato consciously chose how to frame the dialogues and I argue that that 
choice relates to the content of the dialogue just as much as the dramatic elements 
do” (730).
The Platonic Versus the Historical Socrates
 At the end of the previous section, as well as in the previous chapters, I alluded to 
the different characters of Socrates: the historical figure and the literary character, the literal 
Socrates and the Platonic Socrates, respectively. Socrates was an actual person, again, who 
tells us nothing himself. As such, and to a larger degree than Plato, we lack any 
autobiographical or first-hand philosophical account about his life and thoughts. Therefore, 
he leaves behind no version to corroborate or counter someone else’s interpretation of his 
behavior or views, not that he would concern himself too much with that, one way or the 
other.
 The other Socrates is Plato’s—his philosophical mouthpiece, of sorts. So, in that Plato 
chooses to deliver his content in the dialogue form and in which he never casts himself to 
make a speaking appearance, we are left to figure out when—and thus for what purposes—
Plato is remaining true to his old friend and when he merely uses the Socratic persona to 
further his own philosophical agenda. That is not to suggest, however, that Plato 
disingenuously—and with sinister motivations—attempts to commit libel against Socrates. In 
short, we are left to our own interpretive devices to figure out where one Socrates ends and 
the other begins—a task that becomes murkier when forced to reckon with the fact that 
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there is no definitive agreement on the chronological ordering of the Platonic corpus. One’s 
approach for  getting at Plato’s true(r) intent—e.g., Kahn’s pedagogical “reconstruction 
based on developmental chronology” or Vlastos’s noncommittal Plato that “examine[s] the 
views attributed to Socrates in Plato’s (early and early middle) dialogues” as Socrates’ own 
(Osbourne 4, 5)—will determine the specific natures of varying interpretations; that is, 
whether seemingly contradictory philosophical claims ought to be reconciled or not, thus 
leaving the readers of the dialogues the freedom—or rope—to figure out what Plato’s mask 
really sought to achieve in nurturing a mature and nuanced philosophical disposition in his 
student-audience. Such is the strategic goal for removing himself and Socrates from the 
audience who is forced to find the meaning in the dialogue and ultimately in themselves.
 That said, my analysis of provocation has the luxury of not getting bogged down on 
chronological ordering and which dialogues present a “faithful portrayal of the historical 
Socrates.” Plato is the theorist whose writings provoked the likes of Rousseau and Nietzsche 
and many others to respond. Socrates would have never achieved the level of philosophical 
fame, if any at all, if Plato had not documented his life. The point is, Socrates, the man, 
inspired Plato, which is why I thought it important to include the previous chapter and did so 
by operating on the following view of Kahn’s (1996: 74): “[The Socratic literature] represents 
a genre of imaginative fiction, so that (with the possible exception of Plato's Apology) these 
writings cannot be safely used as historical documents” (1996: 74). For my purposes, this 
places special emphasis on the parenthetical statement. Going forward, I examine the 
provocation of Plato’s political theory on the assumption that Socrates, particularly in The 
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Republic, embodies the Platonic character, serving the theoretical purpose of Plato, a 
position consistent with David Wolfsdorf’s11; he writes:
[I]n Republic I, Socrates narrates from a single unspecified location...[in that] Plato's 
intentions were ultimately not to represent historical events that actually occurred... 
[I]t should be appreciated that Plato was not principally concerned...to portray the 
historical Socrates as he actually was ... Of course, all literature, even the most 
realistic, is selective in the aspects of the fictional world it portrays. (181)
 For my purposes, the Apology represents that series of provocations between 
Socrates, the philosopher—or, mirthful comic turned malicious convict—and Athenian 
democrat—or, ridiculer turned condemner, wrongly provokable—that makes necessary 
Plato’s political apology, which comes in the form of the Republic. As Bloom notes, 
“Socrates’ outlandish way of life and the consequences of his thought somehow injure the 
men and the regimes in existing cities; and from the various ways in which he is forced to 
make an apology” (R 97, FN 1). However, in terms of provocation, Plato not only offers an 
apology on behalf of Socrates, he seems to first make one for Socrates—that “outlandish” 
behavior, exhibited not only to his adversaries but his closest friends, as well, to which I turn 
for a short examination.
Plato Apologizing on behalf of the Historical Socrates and to the Philosophical Socrates
 In the Crito, the dialogue whose conversation happens immediately after the verdict, 
Plato captures Crito’s frustration with his friend for that ‘outlandish’ behavior mentioned 
earlier. Plato presents a scenario in which a bewildered Crito comes to understand Socrates’ 
lack of concern for not only what others think of him but what others think about his friends. 
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11 Saxonhouse’s, too, is very similar (730).
To this end, Crito suggests that Socrates allow him to propose paying a fine in exchange for 
a reduced sentence in order to save Socrates’ life and Crito’s reputation. Crito says: 
‘[A] great many people who don’t know you and me very well will be sure to think 
that I let you down, because I could have saved you...and what could be more 
contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money than of your friends? 
Most people will never believe that it was you who refused to leave this place 
although we tried our hardest to persuade you.’ (Cr 29)
In true Socratic form, instead of seizing the opportunity to put off death, Socrates takes the 
opportunity to lecture Crito. 
 It is further evidence of the philosophical distance that not only separates Socrates 
from his enemies but his friends, as well. Socrates’ life represents a third way, an alternative 
from the false-dichotomy of having to choose either “money” or “friends,” in that real 
friendship between the philosophically disposed to reason transcends the ordinary way 
people think of what it means to be friends.  Crito mistakes the appearance of friendship—
i.e., buying Socrates’ freedom—for real justice. For Socrates, who sees no value in the 
physicality of things, accepting the offer would be a far worse sentence, in that it would 
succumb to the ordinary urges that average men think is natural (Ph 96). Socrates cannot be 
persuaded by Crito because through the habit of practicing philosophy, Socrates has come 
to understand that by not drinking the poison, he would be trading one kind of unjust act 
for another. Socrates owes too much to himself to not die, which is a rather counterintuitive 
notion to his friends but serves to underscore his commitment to the practicing philosophy, 
or in other words, “practicing death” (Ph 64). In his failure to convince Socrates, Crito’s 
emotions get the better of him, as he tries another angle—Crito turns the old rhetorical 
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tactic of Socratic shaming onto Socrates himself. Crito says: “‘Really, I am ashamed...First 
there was the way you came into court when it was quite unnecessary ...Then there was the 
conduct of the defense ... And finally, to complete the farce, we get this situation, which 
makes it appear that we have let you slip out of our hands through some lack of courage 
and enterprise on our part’” (Cr 30).
 In the Phaedo, the dialogue to be read after the Crito, Plato makes sure to return to 
this issue of “courage.” In the Phaedo, the dialogue that records Socrates’ death, Socrates 
inverts Crito’s definition back to the natural way of conceiving of courage, saying that 
“courage and self-control as practiced by other people...you will find them illogical” (Ph 51). 
For Socrates, courageous acts as thought of by “othe[s],” in actuality, are examples of self-
indulgence that arise from a cowardly fear of dying. This, for Socrates, explains the 
illogicality of that particular meaning associated with courage. As such, Socrates cannot be 
shamed into negotiating away his virtue for a longer stint in the physical body that seems to 
be the greatest inhibitor of living virtuously. Socrates is contemptuous of the desires that 
incline Crito to find necessary to ask, “What could be more contemptible than to get a 
name for thinking more of money than of your friends?” (Cr 29-30).
 But Plato seems sympathetic to the plight in which Socrates has left Crito and his 
other companions, and Plato does not necessarily share Socrates’ militant negativism, where 
the only way out is death. I argue that Plato’s references to Socrates’ behavior in the Crito 
and Phaedo—as articulated by those friends and colleagues Plato and Socrates admired 
and respected—not only serve to underscore Plato’s disagreement with Athens but to begin 
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to show a separation from the confrontational demeanor of Socrates. That is, Plato 
continues to share much of Socrates’ philosophical positions and keeps him as his main 
protagonists but changes the way for which provocation is used to benefit the citizen, as 
opposed to the private person. For Plato, philosophical provocation replaces the negativity 
associated with Socrates’ embarkment as well as—and relatedly—takes on an additional 
feature. Plato seeks to create a new disposition from which provocation is met not with 
force, or even hesitation, but with an appreciation of and a use for the gift that is a person 
like Socrates to society—the disposition totally absent in the Apology, as indicative when 
Socrates warns them that he is “really pleading on [their behalf] to save [them] from 
misusing the gift of God [and that] it is literally true, even if it sounds rather comical” (A 16).
 Plato apologizes for Socrates—that is, to those Socrates (unnecessarily) “plagued” (A 
26), not to Athens, however, who unjustly returned one provocation—i.e., Socrates’ mirth-
provoking irony—with a disproportionate provocation—i.e., retaliatory force. Thus, Plato 
apologizes for Socrates’ mirth-provoking behavior to those persuadable to Plato’s side—
Glaucon, for example (Dobbs 271)—who find Socrates so comical and ridiculous that it 
detracts from the merits of the substantive content, while simultaneously making an apology 
to the Platonic Socrates, the metaphysician, —for what Athens allowed themselves to do. 
On the one hand, Plato’s departure from Socrates is both a stylistic and a technical, or 
mechanistic one—and comes as a result, to a significant degree, from the problem Guthrie 
understands Plato to be quarreling with; that is: 
[H]ow does one know what one does not know? ... It is reasonable to conclude that 
Plato, by temperament a philosopher rather than a practical moralist, having under 
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the personal influence of Socrates enthusiastically embraced the Socratic code, is 
beginning to subject it to a more dispassionate examination and to find its 
philosophical implications genuinely puzzling (1978: 163).
 Plato introduces into philosophy something that Socrates had denied ever possible
—which, in turn, contributed to Socrates’ provocative militant moralism, philosophical 
negativism and argumentative circularity and whose implications were enormous: “The 
elenchus described in the Apology is a testing of persons, not of propositions...[And] his 
lack of techne is demonstrated by his inability to give a coherent account of what he knows 
and what he does [not]” (Kahn 1996: 97). Thus, Socrates appears as non-serious and 
slanderous. Plato’s mission—and unlike Socrates’, in that it is philosophically motivated and 
not divinely inspired—in the Republic is to make the rational Socrates serious—and the 
Platonic Socrates taken seriously. In this way, Plato becomes a political provocateur; that is, 
in order for philosophy to become a serious solution for Athenian political injustice, poetry 
and the poet—philosophy’s rival—must be effectively shown to be the truly hostile one 
toward good governance. The detrimental effect of poetry on the citizen—with its 
counterpart for producing emotionally erratic dispositions, tragedy12—must come to be the 
object of ridicule. Kuhn writes, “As a political thinker [Plato] had to contrive a remedy to 
supersede the tragic catharsis. This political or educational trend in his philosophy shows 
him as a rival and, in a certain way, as a follower of the tragedians” (26).
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12  Stevens: “In our discussion of Plato's exclusion of envy from the divine nature we referred in 
passing to Aristotle's statement in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that the highest virtue 
and the highest happiness consist in contemplative activity, and that such activity is the only kind of 
action assignable to the gods” (1948: 183).
 On such a view, Plato challenges both the political status quo as well as Socrates, in 
that “the aim of [Platonic] dialectic will be to provide criteria of answerhood” (Meyer 181). 
That said, however, on the other hand, Plato sets out to redeem Socratic rationalism that 
recognizes objectivity in standards by “reinterpreting the Socratic elenchus as the 
preparation for constructive philosophy” (Kahn 99) or, put another way, by “finess[ing] the 
Socratic elenchos and invent[ing] an entirely human techne of lawmaking” (Blyth 17) in order 
to apply a new political science that makes achievable the opportunity to know—and thus 
implement—real justice. 
Persuasion and Provocation
 Near the end of the last section, I made the assertion that Plato, via the Republic, 
becomes a political provocateur. Plato seeks a new politics vis-a-vis personal transformation, 
and although, unnatural, political action arising from philosophical thought, must occur if 
justice is to be experienced by those deserving such an extraordinary encounter. For 
Socrates and because the practice of philosophy necessitates engagement, the private 
experience of intellectual thought only coincidentally became political. Then, the 
intemperance and audacity so pervasive throughout the political class created the inevitable 
conditions for which to infringe upon the philosophical expressions of a Socrates.
 That said, if philosophy cannot escape politics—which, for Plato, it cannot—then he 
sets out to create a new set of conventions. These two new modes of convention, which 
work symbiotically with each other to reproduce each other, will foster and maintain a stable 
and mature political culture, as the established legal processes and outcomes are reflections 
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of the decision-makers’—and average citizens’—dispositions. Therefore, the first convention 
is psychological in nature; that is, what is thought of as conventionally appropriate must 
change, specifically, and most importantly, relating to current levels of power. Power will—as 
it must—change hands. Plato anticipates the force of the resistance—or, the hesitancy to 
even consider resistance—his proposal receives initially; at the beginning of Book IV of the 
Republic, Adeimantus objects and demands: 
‘What would your apology, Socrates, if someone were to say that you’re hardly 
making these men happy, and further, that it’s their own fault—they to whom the city 
in truth belongs but who enjoy nothing good from the city as do others, who 
possess lands, and build fine big houses, and possess all the accessories...and all 
that’s conventionally held to belong to men who are going to be blessed?’ (R 97).
 Adeimantus’ highly charged, knee-jerk reaction is analogous to both the difficulty 
and necessity of finding a societal solution for preventing such emotional outburst from 
occurring—and which will inevitably lead to another Socratic-type execution. To accomplish 
this, Plato must install an additional change in convention complimentary to the first, which, 
again, is the psychological reprogramming of properly understood behavior becoming of a 
mature, reasoned adult. The second newly conceived condition is structural; that is, the 
institutional mechanisms that cultivate such a dispositional reorientation and foster the 
conditions for which peace and stability endure. The task for Plato becomes how to 
convince the non-philosopher-citizen to hand over his political power to someone—or a few
—like Socrates the provocateur, whose motivations are widely and highly viewed with 
skepticism and suspicion and thus whose actions are deemed as useless and unpatriotic or 
vicious and treasonous.
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 Plato’s answer for what triggers the psychological process from which the conceptual 
change begins to occur regarding the specific attitudes and actions associated with what is 
conventionally accepted as legitimate and just lies in his theorizing an education of 
provocation; that is, the exercise of (re)imagining a new political dynamic, where beliefs and 
resources are differently—and paradoxical to “the current regimes” and “cit[ies] today”—
held. (R 176) That “therapeutic” process (Dobbs 266), as a pedagogical strategy, does 
deceive and censure, even if it is not an ordinary one. However, according to Plato—in that 
the lie is noble and the censure principled—what emerges is, finally, “a condition worthy of 
the philosophic nature” (R 176). This means that they have become rightly provokable.
 Plato’s substantive political philosophy comes to us from the dialectically-crafted the 
Republic. Just as Glaucon and Adeimantus are the Platonic Socrates’ student-audience, we 
are Plato’s by participating in that blending of style and content. Plato intends for the 
Republic to make possible the opportunity for which to seize and thus experience Platonic 
conversion, the results of which include a most important political implication; that is, 
“[n]either would we ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand—rather we 
would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them” (Ch 88). We first 
have to become (more) persuadable to not just heed but to be willing to even hear 
Socrates’ words.
Forced to Speak, Socrates Does Do Hesitantly 
 Before creating the conditions that put a person in position for Philosophy to reveal 
herself, one has to have honed the philosophical talent for living virtuously, or more 
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specifically, for exercising proper discretion, thus, in Aristotelean terms, enabling that person 
with the power to know when and how to act, as practiced by ”the good-tempered man 
[who] tends to be unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, 
at the things, and for the length of time, that the rule [of the mean] dictates” (NE 96). 
Therefore, where Socrates stopped short of directly linking the “moral excellence” to sound 
policies, Plato—and Aristotle—extend the discussion to governing. Good laws arise from 
good-natured, well-tempered individuals, who, as Aristotle says: “[Abstain] from bodily 
pleasures...[f]or moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains…Hence we ought 
to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to 
delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; this is the right education” (NE 32).
 For Plato then, of great importance is the implementation of the kind of education 
policy that will not only produce good leaders but whose values will disseminate throughout 
the broader culture. The curriculum, with the support of broader but similarly-focused laws, 
eliminates the role of art—namely, music—in our lives because of the passions it generates 
within us. By outlawing the arts and thus sheltering the youth from the harmful effects of 
music and poetry, future generations will never have to fight the tendencies to find pleasure 
in self-indulgent behaviors, which ultimately make us unhealthy. Instead, from the 
beginning, the youth are put on a path to take pleasure that causes no subsequent irritation; 
that is, they never have to unlearn how to be wrongly provokable. As they mature into 
reasonable adults—receptive to rational argument—a Socrates would never cause them any 
psychological discomfort or emotional pain to which irrational people pay back with physical 
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aggression, whereby increasing the psychological toll their total lack of restraint over their 
own lives places upon them (Kraut 210). One step further, such a Socratic message, 
regardless of delivery or tone, as one of philosophical rationalism, would actually serve as 
the guiding principles from which laws are written; in addition, as they are just laws and 
promote reasonable behavior, they also help to secure a stable and prosperous future.
 In the Republic—both in form and function—can be found the provocation of Plato 
that he means to serve as a model for which we can apply to our own lives and our cities. In 
the language of provocation, Socrates goes from being forced to speak, to speaking with 
such hesitation because of the seemingly paradoxical message, to finally being compelled 
to govern. In parallel, we—Plato’s student-audience—are forceful with Socrates at first, even 
threatening him if he were to otherwise mind his own business rather than to amuse them 
with his ridiculous story. Plato begins the Republic:
A moment later Polemarchus came along with Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, 
Niceratus, son of Nicias, and some others—apparently from the procession. 
Polemarchus said, ‘Socrates, I guess you two are hurrying to get away to town.’
‘That’s not a bad guess,’ I said.
‘Well,’ he said, ‘do you see how many of us there are?’
‘Of course.’
‘Well, then,’ he said, ‘either prove stronger than these men or stay here.’
‘Isn’t there still one other possibility...our persuading you that you must let us go?’
‘Could you really persuade,’ he said, ‘if we don’t listen?’
‘There’s no way,’ said Glaucon. (R 3-4)
Finally, however, for those like Glaucon—having made themselves available to discover the 
revelations of the provocations of Plato—after begging Socrates “in every way...not to give 
up the argument” (R  45), they are persuaded to accept their rightful place within the 
political hierarchy, and concede authority to the rightful rulers, the lovers of justice, who 
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must—and, in the end, will—accept responsibility of governing, thus resist the temptation to 
“study the Forms without interruption” out of political necessity, not natural inclination 
(Kraut 212). 
Listening to the Platonic Socrates
 The success of Plato’s political project rests upon the willingness of philosophers—
like a Socrates—to break from the activity of contemplating things in themselves to help 
rule. On the other hand—and as opposed to the Athenian context—average citizens must 
forfeit the claim to any legitimate right to rule and thus the distributive property and 
benefits previously enjoyed. Plato has to show that such conditions can be made possible, 
as Plato continually reassures his student-audience that they are not “giving laws that are 
impossible or like prayers, since the law we were setting down is according to nature” (R 
135).
 He must present the conditions under which the lives of everyone improve. That is, it 
becomes safe for philosophers to practice philosophy and thus worthwhile to compromise 
their time in order to engage politically. In other words, those would-be philosopher-kings 
are brought back into the physical place in which their bodies reside. If they do not, justice 
cannot prevail—and as such, those past and current failures of leadership will result in the 
deficient policies that perpetuate a culture hostile to dialectic reasoning, a necessary 
component for improving one’s philosophical capacity. Equally important, Plato is tasked 
with stripping the common masses’ attachment to private property. It must be transferred to 
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the public domain, where all the members of the community share a stake in protecting 
both the philosopher and the ordinary person.
 In bringing together the interests of everyone, although a historical accident, Plato 
thinks he can politically solve for the formerly irreconcilable orientations that put at odds the 
philosopher and the city—that is, the historical Socrates’ all-consuming, other-worldly focus 
that got him accused of “religious innovation” (Blyth 15) and the non-philosopher’s 
debilitating “irrationality of their unwillingness to face the fact that they must die” (Bloom 
1991: 368). Their proverbial common ground is the literal common ground under them—to 
which they all belong. In that sense, the different members of society—based upon their 
specific role, whether shoemaker, guardian or ruler—no longer view themselves as threats, 
which, in turn, frees them up—if not to tend to philosophy, at least, from their unruly 
emotions that historically disrupted those philosophical pursuits by those who are better 
positioned to know justice. As such, they, too, reap the benefits. That said, however, the city 
still needs protection from potential exterior threats. Thus, for Plato—as a practical matter, 
something with which Socrates was not concerned—all emotions are not to be eliminated. 
Beyond the implausibility of totally ridding emotions fully anyway, it is not desired, in that 
such a culture of detached ambivalence would leave the city vulnerable to attack, similar to 
the way in which unchecked emotions put the city at risk for internal strife and even civil war. 
Such is the reason that makes necessary censure and lies, albeit noble, in that it is not a 
deception against the soul (R 56).
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 Plato attempts to recalibrate different types of people’s dogmatic coping 
mechanisms—that is, to more closely align Socratic other-worldly certainty with the typical 
human’s lack for existential answers—so as to prevent the likelihood for difference in such 
high-stakes beliefs to “inevitably deteriorate into eristics” (Dobbs 265)—or, that subject-
matter has been stripped of its ability to wrongly provoke. Where Plato lowers the perceived 
stakes associated on purely religious matters, in like manner, he makes a metaphysical 
appeal, but with a political and thus earthly motivation—that is, to argue for a perfect 
standard, as set by the Form or Ideal, to which philosophical rulers—in that they are best 
equipped of which to conceive—implement in the form of political justice least removed 
from and most imitative of the Form of Justice.
 As a political theorist, Plato has to make Socratic rationalism effectual and palatable 
while offering a positive alternative to Socratic negativism. To do so, Plato can appear to 
come across as trading one tyrannical regime for a totalitarian one.  I suggest, however—
albeit a highly relevant and consequential debate it is to have had on the substantive matter 
of Plato’s specific politics—more impactful for and applicable to society is his provocation, at 
least, in terms of receiving interpretive privilege. If I am not wrong, his individual policy 
prescriptions—particularly the ones that are indoctrinating and thus ironically enfeebling—
matter minimally if, on his terms, the developmental cognitive goal is achieved. The politics 
will work itself out so long as the stakes of other-worldly importance have been 
proportionately reduced to an acceptable degree, at which point—and in no longer over-
exaggerating one’s universal centrality thus making room for rational consideration of things
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—“her understanding and emotions gain her entrance into a world of completely 
harmonious objects, and so she possesses the greatest good there is” (Kraut 212). 
Otherwise,  she is no longer wrongly provokable, which, in turn, allows her to better control 
not just herself but the direction the next provocation takes, such as a politically beneficial 
one, either for herself or the community at-large.
Plato Correcting and Controlling
 Given that the written dialogue form presents a contextualization of the argument 
(Cook 116), Plato, “the consummate dramatic artist” (Dobbs 268)—having chosen it as his 
method as medium, which is in itself a mechanism meant to provoke—is attempting to 
capture onto the pages all the forms provocation takes—e.g., stylistic, mechanistic, 
substantive—to help minimize any potential misapplication by those unpersuadable and to 
maximize the potential development by those willing to be persuaded. I take Plato’s, “As 
those who play say...you’ll tell me this too” (R 254), to suggest that the answer—the 
metaphysical one—exists. Plato cannot tell the answer, though—he can, however, help, to 
which Kuhn succinctly puts: “Plato was not interested in dramatizing the human event of 
paramount importance, the change of heart, but rather in bringing it about by initiating a 
dialectical process in the mind of the reader” (13).
 In addition to using numerous definitional terms to convey certain actions and 
reactions within a relationship where provocation has social and thus political implications, 
for example, when Plato has Socrates say to Glaucon “that a man who is by nature erotically 
disposed toward someone care for everything related” (R 168)—Plato’s use of stylistic 
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choices in narrating constantly directs his readers toward the correct side of the argument, 
such as inserting grammatical particles to suggest where the reader should pause. To that 
quote, Bloom footnotes, “Socrates...uses an ambiguous sentence...to affect Glaucon’s 
response...Socrates constantly uses words with a sexual or military connotation... 
predisposing him to certain answers by appealing to his...passion” (R 164, FN 1).
 In terms of theorizing his politics from a perspective that privileges provocation in 
offering up an interpretation of Plato’s rhetorical strategy and philosophical doctrine, it is 
Plato, not Socrates, and it is his readers, not Glaucon. Furthermore—and in using the 
definitional terminology of provocation in ascending order connoting intensity—where in 
the Republic, Plato identifies the origin of the major social problem and its consequence—
that is, “if all of you had...persuaded...from youth onwards...each would be his own best 
guard, afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with the greatest evil,” people would not 
consider their reputations when trying to determine what real justice is (R 43). As the 
problem exists—and to which the effects are real—Plato proposes his alternative: “But if we 
are somehow going to persuade them that no citizen ever was angry with another and that 
to be so is not holy, it’s just such things that must be told [to the] children right away...and as 
they get older, the poets must be compelled to make up speeches for them which are close 
to these” (R 56).
 The take away is—and to the points regarding interpretive privilege and perspective
—the education policy option outlined in the Republic is less the educational manual than 
the dialectic Republic itself. Plato’s strategic rhetorical deployment of carefully chosen words
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—those members of Wittgenstein’s linguistic family—depicting forms of provocation and 
types of—and to varying degrees—”rational” and “emotional” responses, I argue, is not 
only an effort to guide reactions to and feelings about the content but double as the 
content itself, that content being the continual increasing of the capacity for synoptic 
reasoning for which philosophical dialectics facilitates.
Reconciling Nature and Convention
 For the dialectical Plato, a central function of rhetorical provocation intends to show 
that useful and helpful forms of provocation can be—and must be made—safe from and 
protected against misguided or ill-conceived allegations. Plato thinks he can present a 
resonate jurisprudence—and again, as his characters “[a]ren’t giving laws that are impossible 
or like prayers, since the law we [a]re setting down is according to nature” (R 135)—that will 
expose the prejudicial nature and detrimental impact of the bias against Socratic 
provocation. At the same time, Socratic rationalism—and thus Socrates’ more naturally-
disposed philosophical orientation, to which, we recall at his defense, he owes his 
“advantage over the rest of mankind” (A 15)—will be vindicated.
 This attempt to right-size expectations for what is best attainable through a particular 
set of political contrivances—and whose rhetorical appeals are grounded in “what is (more) 
natural” and mirrored in “nature”—as an argumentative tactic, parallels the one to bring 
back (or down13) into the city the philosopher and non-philosopher’s focus—and thus their 
allegiances, for the security, stability and harmony that follows. That is, Plato depicts a 
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13 (R 3; Bloom 1991: 310)
political alternative in terms of  what is, at least, “(more) natural”—or the “least unjust”—as 
the best correction for the natural hostility between politics and philosophy. Therefore, 
because of his disassociation with corrupt politics and the intimate one with rational 
contemplation, the (more) natural Socrates becomes a legitimate candidate for rule and thus 
opens the door for the opportunity to present the case for justice in accordance to the 
Form.
 The natural human tendency is to behave anti-socially (Kraut 209), and as we live 
under an unjust regime, the fix has to be—and has to be convincingly shown to be—a closer 
representation of nature, where nature is the mirror image of the metaphysical standard for 
which to strive. However, there is much disagreement about what is (more) natural, in that 
no definitive evidence can prove his metaphysical claims. Politically motivated, however, 
Plato pushes forward, looking for a way to portray the good life as connected to the Form; 
that is, by persuasion from a love of rational argument. For the closer one gets to the Form, 
or the Ideal, the more harmonious and happier life becomes—of which one of the multiplier 
effects is the benefit of improved social relations, as that internal harmony (re)produces 
throughout the political culture. For this to occur, we must possess the love for argument 
and have acquired the necessary deliberative skills to exercise discretion and judgment, 
both of which depend on good laws—laws that promote reasonable behavior; Bloom writes: 
“[Plato’s] Socrates focuses on the contents of poems, thereby implying that the other 
elements of poetry are only accessories used for the purpose of better conveying a theme 
or a teaching. ...Everything in the city stems from the beliefs of those who hold power and 
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are respected in it. If poetry is so powerful, its character must be a primary concern of the 
legislation” (1991: 351).
 Now, with the Platonic Socrates back in the city, the dynamic of the provocation-
based relationship between philosopher and non-philosophers has changed into “is a 
leisurely discussion among cultivated, friendly men” (Bloom 1991: 308)—as they are no 
longer institutionally-sanctioned adversaries, in that the philosophically-based educational 
methods have had a transformative effect: “[O]f the unnecessary pleasures and desires...that 
are hostile to law and...come to be in everyone; but, when checked by the laws and the 
better desires, with the help of argument...they are entirely [or nearly] gotten rid of...while in 
others stronger...ones remain” (R 135). 
 To validate such laws, Plato refers to the man, in Book 10 who, after losing his son, 
shows self-restraint in public by not allowing himself to be overcome with grief (R 287). I now 
turn to develop Plato’s criticism of the types of people emblematic of the too-emotionally-
disposed, as they are too provokable to responses that create the political conditions ripe 
for injustice. 
Censoring Suffering
 For Plato, too long has the glorification of misery and suffering been part of the 
human experience—the way with which it has been dealt in society has contributed to a 
culture that conflates justice with appearance, justice with physical strength. In that Greek 
tragedian tradition—and from which Socratic rationalism represents the first intellectual 
break—”suffering cannot be explained away as a perspective illusion dissolving in the light 
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of a deeper insight” (Kuhn 23). Where Greek tragedy highly dramatized the confrontation 
and struggle with human suffering, Plato sought to use his newly-installed political levers to 
de-legitimize the cultural entertaining of such so-called realities, as they helped to inflame 
the passions of those who also happened to wield political power. These democratic rulers
—as hearers and fans of such tear-jerking poetry—proved insufficiently rational to deliberate 
on matters to which the concept of justice is appealed.
 As with the feeling of anger, censure may not completely eliminate suffering, but, for 
Plato, the political provocateur, it can change the cultural attitudes toward it to a negative 
view. Socrates says in the Republic: “For...if our young should seriously hear such things and 
not laugh scornfully at them as unworthy speeches...with neither shame nor endurance, 
[they] would chant many dirges and laments at the slightest sufferings” (R 66). Real political 
justice comes only after those philosophically-disposed rulers have assumed the right to 
apply it consistent with the knowledge acquired from having developed the capacity to 
reason. That virtuously-applied knowledge of real (political) justice could only ever be 
revealed by imitating the Form of Justice. Poets like Homer, however—with all of their 
rhetorical maneuvers and lyrical characterizations—depict events and scenes of suffering 
and elation in such a way that intends to rouse the emotions of the audience who then 
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transfer the theatrical pity14  they experienced into the real-world, which, in turn, manifests 
itself in circumstances that call for philosophical seriousness.
 Such is the source of Plato’s political animosity toward the similarly-impassioned 
spirits of the poet and democrat—Plato has Socrates ask of the non-attending Homer: 
“‘Dear Homer, if you are not third from the truth about virtue, a craftsman of a phantom, just 
the one we defined as an imitator...and able to recognize what...make human beings better 
or worse...tell us which of the cities was better governed thanks to you...? What city gives 
you credit for having proved a good lawgiver and benefited them?’” (R  282). Of course, 
there isn’t one, or, at minimum, not one that has the right to, by Plato’s criterion for 
judgment. That criterion—or standard—is the Form. Even for Plato and although he goes 
much further than Socrates, it is far easier to prove the null. 
Conclusion
 Theorizing provides that opportunity to make a wholly satisfactory case for the 
philosophical principles from which to the conditions for political justice. Not to diminish the 
importance of the contributions theory, but in that much of theorizing consists of making 
elaborations about the counter-factual—and with the intellectual freedom of never being 
proven wrong empirically—Plato’s overarching metaphysics, on which his political regime is 
constructed, demands that his word be taken, just as Socrates’ negativism was so matter-of-
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14 Stevens: “Plato does not actually name pity in the list, but, as I have pointed out elsewhere,14 his 
reference to the enjoyment which the spectators of tragedy take in weeping (48 A) shows that he has 
in mind the emotion pity. And just as the spectator of tragedy enjoys weeping and therefore is both 
pained and pleased, so the spectator of comedy enjoys the emotion of envy under circumstances 
which make it a kind of unrighteous  pain, and thus experiences a mixture of pleasure and 
pain.” (1948: 177)
fact asserted. Plato, I argue, was provoked—incidentally—into becoming a political theorist 
out of necessity to save the future of his first love—metaphysics. He had to find a 
pedagogical method to make Socratic rationalism not only more palatable—which is, to a 
large degree, the reason for his political works—but workable. In this regard, Plato—
probably what would have been much to the chagrin of Socrates—gives us written dialectics 
as a developmental tool by which to potentially experience that which he maintains in the 
Republic, at least, is available—the Forms. Vlastos interprets Plato’s position: 
[The Forms] are incomparably the most rewarding to the mind of all the things to 
which it can turn in its search for truth, for their natures are logically perspicuous, or 
can be made so with adequate training in dialectic... Their physical instances are, by 
contrast, intellectually opaque and shifty. They do not display their intelligible 
structure on their sensible surface (1997: 187).
 Experiencing the Form, however, like Socrates’ conversion at Delphi, is similarly 
religious. Moreover, Plato reserves it for the most extraordinary humans,—those very few 
capable of ascertaining the Truth behind the esoteric mask of philosophical discourse. 
Another interpretive difficulty—and, on my reading, a big factor for Plato eventually 
abandoning the theory of the Form15—lies in the inherent problems of language. Despite 
the insistence from metaphysicians like Socrates and Plato, “that there is really only 
one...true description of the human situation, one universal context of our lives” (Rorty 28)—
one which still applies to us today equally so as it did two-plus millennia ago; there has been 
no widespread, initial agreement on the terms of that debate, linguistically or substantively, 
when it comes to politics or much else, for that matter.
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15 In the end, Plato abandons the theory of the Form—at least the pursuit for a successful articulation 
of it.
 What Plato has left us with—despite his attempts to theoretically reconcile Socrates 
and Athens—and what makes him so provocative to this day, is that by voiding any 
contingency with respect to deliberating on legal cases, he raises the definitional standard 
(and thus political stakes) for justice to mean the achievable Objective Justice. 
Consequently, all else is something less than real justice. This is what made philosopher-
kings so critical and would put the Enlightenment so at odds with him, to whom I turn now 
to that era’s most provocative political theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
162
CHAPTER 6
Rousseau
Introduction: The Contextual-Historical Original Provocateur
 Perhaps if eighteenth-century, Genevan political theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
could have—and I use “could” and not “would” because I am almost entirely certain that 
Rousseau could not have helped himself—heeded his own words, “For us—ordinary men 
who heaven has not distributed such great talents and whom it does not destine for much 
glory—let us remain in our obscurity” (DSA 21). Rousseau could have avoided the 
tumultuous relationship between himself and much of his European contemporaries. 
Instead, Rousseau replied to the Academy of Dijon’s solicitation for responses to the 
question, “Has the restoration of the sciences and the arts contributed to the purification of 
mores, or to their corruption?” (DSA 2). So, if one were to become sympathetic to Rousseau 
on a human level, it is possible that the Academy’s provocative question initiated the 
relationship. However, in that the question was an open letter to the public and not just the 
position Rousseau argued but the tone he took, it seems more plausible that Rousseau—on 
a personal and stylistic level and not in substantive terms here—is the instigator for the 
ensuing exchanges traded between Rousseau and his critics, of whom he, too, is critical.
 That said, Rousseau identifies himself as a victim of the oppressive inequality 
resulting from the moral decay for which the arts and sciences are in part responsible. 
Rousseau’s was clearly the minority opinion, running counter to the prevailing point of view 
of the day. Much of what it means to be provocative entails voicing the counter-argument to 
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the more accepted one dominant in society. As such, Rousseau is contrarian. That is not to 
suggest, however, that Rousseau was being contrarian just for the sake of being so. In other 
words, I argue, that Rousseau genuinely held the view he expressed. In addition, 
provocateurs tend to believe that it is their ethical duty to make sure that the “truth” is 
heard—that the status quo does not, at least, go unchallenged.
 Rousseau, however, was not so naive not to anticipate the ire that his answer would 
draw from his contemporaries. Rousseau prefaces his first discourse: “I foresee that I will not 
easily be forgiven for the side I have dared to choose.  Running head on into everything that 
men admire today, I can expect only universal blame ... I have taken my stand” (DSA 1).
Similar to Bloom’s analysis of the political hostility the majority of men in Antiquity felt 
toward Socratic philosophy—which is why it needed an apology—Rousseau’s first discourse 
as well as his future writings were met with equally forceful retaliatory anger. He observes, 
“Among us, it is true, Socrates would not have drunk the hemlock; but he would have drunk 
from a cup more bitter still: the insulting ridicule and scorn that are a hundred times worse 
than death” (DSA 10).
 Just as Socrates knew of “truth”—i.e., the falsity in the claim to possess human 
wisdom—Rousseau, too, in self-deprecatory fashion, backhandedly insults those of the 
opposing view, in that to hold such a view means to live in self-deceit. With the same level 
of irony as Socrates, Rousseau seems to articulate his criticism of others’ certainty for things 
with an equal level of confidence, constantly reminding—at times pleading with—his 
audience to acknowledge his total honesty and truthfulness to describing the truth. At the 
164
very beginning of the first discourse, just after restating the question he was to answer
—“Has the restoration of the sciences and the arts contributed to the purification of mores, 
or to their corruption?” (DSA 2)—Rousseau rhetorically asks his own, only to give the answer 
immediately: “Which side should I take in this question?  The one, gentlemen, that is 
appropriate to an honest man who knows nothing and who thinks no less of himself for 
it” (DSA 2). 
 For me, in terms of provocation as the privileged interpretive category for analyzing 
his theoretical project of which Rousseau the man is part, Rousseau—in being provoked to 
respond to the question raised by the Academy and to which the answer comes in the form 
of his critical reaction to society and culture— on a personal level, assumes the role of the 
original provocateur to whom the relational subject consists of the Academy and those of 
the opinion that the sciences and arts contribute to moral betterment of man.
The Textual-Theoretical Original Provocation
 In theoretical terms, Rousseau names that original provocateur, to whom Rousseau 
gives the title, “the true founder of civil society.” Before that, man—in a more natural 
condition and thus a more natural man—did not carry on close and long-lasting associations 
with others, and thus men were not in relationships hardly at all, let alone ones started from 
some single act of provocation and continued by returning provocations, whatever the 
nature of the provocations, positive or negative or a combination of good and bad ones. As 
such, that original man of civilization—in having “enclosed a plot of land [and saying] this is 
mine” (DOI 60)—did not provoke what would have been the proper response.  It is not so 
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much that at this point people were wrongly provokable, and in that provocation requires as 
subject and an object, they were not provokable at all, in that they were “simple enough to 
believe him” (DOI 60)—or put another way, did not refute and challenge him. This in itself is 
to suggest that they did not view his intentions (being that they were sinister or, at the very 
least, benevolent) with the appropriate level of skepticism, and obviously so because their 
condition would not have previously equipped them to—no one ever “pulled up the stakes 
and cried out to his fellow men: ‘Do not listen to this impostor’” (DOI 60).
 That first provocation—the claim to private property, in which the state was thusly 
formed to recognize as legitimate—became the mechanism used “by the rich as a means of 
enslaving the poor” (Melzer 1983b: 644). What followed was the installation and production 
of a culture of provocation whose origins Rousseau pinpoints as the time in which humans 
physically and psychologically transition into society from the state of nature, and when 
“[p]eople grew accustomed to gather in front of their huts [as] true children of love and 
leisure...want[ed] to be looked at” (DOI 60). In addition, and in conjunction with the 
development for the faculty to reason and thus the ‘desire to know’ and to discover 
meaning, human hope and expectation were introduced into the emerging cultural psyche, 
the effect of which “was the first yoke they imposed on themselves without realizing it and 
the first source of evils they prepared for their descendants” (DOI 63). In other words, the 
invention of intention accelerated the evolution of the sociable man and all the conventions 
that come with civility. Bloom writes of Rousseau’s insights on this historical juncture at which 
humans are increasingly separating themselves from their (more) natural condition: “[An 
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infant] cannot stop it from raining by crying, but he can make an adult change his mind. ... 
With the possibility of change of wills emerges the justification of blame and hence of anger. 
Nature does not have intentions; men do” (1978: 142).
 For Rousseau—and coupled with the advent of property ‘rights’—when people 
began to look self-reflexively at the world, they then wished for recognition from others for 
their knowledge, as they had demonstrated a superior level of talent for intellectual 
reasoning, setting them apart, comparatively, from what is ordinary or common, a concept 
which can now take on a pejorative connotation. For Rousseau, “each one [of them] claimed 
to have a right to [esteem], and it was no longer possible for anyone to be lacking it with 
impunity” (DOI 64). This culture effectively necessitated that each person “show himself to 
be something other than what he in fact was” (DOI 67). The inadvertent acquisition of 
socially-driven vanity—that is, this new psychological dependency for flattery along with the 
obligation for reciprocating—brought with it, in addition to disunity and immorality, 
“incipient inequality,” each having a multiplier effect on the others (DOI 68). Grant writes of 
Rousseau, “Economic dependence does threaten integrity, so one must seek to acquire 
economic self-sufficiency. Cultivating simple tastes is essential” (Grant 436). As such, 
Enlightenment-era Europe culture lauded ostentation—materially and philosophically. 
Rousseau felt compelled to expose the frivolity and hypocrisy of the socially fashionable, 
who achieved such fame for claiming the opposite—those, ultimately for Rousseau, like 
Voltaire (C 399) and the Holbach clique (C 532).
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 The so-called enlightened champions of scientific progress, for Rousseau, battled 
with—as he admitted doing, as well—severe “amour-propre, which [in] mak[ing] 
comparison, is never content” (E 213); that is, suffering from always the yearning for vain-
glory, except  that Rousseau, he thought, had enough integrity and honesty to admit as 
much, to which he credits the decision of withdrawing from society in favor of solitary 
dreaming. However, Rousseau drew from his life experiences and personal relationships, 
e.g., those based on socially and economically unequal terms, to develop a new and radical 
theory of politics, one “that it boils down to the two principal objects, liberty and 
equality” (SC 170). Liberty and equality are in opposition to what he sees all about, 
dependence and oppression.
Dependence and Decadence 
 The natural state is no longer an option, but, for Rousseau, a more natural one—e.g., 
a more just and free one—is theoretically imaginable, and can serve as the model for which 
decay is slowed in those few remaining republics, such as Geneva. To effectively present an 
available alternative, Rousseau first needs to contrast that preferable counterfactual with the 
current state of affairs, wherein the political culture remains one of increasing social 
dependence, the cause of which is moral decadence—that is, given that “[e]verywhere 
[Rousseau] see[s] immense establishments where youths are brought up at great expense to 
learn everything but their duties” (DSA 16). The overwhelming calculative tendency exists to 
prefer the appearance of justice over real justice, which, for Rousseau, establishes 
institutional equality through which political obligation ensures civil—not natural, in that it is 
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no longer available (SC 151)—liberty. For Rousseau, the choice is either civil freedom, 
although imperfect, or neither, the predatory condition to which a timid Rousseau has 
repeatedly acquiesced. Late in his life, he laments in the Reveries, “how they have made 
themselves dependent on me in order to make me dependent on them…move[s] me to real 
pity”16 (RSW 80).
 For Rousseau, a contributor of the culture of dependence, which he finds predatory 
and oppressive, is the doctrines of the modern day sages. His problem with enlightened 
metaphysicians is that in the philosophers’ corrupt pursuit to achieve notoriety, they act not 
in the interest of truth, but out of self-interest for personal gain in the form of esteem and 
reputation—and thus further contributing to the deterioration of the strength that, one, 
binds political communities and, two, fosters individual self-reliance. In addition, 
philosophical doubt seeps into the psyche of the general citizenry, manifesting itself in a 
form of skepticism that undermines the shared and unwavering patriotism to the republic 
values and shared devotion to the civil religion that makes safe a people from falling victim 
to despotic ambition and misanthropic agnosticism. For Rousseau, the stakes could not be 
higher. Melzer writes: “Where citizens and patriotism no longer exist, republican 
government becomes impossible and despotism inevitable” (1983a: 302). 
 Rousseau pessimistically comes to learn the degree to which they seek to impose 
themselves on him and the degree to which he is susceptible to their victimization. As such, 
Rousseau the man combined with  Rousseau the theorist attempts to free himself and man 
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16 Butterworth picks up on what is at work for Rousseau here; noting that “[Rousseau] wants to explain 
how he can follow his own inclinations and et not be blamed for doing so.” (RSW 204)
in the abstract from the culturally psychological and the economically political prisons in 
which others put the weak and the weak put themselves. Rousseau remembers in the 
Confessions:
I could no longer see any greatness or beauty except in being free and virtuous, 
superior to fortune and man’s opinion, and independent of all external 
circumstances. Although false shame and a fear of opprobrium prevented me at first 
from acting on these principles and from openly defying the conventions of my age, 
my mind was made up from that moment, and I only delayed the execution of my 
resolve until such time as contradiction provoked it and rendered it victorious. (C 
332)
Provocation As Imposition and Victimization
 To free himself (including from himself, as he, too, is not internally unified)—and to 
theorize political liberation for all—Rousseau must find a way in which to overcome the 
culture of imposition. Rousseau repeatedly acknowledges his own susceptibility to being 
provoked numerous times throughout his life that resulted in a worse situation than if he 
would have only resisted the temptation to compulsively react. He puts partial blame on 
that time during his childhood “when my senses were aroused my desires took a false 
turn”17 (C 306). However, as he is looking for a political fix, he ultimately turns the focus of 
his criticism on “our absurd civil institutions...which merely gives the sanction of public 
authority to the oppression of the weak and the iniquity of the strong” (C 306).
 For Rousseau, the political culture perpetuates man’s weakness while the political 
institutions capitalize on that weakness. Rousseau's solutions are multi-faceted and must 
work in tandem. Society has to recognize—as he has—their status as victims and work 
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17 Rousseau here is referring to a childhood spanking that “would determine my tastes and desires, 
my passions” (C 25).
toward instilling cultural values—ones that promote self-sufficiency. This, however, needs the 
assistance of a public policy about which he theorizes in Emile—education and fiscal reform 
to educate children in accordance with nature “to learn in detail, not from books but from 
things” (E 184) and to implement taxation in accordance with conventional equality, in that 
“[n]o society can exist without exchange, no exchange without a common measure, and no 
common measure without equality” (E 189). Such ideas provide the theoretical basis for 
which to redefine justice and replace the absurdity of Rousseau’s Europe, where “the real 
welfare of the public and true justice are always sacrificed to some kind of apparent order, 
which is in reality detrimental to all order” (C 306).
 The problem, as Rousseau understands it, is that the so-called beneficiaries of 
structural inequality fail to recognize that they are prisoners of the systems and thus to 
themselves. Rousseau begins The Social Contract by identifying that type: “He who believes 
himself the master of others does not escape being more of a slave than they” (SC 141). 
They too—despotic tyrants, “political sermonizers” (SC 183) and ‘enlightened’ intellectuals
—need to undergo a transformational experience that forces them to confront their internal 
disunity so that the conditions for political reform are viable (theoretically, at least, for the 
pessimistic Rousseau). For instance, Rousseau frequently attacks those hyperrationalist 
philosophers. In contrasting the philosophical man of society with the “savage [who] lives in 
himself,” which, for Rousseau, insulates him from caring about useless talents in nature such 
as being a good dancer, the modern philosopher, is outwardly concerned (DOI 80). 
Additionally, however—and as an impediment to political justice through virtue and duty—
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his metaphysical disposition does not insulate himself as does the savage’s but rather, 
isolates himself and to negative ends, both personally and subsequently publicly; for 
Rousseau, “Reason is what engenders egocentrism, and reflection strengthens it...[and] 
turns man in upon himself ... Philosophy is what isolates him and what moves him to say in 
secret, at the sight of a suffering man, ‘Perish if you will; I am safe and sound’” (DOI 54).
 Rousseau knows that we cannot return to a state of nature. He would rather not, 
anyhow, in that “[we] ought constantly to bless the happy moment that pulled [us] away 
from it forever and which transformed [each of us] from a stupid...animal into an 
intelligent...man” (SC 150). In order for a just regime to come about, there must be a 
change in what compels us to engage one another—that is, relationships cannot any longer 
be defined as provocations of impositions, in which renders Rousseau—and, by extension, 
the citizens/society—”incapable of performing a good deed under compulsion,” 
Butterworth notes (RSW 202). Rather—and with the help of just and impartial laws—the 
people become inclined not to retreat inwardly as the metaphysician does but to act 
naturally authentic, as motivated by a sense of decency and pity, although within a social 
context. In other words, they act out of patriotic duty as a citizen and not out of a sense of 
undue obligation, in which what begins as a pleasurable act, but (for Rousseau) “having 
gradually become a habit, [becomes] inexplicably transformed into a kind of duty...soon felt 
to be annoying” (RSW 74). In sum, social engagement within a politically just context—but 
with the available power to enforce and coerce when needed—brings together engaged 
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citizens to ensure substantive equality, thus, in turn, fostering social bonds of authenticity 
and not of obligation and victimization. 
Rousseau, the Contagonist
 Although an engaged citizenry is critical for the maintenance of republican 
legitimacy, a severe tension exists between that type of general disposition and the 
propensity for anti-social—i.e., personally selfish and publicly detrimental—behavior most 
people exhibit, including Rousseau, as evidenced in handing over his children to the care of 
the state. Recognizing that he “may have been mistaken, Rousseau—“look[ing]upon 
[himself] as a member of Plato’s Republic”—demands empathy from would-be critics, 
rationalizing that “since [his unstated reasons] were strong enough to seduce [him], they 
would seduce many others” (C 333). 
 An apologist for himself, Rousseau is demanding that his apology be accepted—and 
that he would be forgiven. Just as Socrates was no model for Rousseau’s time, neither is he 
a model for a Socrates (DSA 10). Shklar writes: “Being no Spartans in Sparta we are best 
when we listen to conscience and evade situations that stimulate ill will in us [and...[t]o reject 
conscience is to suffer the most painful of all the frustrations that repressed instinct can 
inflict, remorse” (1969: 66). Rousseau, the person, cannot help himself. He is too easily 
susceptible to provocation; for Talmon, “Rousseau was one of the most ill-adjusted and 
egocentric natures [falling] prey to the conflict between impulse and the duties…because 
never in accord with himself” (38-9). However, Rousseau, the theoretician, believes that he 
can transfer the nature of his personal shortcomings and misgivings—of which, he assures, 
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plague many others, too—in order to construct abstractions to which can be applied to 
existing cases.
 Plato apologizes for Socrates, the historical provocateur and then casts the Platonic 
Socrates as his theoretical protagonist. Rousseau apologizes for himself, the contagonist and 
then casts the Rousseauean Legislator to reconcile man and citizen, so that for Rousseau—in 
terms of the strategy for provocation’s use—one will no longer have “to avoid situations 
which place our duties in opposition to our interests” (C 61), in that, as Shklar succinctly puts 
it: “our emotional drives are reoriented entirely to express themselves in love of the 
republic” (1969: 73).
 For Rousseau, emotions are natural and cannot be eliminated, and as such, one such 
as a Plato ought not try to suppress them. The goal is to set the cultural and political 
conditions for successfully delaying not the emotions that Nature has given humans but the 
inflamed passions to which civil society introduced them, and then to ensure that all 
sentiments to which one is inclined are rightly channeled into the political sphere for the 
maintenance of a healthy republic. Rousseau’s second discourse contends, “Nature, in 
giving men tears, bears witness that she gave the human race the softest hearts” (DOI 54)—
of which, according to Rousseau, his was among those with the most tender of hearts. 
Rousseau says of himself, “There was never...a creature of our kind with less vanity than ... 
My strongest desire was to be loved by everyone who came near me” (C 25). Whatever 
trouble the yearnings of his heart got him in throughout his life, his heart also contributed 
much to his work, if only to direct his theoretical cause in locating where real justice lies: “I 
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know my own heart and understand my fellow man. But I am made unlike any other” (C 17). 
Flawed as he was—which, to a large degree, forced him to flee his fellow contemporaries, 
and “[f]rom his lonely and vulnerable position outside all human society, supported by no 
parties and attacking all of them, Rousseau in a sense invited the enmity of all 
mankind” (Melzer 1983a: 309)—Rousseau was committed to being intellectually honest, in 
spite of the (seeming) paradoxical nature of him that contributed to him “seeming so foolish 
and strange in public [and] of acting unlike other people” (C 61). 
Rousseau, the vagabond, “has no functions to fulfill” as a citizen (Shklar 1969: 68)—he is a 
social outcast. Driven away, alone in solitude, Rousseau continued to fixate, as he continued 
to work on his great system, and the self-described victim of jealous people, who resented 
him for the delight he discovered alone—”the idleness of solitude is delightful because it is 
free and voluntary,” he says (C 592)—Rousseau’s writings and life, if only incidentally in his 
eyes, “did not fail to provoke the mob and incite them” (C 592). Rousseau, the thinker, 
continued to provoke as well, drawing upon his interactions and communications with 
”[t]hose who reproach me for my many inconsistencies” (C 592), in his autobiographical 
writings to supplement his system of justice in his political works, such as the Social Contract 
and even the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. 
 The issue is, Rousseau engaged in political theory—despite the fact that, for him, 
philosophy is socially dangerous. Strauss writes of Rousseau, “science and citizenship are 
indeed irreconcilable, but that society can afford to tolerate a few good-for-nothings at its 
fringes, provided that they are really idle” (1947: 478). But just as Rousseau acknowledges 
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that he is not the master of his own destiny (C 373) when it comes to the timing of the 
publication of his Confessions, similarly he ought to have considered that he does not get to 
outright control the definition of ‘idle’—and as that was the truth, his fiery, provocative 
rhetoric “supplied Robespierre” (Shklar 1978: 22) with theirs at the onset and during the 
French Revolution, as well as a litany of more recent scholarly interpreters—Talmon, for one
—who argue that: “[I]n marrying this concept with…popular sovereignty, and popular self-
expression, Rousseau gave rise to totalitarian democracy [and] coupled with the fire of 
Rousseau’s style, lifted…intellectual speculation into that of a great collective experience…
[birthing] modern secular religion…as a passionate faith” (43).
 Rousseau’s political system seeks to rid the charged rhetoric of provocation as a 
legitimate form of political communication, in that it can likely fracture one’s allegiance to 
the general will (Abizadeh 563). Rousseau’s works, however, are filled with the language of 
provocation, but before looking at his political theory itself in terms of provocation, I now 
discuss his strategic use of and implications for rhetorical provocation relative to his overall 
theoretical project that seeks outs—although seemingly paradoxically and certainly 
ambiguously—the conditions for which even the “wretched” among us can experience as a 
result of the stylistically and substantively provocative theory by, as Shklar describes 
Rousseau, “the Homer of the losers” (1978: 24).
Rhetorical Use of Force and the Conceptual Language of Provocation
 Throughout Rousseau’s life—as he was especially prone to falling victim of others’ 
provocation that resulted for him the inferior position. Rousseau, in his own words, tells of 
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how others were successful in “forcing me into a state of obligation against my will” (C 342). 
By nature, Rousseau was gentle, even timid—and lacking the fortitude to resist others’ 
entrapments—Rousseau gives those like him—and all of us, in that just law is blind—the 
Social Contract, which becomes the theoretical basis for which to construct a new political 
process that results in far fewer personal dependencies and much greater equality because, 
as Shklar writes, “[the social contract] alone depersonalizes, and so moralizes 
obedience” (1978: 14).
 So, where Socratic rationalism seeks to suppress all emotions attributed to personal 
bodily urges for moral—but non political—purposes, Rousseau means to harness the 
passions to the benefit of the public sphere, so that “it provides politics with the force to 
motivate...[and this] virtuous domestication of the passions allows Rousseau to envision a 
form of speech proper to modern republican citizenship” (Abizadeh 571). Rousseau is re-
orientating us so that the various forms that provocation take—e.g., dispositional and 
rhetorical—are directed at pursuing a different understanding of justice—one that is real, in 
that all come to embrace the equality that exists for the potentiality of being the recipient of 
sinisterly-motivated provocations, whether in word (e.g., superior debate) or deed (e.g., 
punishment).
 For Rousseau, the general will, as rightly performed, functions to eliminate the 
dominant form of provocation—that is, the illegitimate use of physical force and 
psychological manipulation that rendered pervasive states of dependency. The impartiality 
of the general will strips from would-be political oppressors the opportunity to force their 
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individual wills on others, thus preventing real inequality and curbing the need to always 
compare, which, in turn, creates the necessary social conditions for citizens to take on an 
internally unified disposition—one in which people’s inclinations and duties are consistent 
with one another—a process whose cultural effect keeps the citizenry rightly orientated 
toward the goal of sustaining an equitable and fair distribution of resources as well the 
application of justice. In essence, the transformation from man to citizen corrects for the 
ensuing slavery that came from that first provocation of staking claim to a piece of earth—
and to which Rousseau corrects the apologists for such an act. Rousseau writes of Aristotle:
Aristotle...had also said that men are by no means equal by nature, but that some 
were born for slavery and domination ... Aristotle was right, but he took the effect 
for the cause. Every man born in slavery is born for slavery ... If there are slaves by 
nature, it is because there have been slaves against nature. Force has produced the 
first slaves; their cowardice has perpetuated them. (SC 142)
That previous right to force amounts to slavery—and unjust governments keep them in their 
chains, deliberately. To free man, Rousseau argues that we must accept trading “natural 
liberty (which is limited solely by the force of the individual involved)” for a “civil liberty” 
that the general will grants (SC 151)—and although not ideal, it remains the best of all 
available options, only even if “[t]he aim is to train men to ‘bear with docility the yoke of 
public happiness’” (Talmon 42). And for Shklar, Rousseau’s “[p]rotection is not freedom, but 
it certainly may feel just like it” (1978: 17).
 But one might pose the question as to the possibility that Rousseau’s advocacy for 
the general will as the arbiter for deciding what justice is merely trades one illegitimate form 
of force for another, only instead of culturally-sanctioned obligation it becomes state-
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sanction totalitarian in nature. Rousseau most (in)famously mandates in On the Social 
Contract that “in order for social compact to avoid being an empty formula, it tacitly entails 
the commitment —which alone can give force to the others—that whoever refuses to obey 
the general will will be forced to be free” (SC 150). On my reading, Rousseau’s rhetorical 
provocations seeks to provide a new way of thinking about the appeal for and exercise of 
acts of provocation—one that situates rightly provokable citizens in relation both to 
themselves and their fellow citizens. But as he argues that the limitations of linguistic 
expression prevents him—and anyone—from perfectly articulating the intention for which 
the theory of provocation itself can be applied. That is, inherent in his thought—and thus 
inevitably his writing—is “dominated by a highly fruitful but dangerous ambiguity” (Talmon 
40). That said, however, Rousseau believes himself to be better equipped—rhetorically and 
perspectively—to present himself—and thus relatedly his theory—as one of provocation 
indicative of Plato’s in the Fourth Epistle—that is, provocation for positive purposes, 
although for Rousseau, a form that culminates in mature political deliberation that rightly 
discerns good from bad rhetorical and acts of provocation, which applies, for Rousseau, to 
his entire readership, whether political actors or intellectual thinkers. On this point, 
Kavanagh argues on behalf of Rousseau: “Although the critics distort Rousseau’s meaning 
[via] a judgment made in a paroxysm18 of self-exculpation19, the basic motivation [i.e.] the 
fear of [revolutionary] violence…is [central in] Rousseau’s political thought” (142-3).
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18 Paroxysm, or violent outburst (OED)
19 Self-exculpation, or clear from guilt or shame (OED)
 Rousseau’s anticipation of his critics become, for him, proof of his argument—that is, 
their failure to understand the meaning of his provocation shows that the culture does 
indeed accept shallow interpretations of his theories as well as honor retaliatory acts against 
honest attempts at introducing new—and positive—forms of provocation. Rousseau’s later 
theoretical works—i.e., the Social Contract and Emile—having failed to resonate with a 
persuadable audience set the conditions for the decision—whether it was his or the 
government’s—to create distance between Rousseau and the rest of society, in that 
regardless if “if he had been a little less felicitous and a little more ponderous” (DSA viii), his 
novel uses for the terms “compel,” “coerce” and “force” were taken to incite—another 
term within provocation’s Wittgensteinean family of resemblances—revolution:
Voltaire, then resident there and passionately meddling in local politics, took it to be 
a blatant intervention in the domestic constitutional struggles then at a feverish 
pitch. And when the Genevan Council of Twenty-Five condemned the Social 
Contract in June 1762, its principal reason was the same: in his plaidoyer, Geneva’s 
attorney-general, Jean-Robert Tronchin, cited numerous passages as proof that 
Rousseau was retailing rebellious notions. (DSA xi)
 As the Social Contract whose content can be read as related to his earlier discourses, 
Rousseau’s political theory challenged the foundations on which the political system rested
—that is, those with political power hold it legitimately as their rights have been derived law, 
natural law. As such, they found Rousseau so provocative not only for unconventional 
notions for what constitutes legitimate uses and acts of force and compulsion, but the 
premise from which they begin, which contributes to the harsh reaction against Rousseau’s 
attempt to strip the argumentative force that proponents of natural law theory appeal to in 
staking their claim to legitimacy—a definition whose current application Rousseau wholly 
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disagrees with, and is what I look at next in terms of the provocation found in Rousseau’s 
work.
Rousseau Challenges Natural Law Theory
 In his preface to the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau asks on what 
basis does “moral or political inequality” exist—to which he begins his answer by 
questioning the premise that “nature [is] subjected to the law” (DOI 35). Rousseau intends 
to expose the weakness of the argument that those make to justify their sense of superiority 
and place of privilege by applying to themselves some laws found in the natural order of 
things—that is, natural law. The implication in asking, “Is that inequality authorized by 
natural law?” (Neuhouser 372), Rousseau strategically connects this political inequality to 
conventionality, thus separating it from what is (more) natural, and, in turn, adding to the 
conceptual meaning of it an element of arbitrariness. 
 In order for Rousseau to sufficiently strip the natural law theorists of their 
argumentative proprietorship over how the metaphysical truth supposedly supports their 
claim to the acceptability of this political inequality, Rousseau must successfully shift the 
argumentative burden of proof on them—that is, he has to show that their position does not 
have some natural permission to speak on behalf of Nature. For Rousseau, natural inequality 
is a separate matter and irrelevant to political inequality—and thus has no basis for which to 
extend the political context, but this is exactly what Rousseau sees natural law 
metaphysicians doing, and exposes the contingency and convention from which they 
rhetorically proceed. In order words, Rousseau is charging them with working backward—
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that is, for Rousseau, these political beneficiaries, within their specific context, strategically 
but arbitrarily select a method whose “universal” data is led by their prejudicial conclusions 
that “prove” their case for keeping power. In reality, however, for Rousseau: “So that all the 
definitions [of ‘law’] of these wise men...it is impossible to understand the law of nature and 
consequently to obey it without being a great reasoner and a profound metaphysician...men 
must have used enlightenment which develops only with great difficulty and by a very small 
number of people within the society itself” (DOI 34).
 For Rousseau, within the context of political inequality, natural law metaphysicians 
lose any argumentative credibility for their rigid claim that out there exists ‘universal 
agreement’ but the fact is—and in terms of the language of provocation—”[i]t is not without 
surprise and a sense of outrage that one observes the paucity20  of agreement that among 
the various authors who have treated it. Among the most serious writers one can hardly find 
two who are of the same opinion on [the true definition of natural right]” (DOI 34). 
Moreover, proponents of and apologists for some legitimate claim to natural rights as 
derived from natural law undermine their overarching theoretical goal when extending the 
argument to the political sphere and expose themselves as not more than intellectual 
opportunists in that they word the definitions of terms like the true ‘nature of man’ and ‘law’ 
not in earnest but “convenient[ly]”. Rousseau writes:
Writers begin by seeking the rules on which, for the common utility, it would be 
appropriate for men to agree among themselves; and then they give the name 
natural law to the collection of these rules, with no other proof than the good which 
presumably would result from their universal observance. Surely this is a very 
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20 Paucity, fewness (OED)
convenient way to compose definitions and to explain the nature of things by 
virtually arbitrary views of what is seemly. (DOI 35)
Here, Rousseau’s provocative challenge is meant to set the stage for his theoretical 
proposals by attempting to expose their systems for analysis as weak and their agendas as 
fraudulent, charges that both of which also support his criticisms of decadent society relative 
to the moral bankruptcy of those who view history as a story of progress, which, for 
Rousseau, is one of moral regress. 
 In sum, he wants to reframe the starting premises from which to analyze the 
developments leading to contemporary society, making the natural law metaphysicians work 
forward instead of backward. Rousseau feels that natural law metaphysicians got the 
theoretical ordering of, as Masters puts it, “[t]he foundation of social morality and justice” 
wrong. Rather, in that “Rousseau saw that it is impossible to account for the existence of civil 
society apart from the evolution and history of the human species,” that foundation “is the 
‘nature of law’ (i.e., the logic of obedience which is necessarily implied in any freely obeyed 
law)” (202). And as such, legitimacy and justice come through consent—and maintained by 
virtuous and dutiful civic participants.
Replacing Provocation (of Man) with Depersonalization (of Law)
 Now, as Rousseau thinks he has sufficiently poked enough logical holes in the natural 
law theorists’ chronology by discrediting their argument for placing the rationale for 
obligation and obedience to some power outside a specific political context—that is, for 
Rousseau, “[a]ll political power is dependent on publicly accepted, legitimating 
opinions” (Melzer 1980: 1026)—Rousseau can place political legitimacy within the confines 
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of a consenting community. That distribution of power becomes just “when” that citizenry—
even if only hypothetically—has agreed to the terms of the social contract—the terms of 
which, although abstractly written to cover all, cover all in that context. For the pragmatic 
Rousseau21  understands that—despite the fact that all people carry the natural instinct for 
self-preservation, which manifests itself in the sentiment of feeling pity—the amount of 
liberty available is contingent on the conditions specific to certain political communities, 
making some places freer than others. So for Rousseau, the emphasis ought to be on the 
prevention of some—namely the rich—to “bend the law in their own favor” (Shklar 1978: 
17).
 That said, however, just as Rousseau finds the intellectual elite corrupt power 
grabbers, who have usurped the dogmatism of the former religious leaders, Rousseau 
pessimistically has to confront the reality that the average people, who have not only been 
duped by political opportunists but fail to demonstrate the necessary decision-making skills 
to enact fair, abstract law, both equal in its application to everyone and expansive in its 
protection. In reviewing his life, Rousseau bemoans, “Why is it that, having found so many 
good people in my youth, I find so few in my latter years?  Has the race died out?  I am 
forced to look for them today in a different class from the one I found them in then” (C 144). 
Predictably, Rousseau fails to find them, so he abstractly theorizes the political conditions—
and the necessarily disinterested Leader—for which to answer the question: “How will a 
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21Grant: “In politics, one must not seek perfection, but only the best that is possible. From this it 
follows that whether a policy is good or bad will vary with the particular circumstances of a nation and 
its people” (429).
blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants (since it rarely knows what is good 
for it), carry out on its own an enterprise as great as difficult as a system of legislation?” (SC 
162).
 For Rousseau, who in agreeing with Hobbes—and in terms of provocation, as Melzer 
conceives of it—man is too susceptible to the political provocations of opportunistic 
demagogues—that is, “[b]y inducing others [men] to follow them...[and thus threatening 
anarchy]...because they are too obedient....[and being] superstitious…the mass of men are 
followers, too easily led by rabble rousers…demagogic moralists, and…ambitious 
priests.” (1983b: 635). And additionally, the common person is too short-sighted, in that, for 
Rousseau, “[e]ach individual...finds it difficult to realize the advantages he ought to draw 
from the continual privations that good laws impose” (SC 164) which necessitates that great 
Legislator’s authorship of sound and impartial law that will rule supreme—and thus protect 
equally. “The state as a paternal savior was the only possible hope” (Shklar 1978: 17) to 
prevent what he lived, even as a boy—that is, “in every situation the powerful roque 
protects himself at the expense of the feeble and innocent” (C 42).
 As slaves of history imprisoned in society, which started at the point when that 
original provocateur drove that first fence stake in the ground, Rousseau accepts the defeat 
of the natural self, as indicative of his—and everyone else’s—failure to resist provocation. 
The answer, for Rousseau, lies in re-orienting that provokability toward the benefit of the 
state, where the greatest amount of freedom—albeit it minuscule in comparison to that of 
the savage, for instance—ensures, at minimum, a longer chain for feeble and innocent and a 
185
much shorter one for the powerful rogue. Rousseau must work with what is available and 
adjust—i.e., lower—expectations accordingly; for Levine, Rousseau’s “dilemma is obvious: 
there can be no state without the citizen, but the citizen cannot flourish without the 
state” (550). 
 The point is, Rousseau, the radical pessimist—and not the deliberate inspirational 
precursor to, say, a Robespierre—has not only to believe but make palatable the possibility 
for a change in disposition, so that from the perspective of each member of the citizenry, it 
is accepted that when “the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in 
error...If my private opinion had prevailed, I would have done something other than what I 
had wanted.  In that case I would not have been free” (SC 206).
 For this to happen, man must undergo a transformation that—in terms of the 
dimensions of provocation—redefines what provokes us and resets the levels of emotions 
when reacting. For instance, for legitimacy and security, Rousseau’s citizen must be virtuous 
and patriot without being either aloof and misanthropic or fanatical and xenophobic. The 
social contract’s legalism attempts to neuter the rich and clever political schemer while its 
religiosity means to equip the well-intentioned but ill-equipped commoner with the skills to 
act self-reflexively and citizen-like—that is, as Levin writes: “To admit the possibility of a 
social contract implies acceptance not only of the notion that political society can change, 
but also that it has been created and can be changed by man” (Levin 530). I now turn to 
Rousseau’s attempt at marrying man and citizen, and the success of his theoretical project as 
one of political provocation.
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Internalizing External Provocations 
 Rousseau never develops a foundational philosophical system in the way Plato does, 
but like Plato, Rousseau’s theoretical analysis is also one of provocation, in that he intends 
for his theory to be transformative—that is, his social commentary, cultural criticisms and 
thus political recommendations are meant to force reflection, define the rightly provocable 
disposition so to create the conditions for personal reorientation and political reform, 
through which justice can foster liberty and equality. Rousseau, however, becomes 
increasingly pessimistic of the chances to, if nothing else, even save the few good republics 
remaining. For Rousseau, social cohesion has become too divided and cultural corruption to 
deep—and thus the political sphere has become an enabler of corrosion and generally 
unwilling and/or unable to re-establish virtue.
 Such is the case in large part due from man’s blind faith in foundational 
fundamentalism—both philosophically and religiously. That said, however, Rousseau does 
not deny objective truth—in fact, Rousseau, a Christian himself, believes in God. His 
provocative religious position is one that refuses entry of some religious absolution into the 
public arena, in that—and similar to the natural law metaphysicians—the externalization of 
religion makes people dependent on the self-anointed mouthpieces of other-worldly 
capital-t truths. Rousseau writes: “My reading of the Bible...had led me to despise the base 
and foolish interpretations given to the words of Jesus Christ by persons quite unworthy of 
understanding them. In a word, philosophy, whilst attaching me to what was essential in 
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religion, had freed me from the host of petty forms with which men have obscured it” (C 
366).
 At the same time, however, Rousseau—and without having to abandon the claim 
that “[r]eligion is a natural tendency of the heart” (Melzer 1996: 352) and that “[r]eligion...is 
part of the education to and of the human” (Strong 1994: 125)—avoids the tyrannical 
consequences of the other transcendental claims. Rousseau takes the approach of a 
“reasonable man,” who, without denying the existence of objectivity in truth, has to 
recognize that man cannot with any definitively ever know it—and thus ought never to use 
religious stricture (or philosophical first principles) to suggest a universal application, which, 
for Rousseau, as a Catholic in Protestant Geneva, “has brought such cruel persecutions 
upon me” (C 366).
Conclusion
 Rousseau’s theory of politics attempts to eliminate that kind of persecution of which 
he felt at the hands of religious-types in the majority, and give it over to the state whose job 
will be to channel those deeply-held attachments into developing patriotic citizens, 
beginning with the Legislator whose task “is to create a new type of man [in that]...[i]t is not 
enough to change the machinery of government” (Talmon 49). In effect, Rousseau replaces 
traditional religious education with a new civic-minded religious program where the 
externalization of religious practice takes a new form of adherence to the general will. And 
just like the precedence the general will takes to the private will, the criterion for which 
religiosity is judged becomes insulated from the previous cultural standard of prosecutorial 
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conformity as Rousseau reserves judgment for internal review of sincerity of faith. As such, 
man has been transformed—in theory. But as religious was internalized, the general will was 
externalized, creating a new criterion for judging behavior—one whose standard “was to be 
social utility, as expressed in..the general will...as if it were a visible and tangible 
object” (Talmon 4).
 That potentiality leads to the emergence of another conflict of interest—not between 
man and citizen but within the citizen himself. For Melzer, the citizen “will be torn in his 
desires between his genuine love for the city and his ineradicable love of himself”—and 
although different than Rousseau’s compulsion to oblige others’, e.g., the young boy’s in the 
“Sixth Walk” of the Reveries, advancements to enter dependence induced relationships, 
which put Rousseau at odds with his natural inclinations—merely traded one force for 
another, only this time with the political instruments for enforcement, in that [p]atriotism can 
never be complete; men must be forced to be free and unified” (1980: 1030).
 The question is—and one my model of provocation does not necessarily answer so 
much as assess the nature of the provocative quandary Rousseau got himself in—Was his 
political fix worth the cultural problem? That is, social man is desirous, just as Rousseau 
himself was—and remained so. But unlike the Plato who elevated some, i.e. the 
philosopher-king, above the law, Rousseau, in making law above man, society above 
individuality, Rousseau’s fundamental theoretical linchpin disallowed him from exempting 
himself—and thus forcing him to conclude near the end of his life what Melzer neatly 
summarizes: “Ultimately, however, Rousseau found the unity attainable through virtue to be 
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imperfect … The ultimate invincibility of nature and of the natural self, which led Rousseau 
from patriotism to virtue, finally leads him to abandon the moral-political realm altogether 
and to turn to the perfect natural unity of the solitary dreamer” (1980: 1032). Much of what 
it means to be provocative lies in self-contradiction. Rousseau fits such a characterization, 
which infuriated Friedrich Nietzsche who “hates” Rousseau—and Rousseau’s theory of 
political justice in its close relation with natural equality. I now turn to the provocation of 
Nietzsche—and in his theoretical works, a significant amount of which is a reaction provoked 
by not only Rousseau but Socrates and Plato, as well.
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CHAPTER 7 
Nietzsche
Invention of the Ascetic Ideal as Imposition on Nietzsche 
 The question is to determine what provoked Nietzsche to deliver such a vitriolic 
attack on society—and the political culture—that is, an overall one that is indicative of his 
work, the Untimely Ones, in which it was predicted that Nietzsche would “bring about a kind 
of crisis” (EH 278). Nietzsche is reacting to the societal implications of the effects caused by
—and among other historical realities, like the spread of and belief in Christianity—Socratic 
rationalism and Platonic metaphysics, all of which—including the religious dogma of 
Christianity—claim such capital-t truth is out there. Considering the devastating toll the 
other-worldly focused systems have had contributing to the acceptance of human 
mediocrity, Nietzsche, both cultural critic and philosophic skeptic, begrudgingly retorts, 
“How could such a philosophy—dominate!” (BGE 123).
 Nietzsche intends to present the harshest possible criticism of the ascetic ideal 
because he is trying to undermine philosophy’s purported ability to successfully show that a 
metaphysical theory of knowledge—that is, an epistemology—can be representative of 
Truth, as if one could access such insight even if it were “out there,” which, for Nietzsche, it 
is not, thus making a futile—and dangerous—exercise. Nietzsche hopes to accomplish this 
by calling into question people’s unfounded certainty that they think benefits them from 
having given themselves meaning they previously lacked. For Nietzsche, it is fiction—”[man] 
alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning” (Z 60)—and as Thomas notes: “The 
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invention of ‘knowledge’ as the representation of truth is...one of the great rhetorical 
mistakes of modern thought...In its quest for certainty, the will has always been tied to a 
style of representation that Nietzsche argues has its natural connection in the ascetic 
ideal” (18). Their inventiveness of a false reality, which has taken over the culture of which 
Nietzsche and his ‘higher men’ are a part has become an unnecessary impediment to 
achievement, whether it be, for instance, self-overcoming or willing to power.
 Nietzsche becomes the anti-ascetic in terms of what he—as opposed to the ascetic 
idealist whose most (in)famous example is Socrates—understand what asceticism to 
properly mean. For Nietzsche, it is running toward life, unlike for Socrates, it is a rejection of 
everything that pertains to this world. Such a denial of life itself provokes Nietzsche, 
assuming the provocative title of the anti-priest, responds to Socratic rationalism, which 
Nietzsche refers to it as, irrational rationality. Nietzsche traces religious martyrdom and 
cultural nihilism back to that first self-denier and self-deceiver, Socrates—and thus confronts 
him, as he does in the Birth of Tragedy, even doing so on Socrates’ philosophical turf; 
Dannhauser depicts this within the conceptual framework of provocation, writing that “[o]ne 
concedes a good deal to Socrates merely by consenting to argue with him...The most 
obvious novelty of Birth of Tragedy lies in its presentation of a strange and new image of 
Socrates, a revaluation of the traditional image” (80).
Antagonistic Nietzsche Versus Accepted Cultural Asceticism
 Nietzsche takes on Socrates as the inventor of this kind of philosophy and inquiry 
that seeped into the public sphere and whose consequences have been dire. Also, that 
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irrational rationalism made Socrates sick and has since infected so many since that even 
today,  these modern men of a progressive culture, which for Nietzsche is wrong,  naively 
and even perversely and cynically believe what that invention continues to purport. Thus, 
their affliction continues. Nietzsche writes:
Only now that we behold the ascetic priest do we seriously come to grips with our 
problem: what is the meaning of the ascetic ideal?—only now does it become 
‘serious’: we are now face to face with the actual representative of seriousness. 
“What is the meaning of all seriousness?’... His right to exist stands or falls with that 
ideal: no wonder we encounter here a terrible antagonist—supposing we are 
antagonists of that ideal—one who fights for his existence against those who deny 
that ideal. (GM 116)
But Nietzsche denies them this—or, at least, cannot remain silent and ignore their 
preposterous and dubious characterizations and belief systems. He attacks them for it.
 At work is Nietzsche’s intentions to expose their mediocrity, which they wrongly 
interpret as common decency and politeness. Nietzsche’s criticism is meant to undermine 
the certainty in which they believe their lives have meaning. To do this is to challenge the 
possibility of attaining the standard that Socrates created and Christianity spread, which, in 
turn, has spiraled into a cycle of inevitable failure being redirected into misguided forms of 
retaliatory punishment on those who, like Nietzsche, never fell prey to such philosophical—
turned religious—traps Nietzsche argues that the intellectually weak legitimate their place 
by having created a culture of mediocrity that views achievement with suspicion—thus 
making Nietzsche’s point of view highly provocative, in that it challenges the psychological 
reconciliations made to feel as if they live consistently in terms of traditionally accepted 
cultural mores.
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 In order to get “beyond good and evil,”22 Nietzsche attempts to discredit the notion 
of unified objectivity by, first, showing its incomprehensibility for which Ideal is the standard 
as arbitrary and absurd as well as how the fundamentally incompatible principles to which 
people make claim for living their lives have produced in them an incoherent ideology that 
has infected the political culture to the point of total perversity both intellectually and 
morally relative to the natural order of things, as Nietzsche has understood man’s 
genealogical record of history. Opposite of the ascetic—consumed with other-worldly 
burdens—Nietzsche, in having psychologically liberated himself from cultural conformity of 
the masses, can confront—and thus overcome—the contradictions of the past and the 
struggle between conflictual inclinations, which, in turn, allows him to live joyously and think 
clearly and freely. His freedom—and thus understanding—coupled with his commitment 
toward improving this life—the only one—offend the vast majority of people (the 
philosophical community as well as Christian masses) unquestioning dogmatism. 
 Ironically, for Nietzsche, what elevates him above the societal status quo—whose 
champions are the historical Socrates and the Christian Jesus—is the pursuit of perfection—
on this earth and not the promise of it in some next life. He takes his  willingness to buck the 
past and accept the contradictions within as evidence for committing rigorously to improve. 
And as Nietzsche’s philosophical skepticism is met with societal skepticism, he—as 
principled—returns their cultural provocation with the kind of rhetorical provocation sure to 
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22 “In contrast to Plato, Nietzsche frames his new epistemology in what we might call an ‘extramoral’ 
or ‘nonmoral’ sense, carrying with it the connotations of moral transcendence, of being ‘beyond good 
and evil’” (Thomas 38).
antagonize. The difference lies on which side if truth—not Truth; Nietzsche condescendingly 
retorts, first in the Gay Science and then in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
Wouldn’t that be fair, given such overweening deviation on the whole? When I hear 
of the malice of others against me—isn’t my first reaction one of satisfaction? Quite 
right! I seem to be saying to them—I am so ill-attuned to you and have so much 
truth on my side that you might as well have a good day at my expense whenever 
you can! .... [M]y words are small, despised, crooked words...I can still use it to tell 
hypocrites the truth ... Behind a god’s mask you hide from yourselves. (GS 249, Z 
123)
As Thomas notes: “[R]hetoric is a means to challenge the production of values; it offers a 
critique that is separated from philosophical dogmatism and metaphysics” (38).
The Politics of Life and “Truth”
 Nietzsche contrasts himself with whom he identifies as self-deceivers. He is referring 
to those in a debilitating state of constant anxiety who are afraid of reality and what is 
truthful—and not some version of truth they created and attribute to themselves in order to 
give their lives, according to Nietzsche, false hope. They are contemplative, reactive and 
wrongly disposed emotionally, including, for some of them, those whose contemplation 
detach them from this-worldly life, as defined by their unnatural suppression of active 
engagement with life. For Nietzsche, their philosophical (in)activity makes them weak. 
Nietzsche, however, is strong—strong in the sense that he has correctly identified his own 
mortality and the relative futility of it, while still embracing the aristocratic recognition of 
place and legitimate position of his nobility and superiority relative to the herd-like masses 
as well as the dogmatic rationalists. Both of whom, for Nietzsche, accept concepts as fact—
for instance, the socialists’ proclamation of “equal rights for all” (AC 191)—and by which 
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now society at-large live, and thus continue to contribute to downward spiral of nihilistic 
decadence. Charles Adler on Nietzsche’s reading of Paul Borget regarding nineteenth 
century European nihilism23: a “disgust with the world,” identified “as the discrepancy 
between the needs of the modern age that accompany the development of civilization and 
the inadequacies of existing reality” (Muller-Lauter 41).
 To force them to confront their “disintegration,” if nothing else—in that their 
psychological state is being cared for and perpetuated by the democratic state—and 
subsequently free himself and his identified “higher men” from the cultural impositions that 
seek to inhibit Nietzsche and “friends” from creating self-expressions of excellence, beauty 
and truth—whose provocations’ impact, at worse, remain only incidentally negative, where 
the provocations of the democratic-socialist state continue to be deliberately harmful to 
both the weak and the strong—in that, for Nietzsche, “[w]hile a weak state may kill off all 
dissenters, a strong state should be able to tolerate them” (Kauffman 251). People have 
come to naively accept as matter-of-fact that truth precedes history, which, for Nietzsche is 
false, and the success to which these inversions of actual reality have seeped into the 
(German) cultural psyche—and where law has become the (re)enforcement (i.e., torture) 
instrument (EH)—must be shown to be arbitrary and disputable, which, if accomplished, 
doubly “proves” his notion of truth. Wilcox writes: “Nietzsche holds [against Kant] that the 
categories we employ in interpreting the world simplify and hence “falsify” the world, that 
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23 Referring to nihilism, Nietzsche writes in Ecce Homo: “Against all this the sick person has only one 
great remedy.  I call it Russian fatalism...exemplified by a Russian soldier who...finally lies down in the 
snow.  No longer to accept anything at all...to cease reacting altogether...” (EH 230)
our interpretation of the world is only one among many which are possible, and that we 
interpret the way we do because of human, very human valuations and conditions of life in 
the past and present” (156). For Nietzsche, Christianity, as Platonism for the masses (BGE), 
whose control over the socio-political dialogue is in need of an adequate response—that is, 
a second conversion that privileges, once again, this life. His response is Nietzschean irony 
as provocation: “What defines me, what sets me apart from the whole rest of humanity is 
that I uncovered Christian morality. That is why I needed a word that had the meaning of 
provocation for everybody...Blindness to Christianity is the crime par excellence—the crime 
against life” (EH 332).
 Nietzsche’s perspectivism is truer—in that it is rigorously skeptical and honestly 
pursued—than the self-deceivers’ (metaphysical) religiosity that re-makes the world—in the 
claim that their version of things as the one Truth—in their own image, and essentially with 
their eyes shut. For Nietzsche, they cannot (both intellectually and psychologically) be 
truthful about the world and thus to themselves. This standard of objectivity was invented—
as opposed to discovered—to help with those who could not otherwise deal with life as it 
was—and ought to be. Platonic ‘knowledge’ is insanely hopeful, and if it were not taken so 
seriously and accepted as fact so uncritically (recall Socrates’ use of the concept criticality in 
the Phaedo), and afforded such undue consideration by the masses—who reinterpreted its 
principles into Christian values—would be laughable if the cost has not been so high. 
Nietzsche rhetorically asks, “[H]ave you ever asked yourself...how much the erection of every 
ideal on earth as cost?” (GM 95)—to which, he answers, in short, no. Nietzsche’s contempt 
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of the credence extended to so-called wise, deliberative and contemplative men, all of 
whom, in their immature naivety, displayed a susceptibility to dangerous provocations24—
coupled with the effect of its cultural dissemination—has made reason into a doctrinal 
inactivity instead of an experimental pursuit, determining conclusions before rigorous 
investigations, and ultimately producing a politics that caters to demagoguery; Nietzsche—
using the conceptual language of provocation—notices: “In what strange simplification and 
falsification man lives!...How we have made everything around us clear and free and easy 
and simple! How we have been able to give our senses a passport to everything superficial, 
our thoughts a divine desire for wanton25 leaps and wrong inferences!” (BGE 35).
Interpreting the Object of Provocation
 For Nietzsche, ‘absurd deliberation’ weakens a person, in that a sense of paranoia 
fills that person. He creates intentionality everywhere, as if all actions were deliberate 
provocations directed at him for being in such a vulnerable condition. As such, that fear 
manifests itself into moralizing provocation, whose meaning of morality—and conveniently 
so, Nietzsche mocks—happens legitimize their failed attempts at acts of strength but comes 
with the promise of other-worldly rewards for such indifference toward action, which only 
further incapacitates them as well as incentivizes them to continue thinking instead of 
overcoming or willing. And worse, since threats from others who do not subscribe to their 
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24“The inactive, brooding, unwarlike element in the instincts of contemplative men long surrounded 
them with a profound mistrustfulness: the only way of dispelling it was to arouse a decided fear of 
oneself” (GM 115).
25 Wanton, or “unprovoked” (OED).
definition of “reason” still exist—and to which they have lost their ability to defend 
themselves as well as the natural instinct to do so—they attach to any form of provocation 
that threatens them a newly invented connotation, “evil.” At that point, the world—starting 
with Socrates (and then Jesus) and spread by the likes of St. Paul—loses perspective. No 
longer is an action assessed in terms of, say, good for me, bad for you, but Reason—or God
—has determined prior that that once good act, as one that produced an amoral result, was 
immorally conceived and thus no longer just bad for me but evil of you. Such is our 
simplification—and our decadence.
 So, in terms of the first dimension of provocation—the relationship between some 
subject and object—where the subject acted upon the object for a reason that lacked a 
moral quality, that act now gets evaluated not solely by the immediate parties but from an 
Objective interpreter. What I am suggesting is that by including an Objective standard, the 
rationalists and religious, as the once objects of other human subjects of aggression, make 
Reason and God—as they perceive or define It/Him, as it comports with their position 
relative to the previous object—the unquestioning and unquestionable object—and thus the 
framework by which to assess the nature of the relationship based on provocation. As such, 
Nietzsche seeks to undermine this—that is, just as Nietzsche confronts Socrates on his 
methodological terms—and as Cox writes: “Nietzsche thus reverses our...philosophical 
conceptions of the primacy of the subject ... [I]nstead of first positing a given subject who 
then acquires various perspectives and interpretations, Nietzsche maintains that 
interpretation is primary and that the subject is itself an effect of interpretation” (139).
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 Nietzsche intends to challenge their conception of the superiority of the subject—in 
that they have permanently filled that position with Reason or God to add a moral 
component that comforts and protects them. By doing so, Nietzsche privileges 
perspectivism over dogmatic revelation, so that the pursuit of knowledge and truth is a 
forward-moving process instead of an effort to conform the events of life—as it is a chain of 
provocative phenomena—with some first (unknowable) Principle(s), doctrinally retrofitted so 
that people no longer have to wrestle with life or improve their condition, in that everything 
has been solved for—that is, in the next life, where the good—now, the Good—is rewarded 
and the bad—now, Evil—is punished, for all eternity. 
 For Nietzsche, however, whatever certainty, hope and peace for which they intended 
their lazy dogmatism to work as a sedative for dulling the pain their asceticism causes, 
failed. That is—and in terms of the conceptual language of provocation—having been 
seduced into believing that faith in Another—and not will from within—empowers them to 
best cope with the reality of what the natural human condition truly is, they reversed their 
instinctual drive to dominate—and thus have inverted the (more) natural—and superior—
meanings of concepts relating to human interaction. “Justice” has now become “justice for 
all,” as if, on Nietzsche’s terms, all are equally deserving of justice—and thus their slave 
morality rationalizes their condition of slavery, not just in relation to their incidental masters 
but also to themselves and, by extension, a culture of decadence that systematically seeks 
to assure that all are equal—for Nietzsche, equally repressed.
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Nietzsche, the Immoralist
 Now that Nietzsche has identified the original provocation—other-worldly morality—
and reacted to the original provocateur—the ascetic priest—and has been provoked rightly, 
which manifested in his describing the different reactions to that provocation in terms of 
what has resulted, I now discuss Nietzsche as provocateur. Once the object of others’ 
provocation—that first revaluation—Nietzsche assumes the role of subject whose theory is is 
meant to provoke a second revaluation—that is, as he who has been imposed upon as a 
result of that provocation sets out to change the dynamics of provocation to create a 
different set of conditions by which one accepts conceptual meanings, so he, the provoked, 
channels that and become the provocateur with respect to his project. He reacts against 
those who have furthered the original provocateurs’ message. Thus, he acts on behalf of 
himself and those whom he seeks to liberate. Liberation can be (more easily) accomplished 
if a reversal or inversion of that original inversion is sown to be poignant in his analysis. His 
analysis, in turn, will resonate both stylistically but, more importantly, substantively. Thus, it 
will create a new kind of values that will establish the conditions for a new societal 
disposition. Such a disposition will bleed over from the cultural to the political and then 
hopefully back to the culture where art truly lives and resides.
 Better and worse behaviors—as incentivized and disincentivized by institutional 
mechanisms—are indicators of dispositions that have been changed in tandem with this 
bigger societal change. Also, the greater number of people who behave badly—in 
Nietzsche’s view—is indicative of the democratic state’s—as it is the formation of 
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‘democratic tastes’—which as we have seen benefits from their simplemindedness and 
confusion. This is why they mistake good for bad, right from wrong, and better for worse—
all to their detriment, in that this is systematic and not incidental which mirrors provocation 
as a concept. This is so in part because they are linked. Nietzsche writes, “[E]very 
people...has invented its own language of customs and rights.  But the state tells lies in all 
the tongues of good and evil; and whatever it says it lies—and whatever it has it has 
stolen...Verily, it beckons to the preachers of death” (Z 49).
 They do this because they resemble the democratization efforts and democratic 
instincts as they are the democratic men who in their weakness and suffering which is 
glorified—as if that is a good thing, which Nietzsche mocks—fear strength. As they are 
paranoid and anxious, they will not only suffer in a way they cannot control in terms of the 
narrative, for it is defined differently from the way they conceive it to be. Nietzsche writes, 
“‘He is so polite.’ —Yes, he always carries a biscuit for Cerberus and is so timid that he 
thinks everyone is Cerberus, even you and I” (GS 213). Nietzsche recalls a better time—
before Christ—which is opposite from their thought. For Christians, Jesus was sent because 
those times reflected a most sinful one. During this golden age of nobility, if justice was 
done, it was not forgiven in words and punished in terms of justice but repaid in equal 
measure, which ought to be admired. Nietzsche writes, “It was an age marked by the 
incapacity for bad manners: even an insult was accepted and returned with obliging words. 
perhaps our present age furnishes the most remarkable counterpart” (GS 112).
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 Instead, now, they do not react as they should, if at all, but recoil and condemn. In 
one sense, they turn the other cheek but, on the other hand, use an illegitimate system 
based upon slave ethos to get that eye which was taken from them. Their whole being—in 
terms of provocation—has been turned completely upside down which is why there needs 
to be such a reversal and a total revaluation. For Nietzsche, Jesus embodies this—and what 
has resulted in terms of the modern European Christians, in that they report to practice 
Christianity: But what does that mean, especially in terms of the original Christian, Jesus? 
That is, he is wrongly provokable, susceptible to the wrong kinds of provocation, and when 
provoked to the wrong ends, he reacts improperly. In fact, he provokes more, worsening the 
situation, as one ought to approach such events. Nietzsche writes, “This ‘bringer of glad 
tidings’ died as he lived, as he taught—not to ‘redeem mankind’ but to demonstrate how 
one ought to live...He does not resist, he does not defend his rights, he takes no steps to 
avert the worst that can happen to him—more, he provokes it” (AC 159). 
 Consequently, modern men are simple, and because their education is a reflection of 
these values, their education is no help to them in terms of not being more rigorous and, 
thus, less simple. Nietzsche writes, “[O]ur educated people of today, including the Christians 
of “educated” Christianity [have] no cause for amazement...among these ruins [that is] the 
taste for the Old Testament” (BGE  65). This is why Nietzsche must call out their education 
system, which is what Rousseau and Plato do as well, all from different points of view. As a 
result they too have become audacious in their provocative behaviors in having glued the 
two incompatible and incommensurable texts into a single, unified message—one that on 
203
one hand returns an eye for an eye and on the other hand is to turn the other cheek.  They 
have a lack of skepticism and commitment to the hope that this must be true because they 
need to believe that there is eternal salvation for them, if only they can make sense out of 
this, so they just accept it, despite all the obvious contradictions. Nietzsche is hoping to 
lower the stakes on one hand but in a sense keeps them high in terms of the importance of 
the message which is why the rhetoric is so forceful and vitriolic. 
 Therefore, Nietzsche, who is differently provokable, must counter this provocation 
with equal provocation—a rhetorical eye for an eye, of sorts. Kaufmann notes, “This is 
Nietzsche’s very deliberate antithesis to the Christian tradition, designed to give offense to 
Christian readers” (338). Nietzsche not only chooses the most provocative words in terms of 
the challenge of these notions as fact—as it seems that people conflate faith with fact, but 
he also wants to show “moral” as what it actually is—some concept whose definition is 
contingent upon a certain context and not one that is universal. His genealogy helps to 
clarify how moral—despite being defined by God—differs as people and time change which 
are at odds with each, which is why he as an immoralist, although striking to the ears of 
some, means to more immoral than their moral is representative of a previous notion 
associated with God. He is trying to show how people have been misled and wronged by 
those who are actually opportunists that invoke God for their benefit, not theirs—which 
makes them the worst kinds of people, far worse than any immoralist like Nietzsche.
 The problem is, for Nietzsche, sometimes the rhetoric engulfs the message, but I am 
not sure Nietzsche cares, in that he has written off so many. This is an indication of his 
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pessimism in terms of what is possible, which rings similar to Rousseau. Nietzsche attaches 
and associates the term immoralist with saint or at least, his version of a saint. Saint is, a 
term reserved for the most faithful of Christian commonly held. As an immoralist, he is 
reducing the reverence of this and alternatively ascribing sainthood to the ultimate artist. He 
assumes the role as the new bringer of glad tidings, similarly to the way in which he 
characters the saint and immoralist. To cause an upheaval in their traditional modes of 
referencing, he undermines and then can pivot to a new way for them to conceive things. 
This new way instills and cultivates skepticism, rigor and attitude, all characterized by the 
gay science. That said, his style is provocation but is one that reinforces a substantive 
message defined by provocation as well: “Have I been understood? —What defines me, 
what sets me apart from the whole rest of humanity is that I uncovered Christian morality. 
That is why I needed a word that had the meaning of provocation for everybody... Blindness 
to Christianity is the crime par excellence— the crime against life” (EH 332).
 So, Nietzsche’s mission is one of provocation, his overall strategy is to deliver the 
message of substance, and  provocation is an integral part of that substance. This message 
of substance is similar to Emerson’s and reminiscent of Socrates’, in addition to the others, in 
terms of provocation as being privileged and assuming a category of the highest ones in 
politics. With this mission, Nietzsche like Socrates and Rousseau accessed a new way of 
conceiving things. They were allowed to do this in that they possess something most if not 
all do. They possess something that others like the previous theorists they are reacting to do 
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not possess. They also see the world differently from them. Their new way of conceiving 
things is an improvement:
[T]hat we mostly lazily stick with our Christian inheritance, which we persuade 
ourselves is the ‘natural’ view to take.  But...we realize that something is amiss, so 
we tinker around in an ad hoc sort of way, holding on to such concepts as ‘rights’ 
and ‘equality’...ignoring others that we find inconvenient. The result...is a moral and 
spiritual vulgarity so depressing that [Nietzsche] has to stage a one-man, non-stop 
demonstration of exaltation. (GM 68, Ed.)
Nietzsche wants this confrontation with those who never confront what needs to be 
confronted. He wants a confrontation with those who never confront the truth anymore, and 
he hopes his words can serve as a trigger for that. This is, in part, his provocation. He is 
unconcerned and will remain uncensored in that  as a philosopher, he is not only battling 
non-philosophers but also those who are held in high regard, for example, ones who like 
Hegel in similar fashion, lull the youth (Kaufmann 93).
 True to his multi-front attack at all times, Nietzsche’s point is that the religious, the 
intellectual and the political classes—although from different perspectives—are all enemies 
of Nietzschean high culture, which is why Nietzsche wishes to delink the intellectual and 
religious’ uses of politics from culture, which explains why there is a link between the culture 
and the state. He objects to this relationship, as representing a view opposite of Hegel’s. 
(Kaufmann 93) To accomplish this, he must win back proprietorship over the meanings of the 
concepts at work here. He will do so to force people to awaken from their slumbers and 
without regard for how people react. Thus, his stance will be adversarial in that the people, 
in typical form, will hunker down in a defensive crouch and instead of confronting 
themselves, will direct it toward people like Nietzsche. That said, Nietzsche does not care. 
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Like Rousseau, if he is going to be taken down, he is taking them down too, and, at least in 
terms of having confronted them.
 Nietzsche’s position is provocation. The times and his commitment to the truth 
necessitate it. Thus, to awaken some and disarm others, he exposes them, forcing them to, 
at least, have to even at face value consider the lies they have been told and have come to 
accept as truth. The priests have been told not to dwell upon or even dabble around in such 
areas that are reserved for those who will deliver God’s true message for them. Nietzsche 
wants them to deal with this. He is doing this in the face of these academics and priests and 
wants their audiences to circumvent them. This has to do with the idea of the stakes, which 
he is reducing in substantive terms and raising on stylistic ones in order to catch their 
attention. However, it can be debated whether the strategy is an effective one, but again 
this has to be matched to his intent, if we want to, that is. Like the preachers of equality, 
they have all colluded into bringing about an age of nihilism whose last man is forcing the 
higher man into extinction. Nietzsche writes: “To me you [preachers of equality] are 
tarantulas, and secretly vengeful. But I shall bring your secrets to light; therefore I laugh in 
your faces with my laughter of the heights. Therefore I tear at your webs, that your rage may 
lure you out of your lie-holes and your revenge may leap out from behind your word 
justice” (Z 99).
 All of life is about power, but the differences is in the types, in particular, what they 
intend to do with that. For the weak, because of their bad conscience, they have reworked 
the process and rigged the game for expressing power, so that it is no longer overcoming as 
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Nietzsche sees fit. Instead, it is the opposite. It is a retreat and not advancement, almost in 
the military sense in terms of his language and analogy and metaphor. For them, it is 
external which is why they obey laws:
All men obey certain laws, and most of them obey laws that others command them 
to obey ... He also thought that the reason why people obey the laws others impose 
on them is that they want power. They believe that this is the way to get ahead and 
become influential and successful; they fear that an infraction of custom might cause 
society to retaliate and to diminish their power. (Kaufmann 250)
They believe that they can get ahead from obeying the law which brings in a couple of 
things. For example, it includes one’s yearning for acceptance and good reputation because 
they care about what other people think about them. This also ties in the notion about pity 
and suffering and cares about conformity which underscores their timidity and fear of 
excelling. It is as if they are less afraid to fail than they are to succeed. In addition, this 
supports how they are differently disposed, as the weak versus the strong. They obey 
because their power comes from others’ recognition and valuation of it in Christian/
democratic terms. Doing so in conjunction with the bad conscience which is anti-instinctual 
makes them believe they are astonishing. This, in an ironic and sarcastic way, ‘astonishes’ 
Socrates, specifically, their crudeness and stupidity astonishes him. However, where they 
interpret being this kind of provocative as something positive, Nietzsche finds it absurd. 
Their “mastery” is one in which they have mastered how to seem: “[W]ho does not say a 
word or cast a glance in which there is no consideration and ulterior enticement [motive]; 
whose mastery includes the knowledge of how to seem...the genius of the heart who 
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silences all that is loud and self-satisfied, teaching it to listen; who smooths rough souls and 
lets them taste a new desire” (BGE 233).
 Nietzsche is trying to win back what beauty means. This stands in sharp contrast with 
the noble man who does not deliberate for too long as that only suggests that one is overly 
contemplative and calculative which then suggests that he lacks the instincts that are 
natural, strong and assertive. This deliberation is not to be confused with reason or 
reasonableness, which Nietzsche thinks is right, so long as it is understood properly. This 
transfers into the political realm in that the noble man is not concerned with such rules. For 
Nietzsche, the noble ought not to be valued under such a structure. Self-perfection is a 
process that stands both outside of and against the state. Therefore, Nietzsche wants to 
reverse this so that power is viewed differently. Hence, power is—not with the masses who 
use the state, but instead, this power is one that does not need the state, which is a sign of 
real power. This stance assumes the intentions behind power are pure and that will result in 
productions and effects that are in line with these intentions, which as a rule, Nietzsche does 
not put value in. Nietzsche needs to communicate a condition by which they no longer see 
themselves as “wild,” “free” and “natural.” They are the opposite, the herd-like masses, 
that is:
The origin of a condition in which feelings of displeasure...preponderate over 
feelings of pleasure, is the same as the origin of the “state.” The state...is an 
imposition of form on the formlessness of wilderness humanity. The net effect of this 
imposition of form is the damming up of old instinctual drives forcing their 
sublimation into other modes of release.  Whatever its specific cause...this is the 
basic patter of the sickness that Nietzsche associates with religion. (Murphy 82)
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 Because of their religious misunderstanding, they have given power to the state for 
its uses which only hurts them. “[I]f there should ever be a socialist state it would enforce an 
unprecedented iron disciple” (Kaufmann 191). For Nietzsche, it is a zero-sum game—he 
wants a “weak state” so that there can be a strong culture. He wants a weak state and a 
strong culture, in part, because it seems as if they are inseparable at this point:
[I]f Nietzsche did have a plan for world government or even European unity he is not 
revealed it ... We may of course argue [of Nietzsche that] institutions reflect the will 
to power of a dominant group and this is all that is to be sought by way of 
justification. To look for more is to make the mistake of supposing that there can be 
something other then will to power at the back of political choices, that justice is 
something more then or other then will to power. (Nussbaum 4)
He wants to reverse the way in which the will to power is reflected so that what is dominant 
is what is rewarded. The point is, in this situation, everyone is oppressed. Again, Nietzsche 
does not give the masses any kind of out. Although Nietzsche does not do this in any 
substantial way, he argues that, at least, part of us could be free. The problem is that in 
provocative terms, he wants those in charge, those who are benefitting from the system, to 
just hand over power and return voluntarily to their role as slaves, in a sense. The weak will 
only be hurt, incidentally. The difference is that the weak rationalize their justice in terms of 
power that does not improve upon their lives in any real, measurable way. Such power also 
hurts the culture, but then again, these are the ones who are using provocation in terms of 
the argument about losing the culture war. Nietzsche wants institutions that make free a 
culture in which the noble can prosper. 
[Nietzsche] was concerned, above all, with the artist, the philosopher, and the man 
who achieves self-perfection—the last having taken the place of the saint.  Particular 
actions seemed much less important to Nietzsche than the state of being of the 
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whole man ... They want eternal recurrence out of the fullness of their delight in the 
moment. They do not deliberate, absurdly, how they should act to avoid unpleasant 
consequences. (Kaufmann 322)
 While the weak and the meek fear retaliation, they turn to the offensive as the best 
defense. Thus, they do not act what is naturally instinctual, but always absurdly deliberate 
and in schemes as to what is self-mastery and everything is reactionary. It is always them as a 
reaction, for that is how their identity is formed. This underscores why they think so 
intuitively about all that should be looked at in opposite terms. They, like Jesus, “do not 
resist,” accepting death rather than to fight back. This is problematic. What is Nietzsche 
saying? It seems by implication that, on one hand, he mocks them for not fighting back, but 
on the other hand, he seems like the acts against them are not bad, which is a reason to 
think about his perspectivism. Like Socrates, their self-control is not noble. It is absurdly 
foolish, in that it is anti-life—their moderation is immoderate. It is immoderate in that it 
restrains. It is not one a self-control in which that restraint is used against wrong 
provocations but one that causes death, revealing that they have already accepted death 
and, thus, stopped living assertively long ago. Their misunderstanding provides the 
mechanisms of the state to control them and to coerce them to obey the laws which has 
made sheep out of them. They call this progress and civilization. In addition, this 
misunderstanding makes them value other people’s opinions and how to seem which is their 
definition of success, which is similar to Rousseau’s, which Nietzsche hates. Nietzsche writes: 
“It involves subtle and...noble self-control, assuming that one wants to praise at all... for in 
the other cases one would after all praise oneself, which offends good taste. Still this kind of 
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s e l f - c o n t ro l f u r n i s h e s a n e a t o c c a s i o n a n d p ro v o c a t i o n f o r c o n s t a n t 
misunderstandings” (BGE 225).
 While Nietzsche provokes to reveal their absurdity, they see it as offensive and thus 
threatening. This perspective causes them to take action and to protect themselves, and 
that is the difference in their tastes, one noble and the other democratic. Everything about 
their emotions and what provokes is backward. They retaliate when they should resist and 
resist and remain silent when they ought to defend themselves with force. They know 
nothing of self-mastery and in the process kill dissenters. They would not understand that 
those dissenters’ voices could be elevating for the culture. Worse, they would find the 
dissenters offensive and sinful and would retaliate to thwart them.
The Last Man—Democrat, Socialist, Nihilist
 In moral and, subsequently, political terms, Nietzsche nostalgically harkens back to a 
time long passed—before the moralist conceived of the bad conscience. Nietzsche wants to 
reverse the accepted perspective to reflect those Aristocratic values in hopes, albeit unlikely 
he pessimistically concludes, to once again culturally celebrate wills to power, as defined not 
by majority opinion but reserved for the greatest among us, in that the strong—not the 
weak—give meaning, even when it comes about the value of human worth, specifically 
intrinsic value. He also emphasizes that, whatever the consequence, an action ought not to 
be valued in terms of the evaluation as set by the slave. In contrast, when intentionality is 
favored or given privilege, the merits of the action are disconnected. Also, mediocrity is 
accepted, so long as the intentions were sincere and pure, as defined by them.To 
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complicate matters, intention can never truly be known with any real definitiveness, which 
allows for people to project and affords them the ability to rewrite the narrative as to the 
events surrounding the motivation, the action, the result and the repercussions. This 
scenario is similar and parallel to the concept of provocation in terms of the chain.
 The problem is that one is at the mercy of one’s own interpretation, and that 
interpretation is skewed, not in perspectival terms but by the fact that it is offered through 
their prism of the Ideal. Their prism of the Ideal is not empirical in any real way in that it is 
influenced by their position, a position that is representative of the herd mentality and which 
is protective and reactive. All of this is perpetuated because of the institutional recognition 
of intention as an important concept in determining justice. Also, because of equality, there 
is room for false equivalency in that people’s opinions and positions and stories are not just 
influenced by intentionality, but also in that it is presupposed they are equal. It is easier to 
view ideas as equal and less prone to false judgment and misunderstanding than it would 
be if they were evaluating actions, almost exclusively, in terms of the consequence, the 
result and the product. However, they do not see the value of the consequence, the result 
and the product because in terms of living their lives and understanding the origins and 
manifestations of their actions, false judgment and misunderstanding are standard. Again, 
for Nietzsche, the noble person, who acts deliberately and without undo deliberation—
because reasonableness is within him, is able to achieve greatness and to experience 
“beauty,” not “Beauty.” 
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 This context leaves him vulnerable to being judged according to the standards of 
those who should not be judging. The democratic system advocates for them not to judge 
in that they have no authority. Nietzsche notices this dilemma when comparing the pre-
Socratic times, before decadence started infecting populations. Kaufmann writes:
[T]he overman does not have instrumental value for the maintenance of society: he 
is valuable in himself because he embodies the state of being for which all of us 
long ... ‘The goal of humanity cannot lie in the end but in its highest specimens.’ 
Perhaps there is no other more basic statement of Nietzsche’s philosophy in all his 
writings than this sentence. (313, 149)
Nietzsche, despite that empirical facts do not seem to warrant history as progress,  looks to 
the future to free himself of the dangers that exist today and can entrap him, if he is not 
careful.
Nowadays it happens occasionally that a mild, moderate, reticent person suddenly 
goes into a rage, smashes dishes...insults everybody—and eventually walks off, 
ashamed, furious with himself—where? what for? ... I welcome all signs that a more 
virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all. 
For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher...—the age that will carry 
heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas 
and their consequences. (BGE 225, GS 228)
Nietzsche’s criticism attempts to counter what religion and Christianity have done, as in his 
referring to types. Murphy writes: “[I]t is clear that much of what Nietzsche was trying to say 
in his treatment of the Jews and Judaism was as much—if not more—about the German-
Christian construction of modern European identity than it was about the Jews 
themselves” (106).
 Nietzsche seeks out a new future, one which is more war-like and something 
opposite of today and more reminiscent that the Dionysian age, which would require a 
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different political culture. However, while his philosophy is directed at the individual whose 
desires reflect that of a “high and choosy soul,” his politics do not leave open that 
possibility to too many people. He does not afford many the opportunity to capitalize on 
what he is advocating for and on what his teachings are. The point is, Nietzsche is talking to 
a crowd—presumably those like Goethe and Wagner (at one point)—who are likely not the 
ones who need him, so what is the point? Who is Nietzsche trying to reach, if not those 
people who could be the Goethean man—not just the artist and saint but the warrior? Also, 
would it not be advantageous to have more than fewer, so as to counter the masses, in that 
he sees what sheer numbers can do? However, that he seems not to be too concerned with 
this signals that he is interested in little else but fiery rhetoric rather than actual change. 
 When Nietzsche is ironic and contingent in his criticism, he is not so in terms of his 
politics, but rather, in terms of provocation. In other words, Nietzsche’s works ought to be 
read by those with the desire and the inclination to become more naturally inclined to enlist 
in his army to resist the last man and to resist becoming the last man and crawling back to 
the cross. For Nietzsche, if one cannot be a saint, at least, he can be a warrior. If Nietzsche 
has any real, positive agenda in terms of political theory, the goal ought to be to maximize 
the number of potentially “great specimens.” The greater the number is, the greater is the 
ability to influence the politics. This maxim undermines the role of government and extends 
power to the sphere of culture. Kaufmann writes: “Empirical facts do not seem to him to 
warrant the belief that history is a story of progress, that ever greater values are developed, 
and that whatever is later in the evolutionary scale is also eo ipso  more valuable” (149). The 
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bar will be raised, and again failure will be internalized by those who cannot cut it, those 
who tend to be the masses. However, that number will be less likely to be mobilized in that 
they will recoil in their shame. “It is not actions that prove him—actions are always open to 
many interpretations, always unfathomable—nor is it ‘works’ ... [S]ome fundamental certainty 
that a noble soul has about itself, something that cannot be sought, nor found, nor perhaps 
lost ... The noble soul has reverence for itself” (BGE 228).
 It goes back to restraint and Socrates in terms of the narrowness of their project and 
the specificity of their agendas, which is more about themselves than something bigger. Like 
the historical Socrates, Nietzsche was less political, as theorizing politics has been 
traditionally viewed, making them provocative, even politically so. Nietzsche must not have 
really been concerned with politics, as politics is traditionally viewed and to the extent I use 
the word tradition, they must undermine it using a familiar language as a reference point to 
ultimately use their language to discredit it and provide a different conception of politics, 
like their conceptions provide. Even if it is not overt, which it is not, as Nietzsche would 
prefer for culture to replace the role that the state plays now. The problem is that it 
generally interfered with any positive or constructive political culture. Regardless of what 
they argue, i.e., man defines society—not society defines a Napoleon.
Conclusion: Culture Versus State
 Nietzsche’s consideration of the state—and thus his political thought—is 
necessitated by his theory of culture, in that the democratic mob have wrestled away the 
mechanisms of political power not just from the cultural nobility—his aristocratic higher-man
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—but, in turn, spread socialist equality—and thus by implication thwart those who, for 
Nietzsche, transcend politics. As such, the deterioration of society stems from culture having 
been reduced to serve the interests of the democratic state, where the fearful masses—who 
have managed to successfully tie together the notions of political legitimacy with popular 
sovereignty—impose widespread conditions of equality, an argument founded on the 
metaphysical principle of intrinsic human worth. For Nietzsche, however, the commoner is 
no Shakespeare, no Spinoza—in fact, Nietzsche, in true provocative form, makes the 
argument that the gulf separating the average person is greater between him and Leonardo 
than the one between him and a chimp (Kaufmann 151). 
 So, where democratic theory becomes the basis from which to construct socialist 
policies that benefit “all,” the political cultural that emerges is one antagonistic to a higher 
culture that values real expressions of excellence instead of intrinsic worth that not only fails 
to exceed personal expectation but directs those few individual talents, as pooled with 
others—in “desir[ing] to find scapegoats” (WP 140) for their own self-contempt—to 
institutionally insure that no one can ever transcend the law—and thus their mediocrity. Such 
is the linchpin of democracy and socialism. For Nietzsche, the “Socialist rabble”—whom he 
hates the most—use “power politics” to derive some sense of power over their own misery 
by denying the opportunities of free cultural expression to Nietzsche’s would-be higher-
men. And since the “cultural state” is merely a modern idea,” and with respect to the state 
and culture, where [o]ne thrives at the expense of the other” (TI 73), Nietzsche’s politics of 
provocation means to de-legitimize the tenets of democratic political theory in order to 
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separate out culture from political culture. His presentation—although limited and ancillary, 
particularly in comparison to Plato and Rousseau—means to free the higher-man from the 
public sphere altogether, giving him instruction for how to, first, ward of those preachers of 
the “bad conscience” and of equality  in order to, next, concentrate on the sublimation 
process for which to be Nietzschean great.
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CHAPTER 8
Dissertation Conclusion
Introduction26
 I conclude with a brief review of how paying provocation with provocation can begin 
a long chain of provocations that eventually escalates into the most dangerous of scenarios, 
particularly if the recipient of the most previous act of provocation interprets the subject of 
provocation at that specific juncture—i.e., the provocateur—to have intentionally sinister 
motivations. As I have shown, relationships between those whose interactions are 
predominately characterized as provoking one another back and forth can quickly 
deteriorate, leading to the stronger—i.e., the party with institutional authority, especially—
preventing the weaker, regardless of the original instigator, from further acts of provocation 
by resorting to use the necessary political or legal enforcement levers at that party’s disposal 
as retribution. Take for example Rousseau who ultimately fled to Scotland to seek refuge at 
the home of David Hume (C).
 European authorities increasing impatience with Rousseau stemmed from in part 
what they interpreted as revolutionary theory, regardless of Rousseau’s competing claims. 
Rousseau ended up being right on another related issue, however—revolution was just 
around the corner, both in France and in the British colonies across the Atlantic Ocean. The 
French revolution turned especially bloody. Today, however, whatever type of war—civil, 
state against state or state against non-state terror organizations—technology has 
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26 All references to news-related events and basic historical facts throughout chapter from 
www.nytimes.com.
exponentially increased the possibility not just for a high number of troop casualties but 
total human annihilation. As such, the stakes for de-escalating increasingly hostile acts of 
provocation—perceived or actual—between two enemy groups have never been more 
critical. Socrates saw war. Plato observed the 30 tyrants. Rousseau feared the effects of 
technology. And Nietzsche warned of what Heidegger—author of the post-WWII essay on 
provocation, “The Question Concerning Technology”—had been, in the least, complicit in: 
the Holocaust. 
 To set up the final discussion of the chapter, where I provide contemporary examples 
of ongoing provocation in the world today, I review how acts of provocation are disputed as 
such—that is, whether or not some “initial” act was, one, intended to be provocative and, 
two, what the motivation was for acting in such a way that it was interpreted not only as an 
act of provocation but one with sinister and antagonistic motivations. On the world stage—
where all countries and peoples have a vested interest in peaceful resolutions, so as to be 
protected from nuclear fallout—the disputing groups involved engage at first in a war of 
words vying to be recognized as the legitimate object of that subject’s unjust and negative 
original act of provocation. And just as each of the theorists’ analysis entailed a moral 
component, contemporary groups try to take the moral high ground in order to convince 
both domestic and international stakeholders and observers that that country’s rhetorical 
enemy at this point would be responsible and guilty if the provocations turned from 
rhetorical to physical—on an infinitely greater scale than in the case of Socrates. 
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Escalation of Provocation
 Nietzsche called Socrates a buffoon who got himself taken seriously—so seriously 
that his fellow Athenians sentenced him to die. What Nietzsche makes reference to is how 
provocation can escalate, and does so as those provocative behaviors are seen as 
increasingly provocative—to the point of retaliation ending in death. Thus, the stakes are 
high, especially because words of provocation that are used for figurative purposes—
depending on the dispositions of the hearers—can be taken literally, as Nietzsche’s use of 
“war” was. And war is the ultimate result of provocation. The technological capabilities 
available for military use makes engaging in provocative rhetoric with a potential adversary 
or adversaries consequential for the entire world, which is why when a country charges 
another with provocation, it characterizes the other’s behavior knowing the international 
community plays, in a sense, an evaluative role in judging the nature of the relationship 
between the two (or more) countries competing to set the terms for how to characterize 
their dispute and responsibility for any future escalation.
 In that the conceptual terminology of provocation has evolved into predominantly 
meaning deliberateness, and has also taken on a negative connotation, where the potential 
provocateur—although disputed in that either party denies the validity of the other’s 
definition of, say, what “right” or “just” means—would come to be blamed as the instigator, 
and likely held responsible for starting the slide down the path to destabilization and 
ultimately violence. Thus, on the world stage, each side attempts to vie to be seen as 
occupying the position of the object and not the subject as it relates to the origin of the 
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dispute. This could escalate into all-out war if parties perceive the other’s use of provocation 
becoming more and more threatening, so one has to protect itself—even if that means 
preemptively striking in order to protect its interest. Again, to be the provocateur means to 
be the instigator. Consequently, if the nature of the relationship between two countries is 
antagonistic with a real danger of war breaking out, the party that is defined as the initiator 
or aggressor will likely be held primarily responsible for the original provocation and thus, 
for practical purposes, starting the war. Regardless of how the terms are viewed by the third-
party countries—or, in terms of provocation, the incidental audience—each of the two 
countries directly involved—at least in real-time as opposed to historical hindsight, which is 
largely dependent upon the outcome, if it were to descend into war—never identifies itself 
as the originator but continue to cast the other as the subject. 
 An example of this is the reason for the United States changing its Department of 
War to the Department of Defense. Doing so is an attempt to help frame the appropriate 
course of action—the initial one being a “reaction,” on its assessment—as one favorable to 
all stakeholders as (most) appropriate, in a similar way to Aristotle’s analysis of contentious 
relations; Aristotle observes in his Nicomachean Ethics:
[I]t is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the 
middle...anyone can get angry—that is easy...but to do this to the right person, to 
the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is 
not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and 
noble. (NE 45)
 Before identifying current examples, I believe it is helpful to provide context for how 
long two conflicting sides try to define the opponent as predator who is guilty of committing 
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that first act of provocation. As Plato records it in the Apology dialogue, at his trial, Socrates 
tries to convince the jurors that his accuser, Meletus, “is a...selfish bully, and has brought this 
action against [him] out of sheer wanton [unprovoked] aggressiveness” (A 13). In making use 
of the language of provocation, Socrates intends to present himself as the victim. Implicit in 
this assertion is that it is illogical for Socrates to be the defendant—and thus guilty—of a 
crime when, on his account of the so-called criminal incident, Meletus was the true 
perpetrator. But when Socrates fails to persuade a jury of his earthy peers, he, in true 
definitional form of provocation—in that the OED includes “provocation” to also mean a 
“request...to a higher authority”—invokes an authority superior to them, as to the legitimacy 
of his conduct. In effect, Socrates is stripping them of any claim to legitimacy—on his 
ranking—for the guilty verdict. It is also an implicit attack on the democratic jurors 
themselves, in that he turns the trial on them, chiding the jurors for allowing the prosecutors, 
Meletus (and Anytus), to rile them to so much anger—the kind Aristotle describes as 
“[a]nger [which] seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it...[and] though 
it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge” (NE 173)—whose implication 
is for (democratic) Athens, in his words, a misuse of “the gift of God” that Socrates, on the 
authority of the oracle, believes himself to be to his fellow Athenians. He adds, “If you put 
me to death, you will not easily find anyone to take my place. It is literally true, even if it 
sounds rather comical, that God has specially appointed me to this city” (A 16).
 In sum—as I jump two and half millennia to the contemporary world whose examples 
of provocation remain strikingly similar to Greek antiquity—Socrates and his opposers 
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sought to characterize the other as the provocateur once the stakes became perceptually 
severe enough to warrant a capital charge. Similarly, today—in that a declaration of war is, in 
a sense, a capital charge on a mass level—those engaged in a war of words compete to 
“win” the argument of successfully defining the opponent as the aggressor and originator of 
that first provocation, regardless of which side shot first. Again, not until a treaty signing 
ceremony, anyway, will the two formally agree as to what that initial provocation was, thus 
each operating as the object of the other’s provocative act, even if it were seemingly an 
unrelated and distant event or phenomena, thus providing the opportunity to appeal to 
some other—a higher, more legitimate—arbiter, whose sense of fairness, equity and justice, 
corroborates its respective narrative about the (more) truthful chain of reactions provoked 
proceeded from the actual historical record—and on the authority of, as often is the case, 
God or Duty or Morality.
Provocation on the International Stage: 9/11 and the “Axis of Evil”
 On September 11, 2001, members of al-Qaeda hijacked four passenger planes and 
flew them into each of the two World Trade Center Towers in lower Manhattan, the side of 
the CIA headquarters just outside Washington, DC and into a field in Pennsylvania, killing 
more than 3,000 innocent civilians. In a world where no one can agree on much, everyone 
would—and has come to—agree that the world would no longer be the same after that day. 
However, the consensus seems to have ended on that one point. The September 11 attacks 
were certainly an act of provocation orchestrated by the al-Qaeda network’s leader, Osama 
bin Ladin, a Saudi man running the terrorist organization in Afghanistan.
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 Along with his supporters and sympathizers, bin Laden cheered the success of the 
attack as a battle victory in a jihad they, unbeknownst to most Americans, had been fighting 
for many, many years. To their minds, it was a victory for them and for their radical brand of 
Islamic fundamentalism. The organization al-Qaeda claimed the attack was not the start of a 
war against the West but a response for an American military presence on Muslim holy land. 
For America, however, it was an unprovoked act of aggression made by religious zealots 
who have twisted the meaning of the Q’ran. A single scriptural passage can be interpreted 
wholly opposite whose meaning is one side’s “good” and the other’s “evil.” The ideological 
adversaries, like the West and organizations such as al-Qaeda, do not agree on the nature of 
the origin of their antagonistic relationship, which has escalated into a global, never-ending 
war between paradoxically opposing views of and for humanity.
 In the following weeks, the U.S. declared war, a war on terror that would be fought 
preemptively on enemy soil, and quickly invaded Afghanistan where the Taliban had been 
harboring al-Qaeda. Therefore, from the span of the early 1980s, when the U.S. supported 
bin Ladin’s resistance of the Soviet Union’s expansion into Afghanistan, the relationship 
devolved into being mortal enemies. The relationship, which began as one of convenience, 
soured into one of theoretical difference marked by figurative provocations and eventually 
descended into literal combat, each side claiming moral authority, casting themselves as the 
allies of what is Right, morally. 
 With the war in Afghanistan and the broader war on terror as the backdrop for the 
January 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush vowed to use all of the 
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U.S.’s military might to win this new war that had no official sponsorship of a traditional 
regime whose borders were defined. President Bush did, however, name three countries 
that the American government deemed to be state-sponsors of those terror networks whose 
headquarters were not in capitols but in caves. The nations were Iraq, Iran and North Korea
—and were dubbed the “Axis of Evil,” as their unelected and thus “illegitimate” leaders 
were provocateurs, not only in their own countries (Iraqi aggressor Saddam Hussein used 
chemical weapons on the Kurds in northern Iraq, for instance) but also on the world stage. 
Now, the world has become the battlefield on which America and its allies are fighting 
terror. As such, later in 2002, after presenting the international community with evidence of 
Hussein’s stock piling of “weapons of mass destruction,” which was a violation of 
international policy—America-led forces, provoked by Hussein’s non-compliance with UN 
inspectors, invaded Iraq, quickly toppling the regime. Hussein’s rule—and life—ended by 
public hanging after being dragged out of muddy hole and dragged into court.
 The stakes over the war on terror had reached new heights, and the two other 
“Axes”—North Korea and Iran—who watched Hussein fall so rapidly, took notice. Also, as 
Pakistan had shown by becoming a nuclear power, would-be invaders could not be so easily 
inclined to go to war. That is, possessing a nuclear weapon, in fact, lowers the stakes, in a 
certain sense, from the perspective of a North Korea or Iran, in that second-strike capability 
makes destruction mutually assured. The problem, however, is that acquiring the technology 
is an illegal project, one that would certainly provoke some kind of response, including 
preemptive military attack. However, for a nation such as North Korea, the calculation has 
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been made that becoming capable of launching a nuclear-armed weapon is worth the 
potential cost of decimation militarily and worth withstanding the already-induced economic 
pains of sanctions.
 Therefore, in terms of this escalating feud in which the subject and object have not 
been agreed upon but the participants have been, in this case, the U.S. and North Korea, I 
want to highlight a point at which this relationship has not reached the level Iraq did. It is 
worth pinpointing, in that, as Nietzsche said of Socrates, which applies here, I believe, 
Socrates was a buffoon who got himself taken seriously. That is, I am not suggesting the 
leader of North Korea to be a buffoon, but his acts of provocation, as deemed by the U.S. 
and much of the international community, to have been mirth-like but are now increasingly 
being viewed as more and more threatening, which will, in terms of provocation, require a 
different, more serious response, potentially. 
 Since the mid-2000s, North Korea has defied the orders of the international 
community, and has tested missiles by launching them into the adjacent bodies of water. 
Upon their notification, these tests have been repeatedly described as “provocations.” 
Although they have become more successful in the launches, they often failed—the missiles 
misfiring and plopping into the Sea of Japan. The world—not necessarily governments but 
commentators and expert analysts—scoffed at North Korea’s failings, ridiculing them, 
shrugging them off as a first-order or top-rate country. That view has changed and is 
changing. North Korea is becoming more successful and increasingly defiant, so the world 
has and will continue to react to such “provocations” differently, as they feel more 
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threatened. On such matters, Aristotle writes about the use of provocation, as it goes from 
words to acts:
[T]he very indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible 
thing itself is close at hand; the approach of what is terrible is just what we mean by 
‘danger.’  Such indications are the enmity and anger of people who have power to 
do something to us... Also outraged virtue in possession of power; for it is plain 
that, when outraged, it also has the will to retaliate, and now it has the power to do 
so. Also fear felt by those who have the power to do something to us, since such 
persons are sure to be ready to do it.  And since most men tend to be bad—slaves 
to greed, and cowards in danger-—it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another 
man’s mercy. (Rh 1388)
 And as with North Korea, the situation with Iran is fluid. As it changes, so too will the 
nature of the characterization of each other’s words and behaviors evolve, replacing a more 
dismissive tone—one which Athens spoke in about Socrates in the beginning—with a more 
serious one that requires physical coercion. However, from a contemporary American point 
of view, not all relationships based on provocation happen between countries, they can be 
internal, as well. I now turn to identifying some contemporaneous examples in which 
America has internally encountered and responded to American citizens as provocateurs.
 Cases of Provocation in Contemporary America: Edward Snowden
 In May 2013, 29-year-old American contract employee for the U.S. National Security 
Agency, Edward Snowden, downloaded classified documents, and leaked the secret files to, 
most notably, American journalist, Glenn Greenwald of the British newspaper, The Guardian, 
who, in turn, published and made public a covert program that collects information about 
Americans’ phone use, known as meta-data. The meta-data—or, data of data—is supposed 
to collect the data and feed it into a sophisticated algorithm in order to identify and then 
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thwart terrorist-planning activities. It also, however, tracks calls’ numbers and 
durations ,although it does not record the conversations. 
 Immediately after leaking the contents of the NSA program among an unknown 
number of additional secret programs, Snowden fled the country, afraid—and rightfully so—
of being accused of espionage, which many politicians (including both chambers’ 
Intelligence Committees’ chairs, Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein and Republican 
Representative Mike Rogers) have, in fact, have called him a traitor. Others politicians 
(probably most notably, 2016 likely presidential hopeful and libertarian-leaning Republic 
Senator Rand Paul), meanwhile, herald him as a civil liberties champion and American 
patriot. To further complicate matters, after fleeing, Snowden ended up in Moscow, where 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has granted him temporary asylum. From Russia, he 
continues to speak, even delivering a controversial Christmas day message on British 
television, the same segment that, for instance, former Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, who previously called for Israel’s elimination from the map, delivered a 
message on another matter. After his appearance there, even those commentators initially 
sympathetic to Snowden began referring to him as a narcissist and a provocateur—with that 
negative connotation. It is reminiscent of the type of reaction Jean-Jacques Rousseau often 
received; that is, his narcissism began overshadowing the substantive message that brought 
him to public attention.
 The vast majority agree that Snowden’s, who came in second to the newly-elected 
Pope, Francis, as Time’s 2013 Person of the Year, rise to notary is owed to his provocative 
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act of releasing his government’s secret surveillance program, which included spying not 
only on targeted, would-be terrorists but also on world leaders (e.g., German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel) and average Americans, as well. In terms of provocation, the question is 
what kind of provocateur is he: Is he a traitor who put at risk the safety of his fellow 
American citizens by tipping off terrorist planners or a true patriot who in revealing 
government overreach protects our constitutionally protected civil liberties? The answer 
depends, in part, on what one accepts as the original act of provocation that now defines 
the contentious relationship between the U.S. Government and Edward Snowden—and, by 
extension, all Americans and even the international community. In addition, where one plots 
that original provocation provides a clear signal as to which deeply cherished American 
value one holds dearer, both of which, however, are grounded in securing the protection of 
its citizens—that is, being protected from terrorists or from governmental tyranny, the latter 
of which is in large measure the reason for the existence of America in the first place.
 Therefore, if one were to argue that Snowden—who justifiably circumvented 
“whistle-blower” laws—revealed (whose uses are associated with a positive form of 
provocation’s function) “unAmerican” intrusions into the constitutionally protected privacy of 
American citizens by the government, which, in turn, warrants his act as one, ironically, being 
imposed on him by the government, Snowden becomes identified as the object, thus 
making the government the subject, or aggressor. For those who fall into this category—
who prioritize the Constitutionally protected right to privacy—the original act of provocation 
is the program itself. Also, the point at which the relationship, defined as one of 
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provocation, started between the Government and Snowden (as representative of the whole 
population)—although unbeknownst to everyone until May 2013—is the effective date the 
program came online. However, for those who prefer national security over privacy 
concerns, as that is the necessary cost for fighting the war on terror—the theft of the secret 
program with the intent to protect Americans represents the act of a traitor, subject to 
prosecution for endangering America, which is among the top, if it is not the highest, duties 
of the Executive Branch.
 The task of answering the following question cannot be completed here, but it is 
worth asking, as Socrates and the others posed it long before Snowden. From his refuge in 
Russia—no haven for the protection of free speech—Snowden appeals to a different 
standard than do his detractors. Those in the Snowden camp continue to defend the leaks 
as certainly a provocative act but a positive one made by a loyal American patriot who 
values his “duty” to fight for the protection of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties 
which trump any “inferior” laws made to undermine the core freedoms that make America, 
America, as defined on his terms. Those whose duty it is to protect the country from 
physical harm see the terms of duty differently from Snowden, as Athens did with Socrates, 
who at his trial made the case for having conducted himself dutifully: “From that time on I 
interviewed one person after another.  I realized with distress and alarm that I was making 
myself unpopular, but I felt compelled to put my religious duty first...[as] I was trying to find 
out the meaning of the oracle” (A 8). Before, however, Socrates prefaced with the following 
statement, attempting to set the most favorable terms for proceeding, and foreshadows this 
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continued struggle over who ought to have rightful proprietorship over what terms and 
concepts and thus the meaning and associated behaviors that are grounded in their appeal. 
Socrates asks the jury to look beyond his speech:
One thing, however, I do most earnestly beg and entreat of you. If you hear me 
defending myself in the same language which it has been my habit to use, both in 
the open spaces of this city—where many of you have heard me—and elsewhere, 
do not be surprised...so I am a complete stranger to the language of this place. 
Now if I were really from another country, you would naturally excuse me if I spoke 
in the manner and dialect in which I had been brought up, and so in the present 
case I make this request of you, which I think is only reasonable, to disregard the 
manner of my speech...and to consider and concentrate your attention upon this 
one question, whether my claims are fair or not.  That is the first duty of the juryman, 
just as it is the pleader’s duty to speak the truth. (A 4)
 In a real and functioning democracy, I maintain—a regime fairer than any other—
what counts as fair requires the consultation and maintenance of an informed and engaged 
citizenry in defining its language and then implementing its meaning through sound public 
policies, ones in which the specific contexts are endorsements of a shared vernacular that 
made it impossible for Socrates and democratic Athens to find a common language from 
which to have an honest and good-faith debate about already-agreed upon terms like 
fairness and duty. For the distribution of justice that is fair and legitimate to be sustained—
and to always be striving for improvement—the political culture must continually foster a 
rightly provokable citizen-disposition that cannot be lulled into a state of politically 
misanthropic disinterest or be riled into a fury of predatory majoritarian anxiousness. 
Intellectually speaking, I argue, democratic pluralism has won the position of privilege when 
postulating theoretical assumptions about just political formulations. Plato, Rousseau and 
Nietzsche continue to stay relevant because reading them still forces us to grapple with how 
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to be rightly provokable when confronting and being confronted by injustices—for 
otherwise, we become Aristotle’s negative-example: “those who are not angry at the things 
they should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the 
right way, at the right time, or with the right persons” (NE 97).  Let us develop our capacity 
for recognizing the rhetoric of provocation and (re)act appropriately, and work toward 
eliminating all instances of humiliation and cruelty.
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 I devise a theoretical model that provides an interpretive framework to define and 
describe the concept of provocation as well as to analyze and explain the theoretical 
provocations in Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche’s works. I assess their 
works as well as a wide-ranging body of scholarship both on the concept and the theorists, 
to show that—despite Plato, Rousseau and Nietzsche’s many peculiarities both in terms of 
their lives and works—the three separate theoretical projects similarly use the conceptual 
language of provocation as an integral part of an overall rhetorical strategy to articulate their 
philosophical systems as ones of provocation themselves in order to theorize a new—and 
superior—conception of personhood and politics. In addition, I argue that interpreting 
political provocation through such a methodological framework has relevant applicability 
extending beyond theory to real-life provocateurs and events whose developments and 
outcomes are politically consequential, particularly with respect to helping equip citizens 
with their democratic responsibilities.
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